Nov 19, 2007

Transcribed Minutes from Today's All Hands RIF Meeting

This is the detailed plan that follows the NNSA call for a Workforce Restructuring Plan following the general plan submission on September 20th. In this site-specific plan, there are a number of driving issues:
  • Flattened budget
  • June ’06 began substantially extra costs to absorb due to structure of the new contract at LANL
  • Last year we took aggressive action to deal with those extra costs which helped us get through FY07 although this has reduced the normal flexibility that used to be available to address budget concerns
  • Unusually large uncertainty around the budget for this and future years
  • Continuing Resolution is at FY07 level which may look well on paper but does not portend what the budget will really end up being for FY08 and out years
  • Over the last 2 years we have had extremely low turnover (attrition) in the Lab

Due to these points, there aren’t many options to deal with the budget issues however we are working to protect the long-term well being. The vitality of the institution to carry out the mission now and in the future is my (Anastasio’s) responsibility.

Objectives:

  • Reduce workforce by 500-750 employees – 6-9% of the workforce, applies across the Lab and at all levels from entry level and management
and to ensure that we
  • Don’t allow there to be any compromise of the safety and security of the Lab


Conforming to the 3161 process, this action will be done in three phases:

  1. Self-selection program
    1. Minimize the need for a potential involuntary separation (Phase 2 or 3)
    2. Employees (LANS) who are eligible can volunteer to separate

i. Full time or part time employee, at least 50% time

ii. At Lab for 1 full year at least

iii. Willing to accept terms & conditions of self-select program

1. Not successful for any enhanced incentive

2. This will be the only opportunity to voluntarily separate with financial benefits – there will be no other opportunity (this is the best and only opportunity)

3. Will receive benefits for either voluntary or involuntary separation

a. Monetary (severance benefit) x yrs of svc

b. Continuation of medical benefits for defined period of time

iv. Not Eligible:

1. submitted resignation

2. limited term employee

3. Under grad or other student

4. apprentice or other training program participant

5. in process of being terminated for cause

6. Necessary employee

We must ensure that we maintain the right skills and expertise in order to fulfill our current and future missions. Some employees will not be permitted to apply; employees in those job classifications will be notified following NNSA’s approval of the plan. In addition, Lab management will review each individual application in order to accept or deny based on:

· An employee separation will interfere with meeting key deliverables

· An employee has demonstrated performance in attracting large grants/funding that support critical missions

· An employee has special clearances or skills that contribute to key missions

Employees will be notified of their eligibility (or ineligibility) following NNSA’s approval. Communication will be given via meetings, mailings, etc.

Schedule:

If approval happens this week:

Announce today 11/19/07

Application period 2 wks 11/26 – 12/5/07

Employee Rescission 12/6/ - 12/10/07

Approval Process 12/11/- 12/19/07

Employees notified 12/20/07

Employees depart 1/10/08

After applications, notification of receipt of application, assess where we are at – looking at workforce that remains (flexible workforce, realignment) to conclude Phase 1.

2. Phase 2 will be addressed following conclusion of Phase 1.

Based on skills mix requirement and budget information, a decision will be made whether there will be a need for an involuntary reduction that would be Phase 2. It will follow quickly after the conclusion of Phase 1. The eligibility criteria will be the same as Phase 1 (for a period of 12 months, if initially denied in Phase 1).

We will be working in parallel on the details for Phase 2 as we go through Phase 1. Issues such as criticality of that person’s position, skills, documented employee performance, sustained …… There will be further communications, including all-hands meetings such as today’s meeting. We will hope to have more clarity regarding budget issues which will allow consideration and planning for a Phase 3 which would be a subsequent reduction if that should be necessary.

Q&A From Today's All Hands RIF Meeting

Sent in by a reader.

-Gus

_________________________________________

Q & A:

Q: What if more than your target numbers of people apply?
Anastasio’s Answer: There is a cap of 750 people. We looked at job classifications to exclude as well as those that are targeted by numbers of jobs targeted in specific job classifications. If we get a thousand people that apply, we won’t accept all of them because (the reason) this action is not in response to the FY08 budget because if you look at the severance package, we are looking at setting up the viability of LANL over the longer term. We don’t have a budget that we’re responding to.

Q: You mention the defense authorization Act, are you going honor preference in hiring?
A: Yes, prior to ’91.

Q: If they qualify for the 39 wks severance pay, will there be a tax on it?
A: Will there be another voluntary/involuntary in FY09? I don’t see that happening – not with a ‘voluntary self-selection’. If we have budget drivers that require similar action, I do not see it including a voluntary opportunity with severance/benefit package in the future. There may be future

Q: Will the 120 day count be honored? With workshop fairs or other efforts to help people involved in the layoff?
A: All the necessary days have been accounted for in our current process & schedule.

Q: There is some confusion between amendment #11 which specifies service credit and the Admin manual regarding RIFs where TCP1 & TCP2 are concerned. Are they both going to be treated the same?
A: The accrual of service that goes toward your service will be the same.

Q: In the amendment said TCP2 wouldn’t accrue for the purpose of severance credit.
A: If you came across, it will accrue toward severance. The policy has recently been changed

Q: Will there be any prohibition on people coming back (as a guest scientist) to assist with transition
A: if an individual self-selects and then applies to come back, line management would assess whether that individual would be allowed to return on a guest status.

Q: There will be no difference between Self-select and involuntary in severance or benefits? Have you considered that the voluntary self-select because for those nearing retirement may not be very attractive.
A: we tried to get an enhancement but that was not approved. There is now policy (at DOE) that prohibits enhancements. Have we considered what we would do if we don’t get the numbers we need in Phase 1-SSP? Sure, that’s why there’s Phase 2 and Phase 3.

Q: For indiv who fully retired and came back (double dippers), is the calculation 1 yr service or the full time of their years?
A: The full number of years. If you entered LANS and took TCP2, you would get the full number of years of service to calculate severance.

Q: If someone applies for the SSP and they’re denied, is there an appeal process open to them?
A: I don’t think so because this is a self-selection which you can do any time but if you want to get the benefit of the severance and benefits, that’s a management’s determination.

Q: How uniformly is that going to be applied, if you are denied but not in an ineligible job classification.
A: We have a process that will address each application and we hope to be fair in every step.

Q: [couldn’t hear question]
A: Sure, the whole lab went through scrutiny to look at job classifications and determine what would skills 7-8% of the people are in excluded categories which are also jobs for which we are still hiring.

Q: [couldn’t hear question]
A: In the schedule, mid-December we will get the info on how many people have applied on the SSP. That would begin to give me prelim info on whether we would need to go to Phase 2. The earliest we feel that would be determined would be the end of Jan which would put the end point near the end of March.

Q: Do you know if SSP affects unemployment benefits?
A: If someone chooses to self-select, we’ll treat them as if it was a RIF so we’ll notify the State (of NM) that this is a RIF. The State then determines whether those individuals would be eligible for Unemployment benefits. This is a self-selection in an involuntary action so we see it as involuntarily being let go.

Q: Will the SSP include sick leave? Will we lose that accrued sick time?
A: Lose, yes you’ll lose that sick time.

Q: If we SSP, what is the health insurance time frame?
A: You’ll have med coverage for several years (the same as you have now) but you will have to contribute more and more of the institution’s premium to keep the coverage through 3 calendar years.

Q: After 39 weeks, you’ll continue to get it for the rest of the calendar year?
A: 12 months from the date of termination with the cost paid for you. Then in years 2 and 3, you’ll pay more of the premium.

Q: For Phase 2, the involuntary part. Will it be considered uniformly across the Lab w/o deference to Lab mission?
A: No. The mission of the Lab is still a prime consideration. I said that the program

Q: is there an involuntary severance package and is it different from the voluntary severance package?
A: This is a self-select into an involuntary program so an employee can self-select themselves to be involuntarily removed. So, in that context, there is no difference in the severance package between the SSP and the Phase 2 involuntary selection.

Q: Is there an incentive to self select?
A: If you’re thinking of retiring and are waiting for a good deal, this is it. You know you’re in control subject to not being excluded or denied and you’ll know you’re not going to be RIF’d.

Q: Under the notional schedule and one chooses to self-select and depart Jan 10th, when do they get paid the severance package?
A: I think it’s two weeks following the departure date (Jan 10)

Q: List of critical skills (~ 7%) be published or avail to mgrs so we can get started working on our next option?
A: Two things: first, there’s a set of job classifications that your mgmt was involved in excluding when this gets approved we’ll notify you what job classifications you were in. Two, if you’re eligible, if you’re not in the excluded job classifications, you can decide whether or not to apply which will then begin the determination of whether you’re accepted.

Q: If Phase 2 becomes necessary, the notification is end of Jan and separation is end of March?
A: Yes, that’s the optimistic schedule. I don’t think it could go faster than that but

Q: You mentioned sending out email to eligible or affected employees, will that include our job classifications?
A: We won’t include that in the email but you would be able to log in and find that information. You also have a benefits rep in your line org that has that info.

Q: Are there any restrictions on employment at other Labs or at DOE?
A: You will be restricted from working at another site for 12 months if you self-select. If you are selected under the involuntary, there is no restriction.

Q: So I understand the RIF is not going to save money for FY08, what IS going to save $ for FY08?
A: In the time frame we have, there is not a lot more leverage from the things we’ve already done by enhancing opportunities to bring $ into the Lab along with the changes we’ve already done.

Q: What’s the magic number in dollars that equates to the 500-750 people and that number is used to calc the funding needs to avoid phase 2.
A: $100M for a year. The objective for the plan is 500-750 people. If we get a budget that requires it, more would go in future actions (Phase 2 and 3).

Q: Will the people get paid Unemployment Benefits? What is the percentage that you will tax on the severance package?
A: The Lab will treat you the same whether you will have Unemployment Benefits. We also don’t tax you, the State taxes you. We may withhold 30%.

Q: 120 days, 60 days – what are the notification dates that apply now?
A: For a self-selection program, the 120 days are built into the schedule I showed earlier including the earlier plan submittal. The 120-day clock started when the general plan was submitted. The involuntary plan will provide 60 day notification.

Q: Will the contractors be included in the 750 number?
A: We’ll go through phase 1 process which includes LANS employees. We’ll look at how many people apply and are accepted. We’ll look at the people and their skills and expertise and look at the flexible workforce and realign where necessary. Contractors are not part of the self-select process but are under different conditions.

Q: In the memo that was sent mentioned performance and seniority will be considered. You now mentioned bringing in funding.
A: I don’t recall any memo that mentioned performance and seniority but we don’t have a plan approved yet but we’ll look at how these things overlay and indicate your contribution to the Lab.

Q: You mentioned a change in policy, can I get a clarification? The SSP person couldn’t be hired back for 12 months but in the past it was the length of your severance package calculation.
A: It’s 12 months, not calculated on the number of weeks used to calculate severance pay.

Q: You made a comment about this severance package being generous are we under pressure to reduce that?
A: We will be under pressure to align those benefits across DOE, but the accrual you already have, it may be that you could keep the 30 weeks (for example) but not be able to accrue more than the cap. I can’t guarantee anything, but that DOE is looking at.

Q: Can you tell me if group management will have input in the Phase 2 decision-making.
A: The person deciding if we have Phase 2 is me. If we have individuals to decide upon, your line management would be involved but it would include all managers across the lab to ensure fairness.

Q: The 60 day notification - is that individual or group notification, a clarification?
A: The group notification has been done.

Q: Would management do ‘pay in lieu of notice’ for those that don’t want to stay the 60 days?
A: That may be possible.

Q: For the people who opt for SSP, does that include the non-weapons labs like SLAC?
A: Yes.

Q: For the people who are participating in the 401K are we permitted to participate for the 39 weeks.
A: No. Your participation ends at termination date. Severance is a cash payout based on your years of service, that’s not pay in lieu of service so it’s not compensation for time.

Q: In the category of people who weren’t eligible for SSP, there was also the listing of limited term, post docs, etc. Does that mean later on in Phase 2, will those same categories be excluded?
A: We have a 3-phased process for the 3161 process we’re under. But after we see the people who get accepted in the SSP, I’ll stop, pause and do an assessment of the flexible workforce and determine if we need to do an independent action that may or may not include those who were ineligible in this 3161 action. Limited term and post docs are under different condition of employment and thus can be subject to action outside the 3161 conditions.

Q: Could you summarize what is meant by flexible workforce?
A: Not post-docs but limited term and other available work force.

Q: If an organization has a high number of SSP people, would they be less likely to have Phase 2 impacts?
A: were doing this lab-wide so we’re looking at what the needs will be lab-wide. The places we look will be lab-wide while the program will be implemented through individuals.

Q: Will people be able to retire under either scenario?
A: Yes and also retire outside of the two scenarios described as well.

Q: For people who apply in the SSP but find a job, will they be penalized for not being present for the Jan 10 date?
A: If you apply and get accepted, and you get a job elsewhere. Do you have to stay employed until January 10th? We’ll have to review that and determine what applies or work with you to find the ‘best solution’.

Q: What is your ‘best estimate’ of how many you will actually see in the SSP?
A: What is YOUR best estimate? I don’t think I know this work force well enough to predict that outcome.

Q: Do you get paid for vacation or do you lose vacation?
A: You get paid for vacation but not sick leave.

Q: The term “Job classification” came up frequently. What does that mean?
A: The Common Occupational Classification System isn’t routinely used here but we have now applied it per the plan submittal specs. When we get approval, you will be able to log in and see your COCS number and the number of jobs that fall into those categories (and the target numbers, I think he said).

Q: Could we clarify the comment about losing sick leave? Service credit related.
A: it does get calculated in the service credit for retirement under TCP1 only.

Q: There was an educational grant in the earlier RIF, will that be part of this offer?
A: The answer is that we’re working with the State to see if they’ve offered to provide some help but that would only

Q: I would like LANS to take the initiative to ask the State if they will treat the SSP folks if they would qualify for Unemployment.
A: We can ask but we may not get a definitive answer. But, we can ask. Yes.

Post November 19 RIF News

It's past time for a new RIF news post, so we'll start the new one here:

*** Meeting Has FINALLY been announced. ***

LANS waited until Friday to announce a All-Hands RIF meeting scheduled for next Monday and from the sound of it, I doubt there will be any important information released at this meeting. Sounds like things are not going well in the negotiations with DOE. Rumor is that DOE wants any voluntary package to come out of the $79 million profit fee that LANS receives. And what are the chances of that? Probably slim to none. It's looking like this RIF is going to be largely involuntary and very painful.


To/MS: LANL-ALL
From/MS: Jan A. Van Prooyen, A100
Phone/Fax: 7-5101/7-2997
Symbol: DIR-07-297
Date: November 15, 2007

SUBJECT: Update on Workforce Restructuring
All-Employee Meeting­November 19, 2007

I want to take the opportunity to update you on the most recent
activity related to the Workforce Restructuring efforts. LANL
has been in communications with the Department of Energy (DOE) to
finalize our Specific Workforce Restructuring Plan and secure
approval for implementation. On Friday, November 9, 2007, we
officially submitted the Specific Workforce Plan to DOE.

The Director will hold an All Employee meeting on Monday,
November 19, 2007, in the NSSB auditorium beginning at 1:15 p.m.
to provide you with an update on our efforts. We look forward to
meeting with you at that time.

LLNS, LLC - "Flex Term" Notification Letter

November 15,2007

Dear Laboratory Employee,

This letter serves to notify you that Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC plans to implement a reduction in force. This notice is required under the Federal and State WARN Acts (Worker Adjustment and Retraining Act and California Labor Code, Section 1400, et seq.) requiring at least 60 days notice if there is a reasonable possibility that more than 50 employees may be released within a 30-day period. All flexible term employees are receiving this notice.

The Laboratory currently employs approximately 1100 flexible term employees. Approximately 25 percent of those employees must be released in order to meet anticipated budget shortfalls. As a flexible term employee, you may be impacted by this planned reduction. We expect to complete these reductions by January 31, 2008 and that this will be a permanent release. Affected employees will not have the right to "bump" employees who have less seniority. At the present time, we are determining the job classifications and number of employees within each job classification who will be affected. We will notify individuals who are to be released no later than mid-January.

In the event fewer than 50 employees are released within a 30-day period, you may be notified earlier than mid-December and released prior to January 31. If you are actually released, you will be receiving a separate notification from Strategic Human Capital Management in accordance with Laboratory policy.

Enclosed is a list of internal and external resources you may find helpful. All of these resources are currently available to you.

We truly regret that this workforce restructuring is necessary. If you have any questions, please contact Robert Perko at (925) 422-9501.

Sincerely,



Tamara E. Jernigan
Associate Director
Strategic Human Capital Management
Enclosure


The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy

By HAROLD BROWN AND JOHN DEUTCH
November 19, 2007; Page A19

The end of the Cold War changed "the balance of nuclear terror," and with it the centrality of nuclear forces in U.S. security strategy. In consequence, some politicians and analysts, including several former senior foreign policy officials who wrote on this page, want to make the complete elimination of nuclear weapons a principal U.S. foreign policy goal -- as a practical means of mobilizing more resolute international action to combat the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to discourage their possession and use.

We agree that the strongest possible measures must be taken to inhibit the acquisition of and roll back the possession of nuclear weapons. However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.

A nation that wishes to acquire nuclear weapons believes these weapons will improve its security. The declaration by the U.S. that it will move to eliminate nuclear weapons in a distant future will have no direct effect on changing this calculus. Indeed, nothing that the U.S. does to its nuclear posture will directly influence such a nation's (let alone a terrorist group's) calculus.

Whatever their other merits (and they are significant), it is difficult to argue that a comprehensive test ban treaty, a "no first use" declaration by the U.S., a dramatic reduction in the number of deployed or total nuclear weapons in our stockpile, an end to the production of fissionable material will convince North Korea, Iran, India, Pakistan or Israel to give up their nuclear weapons programs.

True enough, the U.S. ratified the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, whose Article Six states: "Each of the parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

No one suggests abandoning the hope embodied in such a well-intentioned statement. However, hope is not a policy, and, at present, there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons.

One cannot, for example, make the scientific knowledge and technological know-how that make nuclear weapons possible disappear. Proliferating states, even if they abandoned these devices under resolute international pressure, would still be able to clandestinely retain a few of their existing weapons -- or maintain a standby, break-out capability to acquire a few weapons quickly, if needed.

So long as serious political differences exist between nations and peoples, and given that the possibility of nuclear weapons exists, the U.S. should have nuclear weapons to deter potential opponents and to avoid intimidation by other states seeking a capability of weapons of mass destruction. In any case, even in the absence of overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, the great predominance of U.S. conventional forces would remain a strong motive for aspiring states to seek nuclear weapons.

So what is to be done?

It is possible to slow the spread of nuclear weapons. In the 1970s, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Argentina were convinced to abandon their weapons programs. In the 1990s, South Africa voluntarily dismantled its nuclear weapons after apartheid.

During the first Clinton administration, the U.S. successfully persuaded governments of the former Soviet Union to transfer their nuclear weapons to the new Russian state. During the present Bush administration, Libya renounced its nuclear program. In each case, these successes came about by the combined application of the carrots and sticks of proliferation policy, and a change in the way a proliferating state perceived its security circumstances.

Given its predominant conventional weapons capability, the U.S. can safely reduce the total inventory of nuclear weapons to the lowest number needed for the purpose of deterrence. This number is likely to be considerably below the present stockpile of over 8,000 weapons. This reduction will harmonize nuclear weapons policy with our attempt to encourage nonproliferation elsewhere. Meanwhile, the U.S. should not propose or fund large-scale programs or initiatives that suggest new roles for nuclear weapons.

In sum, a significant reduction in the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile could be justified on the ground of cost, compared to the level needed for credible deterrence; however, the vision of zero nuclear weapons is neither necessary nor politically useful for making decisions on those reductions today.

Adopting an aspirational goal -- to eliminate nuclear weapons -- similarly risks obscuring the reasons pro and con for deciding other issues.

For decades, there's been a debate about the desirability of a universal and permanent comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB). Those favoring the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are unlikely to consider a compromise measure, such as a five-year renewable CTB.

Yet a compromise would likely attract political support in the U.S. Congress. It would also likely attract the support of many of the 44 nations listed in Article XIV of the NPT -- such as India, Israel and Pakistan -- that must become signatories before a test-ban treaty enters into force.

Here is another important issue. The Bush administration has proposed a Reliable Replacement Warhead program (RRW) to replace existing nuclear warheads with a new design. The RRW, it says, will facilitate reductions in the stockpile; permit confidence in the reliability, security and safety of weapons for the indefinite future; as well as maintain the design capability of the Department of Energy nuclear weapons laboratories. The RRW could lead to a design that is certified without testing, but that surely would be a subject of debate.

Whether this is a good idea or not, the decision should be made on the basis of the infrastructure needed to support the U.S. nuclear force structure and assure its reliability. It should not be decided on the basis of whether the RRW does or does not contribute to a distant and uncertain goal of a nuclear-free world.

There are several critical nonproliferation objectives that should be pursued, but they do not require any unattainable vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world to justify them. Supplier states, for one, should seek to control the transfer of fissile material and relevant technology, using the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Second: Building on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program, greater emphasis needs to be given to security of weapons and weapons-usable material, and not just in Russia. Third: Given the potential expansion of nuclear power around the world, it is urgent to put into place new means for controlling the aspects of the fuel cycle -- enrichment and fuel reprocessing -- that present the greatest proliferation risk.

Finally, the most important and difficult task is to change the underlying security circumstances that lead nations to seek nuclear weapons. To that end, direct negotiations involving positive incentives (economic, political and security arrangements) for states willing to abandon nuclear weapons aspirations, as well as cooperation with others to impose negative sanctions across an escalating spectrum on recalcitrant actors, are essential. These are concrete actions, analogous to the Marshall Plan, to take a historical example, not mere gestures like the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of 1928, which "outlawed war."

Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated. Foreign policy must be based on this reality; and the U.S. should work with other nations on those achievable objectives that lower the risks of the spread of nuclear weapons capability and the possibility of nuclear weapons use.

Mr. Brown, senior counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was secretary of defense in the Carter administration. Mr. Deutch is Institute professor of chemistry at MIT, and was director of Central Intelligence in the first Clinton administration.

Nov 18, 2007

Comment of the Week, Sunday Edition

One perspective, as provided by a pair of comments from the Post November 19 RIF News post.

Myself, I expect Anastasio on Monday to continue to soft-sell the prospects of a large number of upcoming RIFS. He's got nothing to lose by continuing to sound like the good guy in this business, and nothing to win by publicly acknowledging that the expected numbers could represent job loss for a significant fraction of the work force.

Regardless of the face that he puts on it, every passing day at current staffing levels under the current CR increases the number of RIFS that will be necessary if Congress funds LANL at a substantially lower budget this year, as is anticipated. The fact that LANS' annual award fee will be in no way affected by a large layoff at LANL pretty much guarantees that LANS will continue to be indifferent, at best, to any suggested approaches for reducing the impact of upcoming budget shortfalls.

Good luck,

-Gus

_______________________________________________________


You guys just don't seem to get it.

LANS has *no* desire to cut overhead.
They *want* to reduce staffing levels at LANL.
They *don't* want to encourage WFO.
They *do* want to gear up for production-scale pit fabrication.
LANS will *not* use any part of their annual award fee to fund a voluntary incentive program. - 10:47 PM

Yes, you are right. It's no longer about the science. Those days are over. It's only about the money to be made running this place. Or should I say, running this place into the ground. I get it now.

Nov 17, 2007

U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms

By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: November 18, 2007

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 — Over the past six years, the Bush administration has spent almost $100 million so far on a highly classified program to help Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s president, secure his country’s nuclear weapons, according to current and former senior administration officials.

But with the future of that country’s leadership in doubt, debate is intensifying about whether Washington has done enough to help protect the warheads and laboratories, and whether Pakistan’s reluctance to reveal critical details about its arsenal has undercut the effectiveness of the continuing security effort.

The aid, buried in secret portions of the federal budget, paid for the training of Pakistani personnel in the United States and the construction of a nuclear security training center in Pakistan, a facility that American officials say is nowhere near completion, even though it was supposed to be in operation this year.

A raft of equipment — from helicopters to night-vision goggles to nuclear detection equipment — was given to Pakistan to help secure its nuclear material, its warheads, and the laboratories that were the site of the worst known case of nuclear proliferation in the atomic age.

While American officials say that they believe the arsenal is safe at the moment, and that they take at face value Pakistani assurances that security is vastly improved, in many cases the Pakistani government has been reluctant to show American officials how or where the gear is actually used.

That is because the Pakistanis do not want to reveal the locations of their weapons or the amount or type of new bomb-grade fuel the country is now producing.

The American program was created after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when the Bush administration debated whether to share with Pakistan one of the crown jewels of American nuclear protection technology, known as “permissive action links,” or PALS, a system used to keep a weapon from detonating without proper codes and authorizations.

In the end, despite past federal aid to France and Russia on delicate points of nuclear security, the administration decided that it could not share the system with the Pakistanis because of legal restrictions.

In addition, the Pakistanis were suspicious that any American-made technology in their warheads could include a secret “kill switch,” enabling the Americans to turn off their weapons.

While many nuclear experts in the federal government favored offering the PALS system because they considered Pakistan’s arsenal among the world’s most vulnerable to terrorist groups, some administration officials feared that sharing the technology would teach Pakistan too much about American weaponry. The same concern kept the Clinton administration from sharing the technology with China in the early 1990s.

The New York Times has known details of the secret program for more than three years, based on interviews with a range of American officials and nuclear experts, some of whom were concerned that Pakistan’s arsenal remained vulnerable. The newspaper agreed to delay publication of the article after considering a request from the Bush administration, which argued that premature disclosure could hurt the effort to secure the weapons.

Since then, some elements of the program have been discussed in the Pakistani news media and in a presentation late last year by the leader of Pakistan’s nuclear safety effort, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, who acknowledged receiving “international” help as he sought to assure Washington that all of the holes in Pakistan’s nuclear security infrastructure had been sealed.

The Times told the administration last week that it was reopening its examination of the program in light of those disclosures and the current instability in Pakistan. Early this week, the White House withdrew its request that publication be withheld, though it was unwilling to discuss details of the program.

The secret program was designed by the Energy Department and the State Department, and it drew heavily from the effort over the past decade to secure nuclear weapons, stockpiles and materials in Russia and other former Soviet states. Much of the money for Pakistan was spent on physical security, like fencing and surveillance systems, and equipment for tracking nuclear material if it left secure areas.

But while Pakistan is formally considered a “major non-NATO ally,” the program has been hindered by a deep suspicion among Pakistan’s military that the secret goal of the United States was to gather intelligence about how to locate and, if necessary, disable Pakistan’s arsenal, which is the pride of the country.

“Everything has taken far longer than it should,” a former official involved in the program said in a recent interview, “and you are never sure what you really accomplished.”

In recent days, American officials have expressed confidence that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is well secured. “I don’t see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told a Pentagon news conference on Thursday.

Admiral Mullen’s carefully chosen words, a senior administration official said, were based on two separate intelligence assessments issued this month that had been summarized in briefings to Mr. Bush. Both concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was safe under current conditions, and one also looked at laboratories and came to the same conclusion.

Still, the Pakistani government’s reluctance to release information has limited efforts to assess the situation. In particular, some American experts say they have less ability to look into the nuclear laboratories where highly enriched uranium is produced — including the laboratory named for Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man who sold Pakistan’s nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

So far, the amount the United States has spent on the classified nuclear security program, less than $100 million, amounts to slightly less than one percent of the roughly $10 billion in known American aid to Pakistan since the Sept. 11 attacks. Most of that money has gone for assistance in counterterrorism activities against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

The debate over sharing nuclear security technology began just before then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was sent to Islamabad after the Sept. 11 attacks, as the United States was preparing to invade Afghanistan.

“There were a lot of people who feared that once we headed into Afghanistan, the Taliban would be looking for these weapons,” said a senior official who was involved. But a legal analysis found that aiding Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program — even if it was just with protective gear — would violate both international and American law.

General Musharraf, in his memoir, “In the Line of Fire,” published last year, did not discuss any equipment, training or technology offered then, but wrote: “We were put under immense pressure by the United States regarding our nuclear and missile arsenal. The Americans’ concerns were based on two grounds. First, at this time they were not very sure of my job security, and they dreaded the possibility that an extremist successor government might get its hands on our strategic nuclear arsenal. Second, they doubted our ability to safeguard our assets.”

General Musharraf was more specific in an interview two years ago for a Times documentary, “Nuclear Jihad: Can Terrorists Get the Bomb?” Asked about the equipment and training provided by Washington, he said, “Frankly, I really don’t know the details.” But he added: “This is an extremely sensitive matter in Pakistan. We don’t allow any foreign intrusion in our facilities. But, at the same time, we guarantee that the custodial arrangements that we brought about and implemented are already the best in the world.”

Now that concern about General Musharraf’s ability to remain in power has been rekindled, so has the debate inside and outside the Bush administration about how much the program accomplished, and what it left unaccomplished. A second phase of the program, which would provide more equipment, helicopters and safety devices, is already being discussed in the administration, but its dimensions have not been determined.

Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, which designed most of the United States’ nuclear arms, argued that recent federal reluctance to share warhead security technology was making the world more dangerous.

“Lawyers say it’s classified,” Dr. Agnew said in an interview. “That’s nonsense. We should share this technology. Anybody who joins the club should be helped to get this.”

“Whether it’s India or Pakistan or China or Iran,” he added, “the most important thing is that you want to make sure there is no unauthorized use. You want to make sure that the guys who have their hands on the weapons can’t use them without proper authorization.”

In the past, officials say, the United States has shared ideas — but not technologies — about how to make the safeguards that lie at the heart of American weapons security. The system hinges on what is essentially a switch in the firing circuit that requires the would-be user to enter a numeric code that starts a timer for the weapon’s arming and detonation.

Most switches disable themselves if the sequence of numbers entered turns out to be incorrect in a fixed number of tries, much like a bank ATM does. In some cases, the disabled link sets off a small explosion in the warhead to render it useless. Delicate design details involve how to bury the link deep inside a weapon to keep terrorists or enemies from disabling the safeguard.

The most famous case of nuclear idea sharing involves France. Starting in the early 1970s, the United States government began a series of highly secretive discussions with French scientists to help them improve the country’s warheads.

A potential impediment to such sharing was the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which bars cooperation between nations on weapons technology.

To get around such legal prohibitions, Washington came up with a system of “negative guidance,” sometimes called “20 questions,” as detailed in a 1989 article in Foreign Policy. The system let United States scientists listen to French descriptions of warhead approaches and give guidance about whether the French were on the right track.

Nuclear experts say sharing also took place after the cold war when the United States worried about the security of Russian nuclear arms and facilities. In that case, both countries declassified warhead information to expedite the transfer of safety and security information, according to federal nuclear scientists.

But in the case of China, which has possessed nuclear weapons since the 1960s and is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Clinton administration decided that sharing PALS would be too risky. Experts inside the administration feared the technology would improve the Chinese warheads, and could give the Chinese insights into how American systems worked.

Officials said Washington debated sharing security techniques with Pakistan on at least two occasions — right after it detonated its first nuclear arms in 1998, and after the terrorist attack on the United States in 2001.

The debates pitted atomic scientists who favored technical sharing against federal officials at such places as the State Department who ruled that the transfers were illegal under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and under United States law.

In the 1998 case, the Clinton administration still hoped it could roll back Pakistan’s nuclear program, forcing it to give up the weapons it had developed. That hope, never seen as very realistic, has been entirely given up by the Bush administration.

The nuclear proliferation conducted by Mr. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist who built a huge network to spread Pakistani technology, convinced the Pakistanis that they needed better protections.

“Among the places in the world that we have to make sure we have done the maximum we can do, Pakistan is at the top of the list,” said John E. McLaughlin, who served as deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency at the time, and played a crucial role in the intelligence collection that led to Mr. Khan’s downfall.

“I am confident of two things,” he added. “That the Pakistanis are very serious about securing this material, but also that someone in Pakistan is very intent on getting their hands on it.”

Nov 16, 2007


PU-239: A Powerful Look at Friendship, Fatherhood, and the Dangers of Loose Nukes

Posted November 16, 2007 | 05:23 PM (EST)


With Pakistan in turmoil, Iran pressing hard to join the nuclear club, Putin and Ahmadinejad acting like BFFs, and the annual scare announcement of al-Qaeda's plans to attack our holiday-packed malls, a terrifying portrayal of how easy it would be for nuclear material to make its way from a nuclear facility to the black market might not scream, "That's Entertainment!"

But PU-239, a taut, gripping new film premiering Saturday night on HBO manages to both terrify with its depiction of loose nukes, and touch with its heart-rending story of two fathers pushed to the edge -- willing to do almost anything to help save their families.

The film was written and directed by Scott Burns, one of the producers of An Inconvenient Truth, the screenwriter of The Bourne Ultimatum, and (full disclosure) the creator and director of our Detroit Project ads, a good friend, and a HuffPost blogger.

This is the first feature film he's directed. (Click here to read Scott's HuffPost account of the seven-year odyssey it took to get the film made.) And he's done a remarkable job. Working with a limited budget he has managed, along with a brilliant cast led by Paddy Considine and Radha Mitchell, to create a film that works on a number of different levels. It's a thriller, a pitch black comedy, a cautionary tale, a damning portrayal of post-Soviet Russia, and a tender, tragic salute to fatherhood.

It's also a chilling reminder of the need to remain vigilant about the containment of nuclear materials. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, since the fall of the Soviet Union, there have been 196 cases of people caught smuggling nuclear material. And those are just the ones we know about. There are over 450 tons of plutonium stockpiled around the world -- enough to make over 40,000 nuclear bombs, and countless dirty bombs.

The film -- its title refers to Plutonium-239, an isotope used in the making of nuclear weapons -- tells the story of Timofey Berezin (Considine), a worker who receives a lethal dose of radiation while trying to avert a disaster at a deteriorating nuclear facility in Russia. After being made the scapegoat for the incident and fired, he decides to steal a small amount of weapons grade plutonium and sets out for Moscow in the hope of selling it and providing some security for his wife (Mitchell) and the young son he adores before he dies.

His health fading before our eyes, Timofey eventually meets up with Shiv, a gangster wanna-be who also has a young son he'd do anything for (Shiv is played by Oscar Isaac, channeling Pacino circa Dog Day Afternoon).

The two men are soon immersed in a nightmare of greed, corruption, treachery, and violence -- a place where human life has little value. And the catastrophic consequences of nukes falling into the wrong hands are seen as little more than the price of doing business.

It's a journey into the dark heart of post-Perestroika Russia -- a journey redeemed by its moving rendering of paternal love. When I saw the film at a screening this week, it brought me to tears.

Watch it this Saturday if you can and let me know if it has the same effect on you. In the meantime, you can watch the trailer for the film, and see some clips here.

Post October 1 RIF News

Until we hear anything new, here's the post that you may use to submit comments that contain any information about the current evolving RIF situation. I will be filtering all off-topic material from this post.

--Gussie

UC News

From The Daily Bruin:

In addition to the vote on Proposition 92, Regent Gerald Parsky updated the board on what he said was positive progress regarding the Department of Energy lab contract.

Because of prior mismanagement of lab security, the contract with the Los Alamos National Laboratory was altered to include the consultation of a private company, which has cost the university $175 million in new taxes and contractual fees in the past year.

The regents also passed a motion which specified that a regent must fill the position of chairman on the oversight committee for the LANL and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The regents also passed Regent Sherry Lansing’s motion to establish the title of Regent Emeritus for all ex-board members who had either fulfilled their term of office or served for a minimum of five years.

With the exception of Island, the regents agreed that this will help increase donations and assistance from ex-members.

“It degrades the accolade to give it indiscriminately,” Island said. “I am embarrassed to sit on a board that would create such an award.”

In other business, the board voted to approve President Dynes’ compensation package which includes an above-scale faculty salary of $245,000 at UC San Diego, a year-long administrative leave at his presidential salary of $405,000, a retirement pension of nearly $150,000, full benefits, and reimbursement for all moving costs back for him and his lab back to San Diego.

Garamendi was the lone dissenter opposing the compensation package in the face of what he considered unfairly low salary brackets for service workers and potential student fee hikes.

“Until this university deals with the bottom of the rung, I’m a ‘no’ vote on the top of the rung,” Garamendi said.

Nov 15, 2007

URS wraps up $3.1 billion Washington Group buy

San Francisco Business Times - by Steven E.F. Brown

URS Corp. completed its deal to buy Washington Group International Inc. for $3.1 billion in cash and stock.

Stockholders in both companies approved the deal at special meetings Thursday. The merger, originally proposed at about $2.6 billion, hit stumbling blocks when some major Washington Group shareholders said the deal undervalued the company. URS then sweetened its offer.

The new company, which will have some 54,000 workers, will be called URS Corp.

San Francisco-based engineering and construction giant URS (NYSE: URS) is led by CEO Martin Koffel and has about 29,500 workers. Washington Group (NYSE: WNG), based in Boise, Idaho, has about 25,000 workers.

Washington Group is part of the groups managing Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico for the U.S. Department of Energy. San Francisco-based Bechtel Corp. and the University of California are also part of those management groups. The Livermore group takes over management of the lab in October, though some changes have already started there.

Washington Group -- founded in 1912 in Boise as Morrison-Knudsen Corp. -- has a major division that does nuclear cleanup and remediation for the Department of Energy. The company is working as a subcontractor for Bechtel at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington. Morrison-Knudsen merged with Washington Construction Co., a Montana company, in 1996 after forcing out CEO William Agee, who had come to Morrison-Knudsen from Bendix. The company focused on heavy civil engineering projects, including Tarbela Dam on the Indus River in Pakistan, one of the largest earth-filled dams in the world.

URS will pay Washington Group stockholders $43.80 in cash and 0.9 shares of URS common stock for each Washington Group share.

If Washington Group's shareholders want just cash or just stock, they can choose $95.11656 in cash per Washington Group share, or 1.6681731 shares of URS stock and no cash for each Washington Group share. The deadline for that decision by each shareholder is Nov. 20.

Together, the two companies are at work on projects in 50 different countries.

I Too Have Been Wrong

Pinky,
Maybe you've already visited this web site: http://www.lahdra.org/

If not, please take a moment to do so and review the audio/slide presentation accessible there titled: "What we have learned about early airborne plutonium releases from Los Alamos Facilities"

At the bottom of this 19 minute presentation is a timer. If you don't have time to listen to the entire presentation, listen to the five minutes starting at 10:20 into the presentation.

I'm not particularly shocked at the revelation in the presentation that Los Alamos National Laboratory under reported Pu releases over its history by a factor of 59, nor that reported releases did not included ALL the potential release sites known to exist at the Laboratory. That's just par for the course when it comes to the Laboratory’s habit of downplaying anything negative.
What is shocking to me however, is the revelation that Los Alamos National Laboratory has likely released more Pu into the environment than all the other DOE sites working with Pu combined;
including Rocky Flats and Hanford. I, like most people affiliated with Los Alamos in one way or another, always believed that a research facility could never come close to producing contaminant levels anywhere near that of a production facility. I guess I was wrong.

PS Keep up the good work in bringing light to Pajarito Plateau.

--anonymous

[I couldn't hear the audio on a Mac, but it plays on a Windows XP computer.]

Comment of the Week

A pair of comments from the Post October 1 RIF News post.

-Gus

___________________________________________

Well, it's now Thursday the 15th and not a peep out of LANS has been heard about the promised pre-Thanksgiving meeting to inform us all about the upcoming RIF.

The silence and lack of forthrightness from our lab leadership continues to amaze me.

____________


This will surprise nobody, but the next All-Managers Meeting (Monday's) has been cancelled.

Manhattan Project to be commemorated

By KATY KORKOS Monitor Reporter

“If the National Park Service establishes a Manhattan Project National Historical Park, what would the Los Alamos part of the park look like?” and “What story do we want to tell?” were the two questions posed by Ron Wilkins at Tuesday’s public meeting in Fuller Lodge.

Wilkins serves as chair of the Fuller Lodge Historic District Advisory Board and is also on the board of the Los Alamos Historical Society. He hosted Tuesday’s meeting as a member of the ad hoc committee appointed by the county council to make recommendations as to local participation in the Park Service project.

The committee, comprised of people with experience in tourism, economic development, historic preservation and park operations, has come up with a list of recommendations to present to park planners when they return to Los Alamos this winter.

“We want to speak with a single voice,” Wilkins said.

The concept of a Manhattan Project Historic Park, encompassing sites at Hanford, Oak Ridge and Los Alamos has been discussed since 2004, when a bill to authorize a study was passed. The Atomic Heritage Foundation has led the drive to establish the park, which has been described as “non-contiguous”, incorporating sites in Oak Ridge, Hanford and Los Alamos.

Several committee members attended Tuesday’s meeting, and helped those members of the public who came to also understand the park’s concept. Bandelier Ranger Chris Judson asked the public to think of a string of Civil War or Revolutionary War sites.� Ellen McGehee, who manages cultural resources for the laboratory, said that the Underground Railway National Historic Park was an example of a park that was spread over several states.

The committee envisions the Los Alamos component of the park as having a centrally located visitor center, staffed by Park Service employees, with links out to other arms of the park such as historic buildings, museums and tours. Wilkins described the visitor center as containing exhibits, maps and guides, and modeled on the New Orleans Jazz National Historic Park. The visitor center could be located near or within the Chamber of Commerce visitor center.

Georgia Strickfaden, who owns and operates Buffalo Tours and serves on the committee, said that sites on the other side of the canyon were the first to be considered by the Park Service.

“At first, the Park Service did not recognize this part of town (as being part of the park). They were only looking at V-Site and Gun Site,” she said.

McGehee, who said that the lab was considering its options to allow people access to some historic sites, addressed the issue of historic sites that lie within laboratory property. One possibility is that fences or gates could be moved to put those areas outside the fence. Another option would be to open up those areas for tours once or twice per year, as is done at Trinity Site.

“Hanford and Oak Ridge have many of the same concerns that we have,” McGehee said.

“Hanford is moving forward with their initiative, working with various cultural resources, and integrating the community story with the lab story.” She added that some of the issues in both Hanford and Oak Ridge were different, in that their laboratory sites were often right in town.

Local peace activist Ed Grothus spoke in support of the establishment of the park.

“The bomb was the most significant event in the history of mankind, and what do we have to show for it? Some bronze plaques around the pond.”

“All over the country, people have an image of Los Alamos, and it’s often negative,” Judson said. “This would be an opportunity to present it in a more even-handed way.”

The website is at www.losalamoshistory.org

LANL Top Choice for 'Pits'

ABQ Journal
Thursday, November 15, 2007

LANL Top Choice for 'Pits'

By John Fleck Copyright © 2007 Albuquerque Journal; Journal Staff Writer

Los Alamos National Laboratory is the leading candidate to be the nation's permanent nuclear weapons plutonium manufacturing center— but on a modest scale.

That's what the officials from the National Nuclear Security Administration have been saying in briefings at Los Alamos and on Capitol Hill, the Journal has learned.

The officials have begun laying out a plan that would designate Los Alamos' main plutonium lab as the preferred manufacturing center for future U.S. plutonium "pits"— the explosive centers of modern nuclear weapons.

The choice of Los Alamos reflects a decision to scale back the nation's nuclear weapons manufacturing ambitions.

The plutonium plan is one piece of a broad effort by the NNSA to streamline the U.S. complex for designing, manufacturing and maintaining nuclear weapons.

A draft of that plan is due to be released within the next month, according to agency spokesman John Broehm.

Officials at Los Alamos and the nuclear agency declined to comment, adding that any discussions before the plan's public release are "pre-decisional."

Los Alamos can do the job partly because the demand for future pit production is small, according to Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., who has been briefed on the nuclear agency's proposal.

According to Bingaman, the agency has concluded that the new "reliable replacement warhead," a proposal to build a new generation of nuclear warheads, is not likely to go forward. With no need for the new pits, the future demand for the plutonium bomb parts should be small, Bingaman said.

"Production of RRW appears to be off the table," Bingaman said in a statement, "which means there is no reason we'll need a full-scale pit production facility. Los Alamos was tapped years ago to develop a limited number of pits on an annual basis, and I see no reason for that to change in the future."

During the Cold War, the Rocky Flats Plant outside Denver made hundreds of pits a year. Rocky Flats closed in 1989 amid concerns over safety and environmental problems associated with the dangerously radioactive plutonium.

Since then, the nuclear weapons establishment has been looking for a Rocky Flats replacement.

In the late 1990s, a lab at Los Alamos was assigned the job of making 10 pits per year as a temporary measure until a permanent new factory could be built. The first Los Alamos-made pit suitable for installation in a U.S. nuclear weapon was completed earlier this year.

In October 2006, the nuclear agency launched "Complex 2030," an ambitious long-range plan to build an entirely new nuclear weapons manufacturing complex, including a plutonium plant capable of making 125 pits per year.

Five sites were named at the time as possible hosts for the Rocky Flats replacement— Los Alamos, the Nevada nuclear weapons test site, the Pantex bomb assembly plant outside Amarillo, Texas, the Y-12 uranium plant in Tennessee and the Savannah River plutonium processing plant in South Carolina.

That proposal has foundered, running into significant congressional opposition. Its replacement, renamed "Complex Transformation," is due to be unveiled within the next month.

Instead of a new pit factory, the revised plan will call for doing the plutonium manufacturing within Los Alamos National Lab's existing Technical Area 55, a large concrete-walled fortress built in the 1970s, according to sources familiar with the plan.

A 2006 study of the lab's capability concluded it could manufacture a maximum of 50 to 80 pits per year, far fewer than Rocky Flats at its peak and fewer than in the federal proposal released a year ago.

Rep. Tom Udall, D-N.M., who represents Los Alamos, expressed concern that even the modest pit production rate contemplated in the plan is too much.

He reiterated his call for diversification away from nuclear weapons work at the northern New Mexico research center.

Reliable evidence?

Nov 15th 2007
From The Economist print edition

America wants to ensure that its nuclear warheads would go bang rather than pop—but without letting them off to test them

OLD soldiers never die, they just fade away. Old weapons, on the other hand, hang around stubbornly. Those of the nuclear variety left over from the cold war are causing a bit of a nuisance. Thousands of them are ageing in silos. Ensuring that they do not deteriorate and would detonate if necessary is difficult. That is because of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which, as its name suggests, forbids contracted parties from letting off nuclear explosives in peacetime.

Although America has yet to ratify this treaty, its policy is to act as though it had. It stopped the tests of real warheads (such as the one illustrated above) in 1992. That means scientists wishing to find out whether a particular batch is still potent cannot just pluck a warhead at random from the stockpile and try to explode it. One way to overcome this would be to replace the warheads with newer designs that, proponents argue, would not need to be live-tested in this way. The older warheads, the most elderly of which will reach the end of their 30-year design lifespan in 2008, could then be retired without compromising the country's nuclear shield.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead programme, as this scheme is known, has reached a crucial point. A full (and costed) design for the new warheads was supposed to be unveiled in December. However the National Nuclear Security Administration, the part of the Department of Energy responsible for the programme, said this week that the report is now expected by August 2008. Some people suspect it will be delayed yet further by the presidential election next year.

A year's delay will not matter much. But should the programme be cancelled (and funding for it, first authorised in 2005, was all but eliminated by Congress for this financial year), America risks finding itself without enough nuclear-weapons scientists to keep its arsenal in tip-top condition in the future. For the truth is that the Reliable Replacement Warhead programme is also a job-creation scheme, designed to persuade some of the country's best brains that it is worth trading a career in industry for one in national defence.

Testing without testing
Scientifically speaking, the programme's goals look possible. Earlier this year the National Nuclear Security Administration chose a design that it thinks could be developed without any further live tests. In September Jason, an elite group of independent scientists, published its evaluation of what technical information it could assess about this design. It concluded that, in principle, it would indeed be possible to develop a replacement warhead without conducting any new nuclear tests. It recommended, however, that the final design be scrutinised in an independent peer-reviewed process. That would be a first. Allowing outsiders to assess a design for its strengths and weaknesses is not something that the Department of Defence has done in the past—and it is not, at the moment, proposing to change its mind.

According to Bruce Goodwin, who is responsible for nuclear technologies at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California—which, with the Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, put forward the winning design—the proposed replacement warhead is based on a weapon that was tested but not deployed some 20 years ago. The richness of the existing test data is what gave this design its winning edge over an alternative proposed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (also in New Mexico, and which also had Sandia as a partner). Those data help to give confidence that “virtual” tests, run inside a supercomputer, will produce results that correspond to what would happen if a warhead were tested for real.

The quantities of data involved in such simulated tests are phenomenal. Staff at Lawrence Livermore say it takes their best computers six weeks to simulate what happens inside a warhead when it is going off. Such detailed modelling has only recently become possible. The supercomputers used in the early 1990s, when nuclear testing stopped, would have taken 60,000 years to process the same data.

Part of the reason for this is that a nuclear explosion has three stages. First, a specially shaped charge of chemical explosives surrounding a plutonium pit goes off. That compresses the plutonium while it is simultaneously bombarded with neutrons from a trigger made of polonium, and thus begins the second stage. In response to the neutrons, some of the plutonium atoms split apart, releasing energy and more neutrons. These, in turn, split more plutonium.

This is the famous chain reaction that lies at the heart of nuclear warfare. It is not, however, the source of a modern bomb's main explosive power, for just as the chemical explosives trigger a fission explosion by compressing the plutonium, that fission explosion is used to ignite the third stage, a still-larger fusion explosion, by compressing and heating the main part of the bomb. This is composed of a mixture of deuterium (a rare isotope of hydrogen) and lithium (a light metal). These react to form helium, yet more neutrons and a whole lot more energy. The result, a thermonuclear explosion, is what destroys the target, but the entire three-stage process has to be mimicked if computers are to test weapon-designs reliably.

The models involved in the winning Livermore/Sandia bid are certainly good enough to recreate the results of earlier tests (a trick known as “hindcasting”). Whether they can accurately forecast things, no one knows for sure. But so-called subcritical tests are allowed by the test-ban treaty, and that may add confidence to the process.

Some of these tests involve smashing or shooting at small shards of plutonium. Blowing up little bits of the metal this way, without compressing them in a symmetrical manner, is allowed because it does not result in a chain reaction. And the chemical-explosive detonator can also be tested using “simulants” that are not fissile but mimic the behaviour of the plutonium pit in other ways. Scientists can thus find out whether the charge would have detonated, had it been made of plutonium.

The fusion stage can also be examined within the rules. An enormous—and enormously expensive—system of lasers called the National Ignition Facility is being built at Livermore. It is designed to cause thermonuclear fusion in tiny pellets of deuterium (so small that they would not be covered by the test-ban treaty) and is expected to be completed in 2009.

For weapons scientists this is all exciting stuff. Not quite as exciting, perhaps, as letting bombs off for real, but not a bad substitute. The question for the politicians is whether that excitement—and the personnel and new bombs that will result from it—are worth the money. And that, in turn, depends on just what sort of nuclear arsenal America thinks it really wants.

UC's Dynes could draw extreme high-end salary when he rejoins UCSD faculty

By Eleanor Yang Su
UNION-TRIBUNE STAFF WRITER

8:10 p.m. November 14, 2007

LOS ANGELES – Robert Dynes, University of California's embattled president, will receive the second-highest salary of any professor in his field when he steps down from his post and returns to the faculty at UCSD, under a proposal made public Wednesday night.

The proposal, which UC's governing board of regents will vote on Thursday in Los Angeles, sets Dynes' salary at $245,000 a year – exceeding every physicist in the 10-campus system except Nobel laureate David Gross, who earns $254,900 at UC Santa Barbara. The proposed salary surpasses that of another Santa Barbara Nobel laureate, Alan Heeger, by roughly $20,000.

The plan also calls for Dynes to first take a year of administrative leave, equivalent to a sabbatical, at his current salary of $405,000.

Dynes, 65, also will receive an annual pension of about $145,000 when he retires. He was pressured to resign in the fall, after weathering criticism over his handling of a controversy in which executives were quietly paid millions of dollars in pay and perks. He will step down as president in June, or when his replacement is found.

Provost Rory Hume, who submitted the proposal, told reporters outside the meeting at UCLA that he set the figure based on Dynes' distinguished career as a physicist. In 1990, Dynes received the Fritz London Memorial Prize, a high honor in his field of superconductivity.

“The thinking is to return President Dynes at a level commensurate with his eminence as a scholar,” Hume said.

The salary is a significant boost over the $121,200 salary Dynes earned in 1995 at UCSD, right before he joined the administration.

When asked by reporters about the proposal on Wednesday, Regent Chairman Richard Blum said the salary is appropriate considering that Dynes will be “an important player on the San Diego campus.”

“When he stepped down, he didn't want, nor did he ask for, nor will he receive any special consideration,” Blum said. “There's no golden parachute.”

In other business, regents tentatively passed an operating budget for 2008-09 after a lengthy discussion about student fees, which have soared to an average of $7,495 for in-state undergraduate students, up 88 percent from five years ago.

Regents delayed a decision on increasing student fees until they receive the governor's state budget proposal in January. The UC budget proposal calls for undergraduate fees to rise 7 percent next year if the state does not provide an extra $70.5 million in revenue.

Lt. Gov. John Garamendi, who serves as a regent by virtue of his position, said he will introduce a resolution in January to limit fee hikes to the rate of inflation.

But several regents raised concerns with the idea. They said the quality of instruction may suffer if the Legislature doesn't provide the funding and regents strip themselves of the power to raise fees.

“Historically I've been against fee increases,” said Regent Norman Pattiz, “but to ask regents to give away the leverage we have is unacceptable.”

Eleanor Yang Su: (619) 542-4564; eleanor.su@uniontrib.com

UC Scrutinizes Fine for Lab Security Breach

By Silhan Jin
Staff Writer
Thursday, Nov. 15, 2007

The University of California is seeking a formal review of a $3-million fine assessed after a former employee of the UC-managed Los Alamos National Laboratory was discovered with stolen classified data.

The university was fined after authorities linked 1,219 pages of documents and classified computer data devices to then 22-year-old former laboratory archivist Jessica Quintana, who lived in a trailer that New Mexico police raided for drugs in October 2006.

UC officials said that they are requesting the legal review because of the limited time they have to discuss the issue with the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration.

“The final notice of violation called for UC to respond within 30 days,” UC Office of the President spokesman Chris Harrington said. “[The Judicial Review] preserves the university’s right to continue ongoing discussions with the department regarding the notice of violation.”

The university objected to the alleged violations, claiming that Quintana was not employed by either the university or the laboratory when she was found with the classified material. After working at LANL for three years, Quintana’s work contract had expired a few weeks before the raid. She worked in three divisions at the laboratory, including Safeguards and Security, a physics division and the top-secret X-Division.

University officials also argued that they had taken preventative steps while managing the laboratory, such as reducing the number of removable drives and other forms of portable media.

Despite these claims, the NNSA found that the university showed “a fundamental and disturbing misunderstanding of the proper approach to security matters.”

A D.O.E. notice said that the university failed to manage its classified data, having not implemented suitable measures such as physical checks or escort oversight to prevent unauthorized removal of classified materials from the “vault-type room” where such information is stored.

The final notice of violation from the NNSA also outlined five infractions relating to the security of classified materials, alleging the “negligence” of classified material protection requirements which led to the breach by an individual subcontractor.

“[The UC system] may not escape liability for these deficiencies because an individual subcontractor exploited weaknesses in [the university’s] security management controls shortly after the university’s tenure ended,” the notice said.

The university managed the laboratory from 1943 to May 2006, just five months before the breach.

Los Alamos National Security LLC — an entity of which the university is a member — currently oversees the labs, and has already paid a $300,000 fine for seven security-related violations. Though the university had fewer violations in total, it was fined more heavily because the D.O.E. found fault in the university’s inadequate management, according to the letter.

Quintana said she had taken the material home to catch up on work and later forgot about it. She has since pleaded guilty to a single misdemeanor count of negligent handling of classified documents.

LANL representatives could not be reached for comment.

Despite the university’s decision to seek a formal legal review, it is uncertain if the university will ultimately decide to appeal the decision.

Harrington said that the university wants to communicate further with the D.O.E. on the issue, which the legal review permits.

Readers can contact Silhan Jin at sijin@ucsd.edu

Nov 14, 2007

How False Narrative Works



How False Narrative Works
by Robert, Sam and Nat Parry

Robert Parry's Editorial Note: Over the past couple of decades, the Republicans have benefited enormously from their ability to create and disseminate false narratives through the Right’s large, well-financed media apparatus.

With mainstream journalists unwilling to challenge the false narratives – and thus put their careers at risk – American voters often go to the polls believing things that are almost the opposite of the truth.

In this excerpt from Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush, the authors present a case study from Election 2000:

During Campaign 2000, conservative groups were given wide leeway in smearing Democratic candidate Al Gore without being called to account, even when the Vice President was falsely portrayed as a traitor.

For instance, in the weeks before Election 2000, Aretino Industries, a pro-Republican group from Texas, ran an emotional ad modeled after Lyndon Johnson’s infamous 1964 commercial that showed a girl picking a daisy before the screen dissolved into a nuclear explosion.

The ad remake accused the Clinton-Gore administration of selling vital nuclear secrets to communist China, in exchange for campaign donations in 1996. The compromised nuclear secrets, the ad stated, gave China “the ability to threaten our homes with long-range nuclear warheads.”


But the ad – which aired in “swing” states including Ohio, Michigan, Missouri and Pennsylvania – was filled with disinformation. The actual evidence was that the key breach in national security, contributing to the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, occurred in the 1980s, not the 1990s.

In other words, the secrets were lost during the Reagan-Bush administration, not the Clinton-Gore administration.

The most important compromised U.S. secret that allegedly helped China’s nuclear weapons program was the blueprint for the W-88 miniaturized nuclear warhead, which was smuggled to the Chinese in 1988, the last year of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, according to documents later given to U.S. authorities by a Chinese defector.

China tested their W-88-style warhead in 1992, the last year of the first Bush administration.

Therefore, the W-88 secret was lost – and acted upon – before Bill Clinton and Al Gore took office. Indeed, the only significant part of this nuclear-secrets case that happened during the Clinton-Gore administration was that a Chinese defector exposed the espionage breach in 1995.

However, when the American public first learned of the compromised secrets a few years later, the Republicans applied fuzzy logic and a blurred chronology to transform the lost nuclear blueprints, apparently compromised on the Reagan-Bush watch, into an attack theme on Clinton and Gore.

Cox Report

This clever strategy could be traced back to a May 1999 report prepared by a Republican-controlled congressional investigation headed by Rep. Christopher Cox of California. The so-called Cox report accused the Clinton-Gore administration of failing to protect the nation against China’s theft of top-secret nuclear designs and other sensitive data.

When released on May 25, 1999 – shortly after the Clinton impeachment battle had ended – the Cox report was greeted by conservative groups and the national news media as another indictment of the Clinton administration.

By then, the Washington press corps had long been addicted to “Clinton scandals” and viewed almost any allegation through that prism, regardless of the details.

The Cox report gave weight in the public’s mind to the suspicion that there was something far more sinister behind earlier allegations that a Chinese government front had funneled $30,000 in illegal “soft money” donations to the Democrats in 1996.

Cox pulled off his sleight of hand with barely anyone spotting the trick card up his sleeve. The key ruse was to leave out dates of alleged Chinese spying in the 1980s and thus obscure the fact that the floodgates of U.S. nuclear secrets to China – including how to build the miniaturized W-88 nuclear warhead – had opened wide during the Reagan-Bush era.

While leaving out those Republican time elements, Cox shoved references to the alleged lapses into the presidencies of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton.

So, the Cox report’s “Overview” stated that “the PRC (People’s Republic of China) thefts from our National Laboratories began at least as early as the late 1970s, and significant secrets are known to have been stolen as recently as the mid-1990s.”

In this way, Cox started with the Carter presidency, jumped over the 12 years of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and landed in the Clinton years. In the “Overview” alone, there were three dozen references to dates from the Clinton years and only five mentions of dates from the Reagan-Bush years, with none of those citations related to alleged wrongdoing.

Cox’s stacking of the deck carried over into the report’s two-page chronology of the Chinese spy scandal. On pages 74-75, the Cox report put all the information boxes about Chinese espionage suspicions into the Carter and Clinton years.

Nothing sinister is attributed specifically to the Reagan-Bush era, other than a 1988 test of a neutron bomb built from secrets that the report says were believed stolen in the “late 1970s,” the Carter years.

Only a careful reading of the text inside the chronology’s boxes made clear that many of the worst national security breaches could be traced to the Reagan-Bush era.

[One of the authors of the Cox report was I. Lewis Libby, a key neoconservative who would later become Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief of staff and a figure in the Plame-gate scandal, the leak of Valerie Plame Wilson's covert CIA identity.]

Reagan Security Breaches

When federal investigators translated other documents turned over by the Chinese defector, they learned that the exposure of nuclear secrets in the Reagan-Bush years was even worse than previously thought.

According to a later Washington Post article, “the documents provided by the defector show that during the 1980s, Beijing had gathered a large amount of classified information about U.S. ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles.” But major news outlets didn't spell out the significance of that timing.

Other evidence suggested that conscious decisions by senior Reagan-Bush officials may have put communist China in a position to glean these sensitive secrets.

The rupture followed a secret decision by Ronald Reagan’s White House in 1984 to collaborate with Beijing on a highly sensitive intelligence operation. The project was the clandestine shipment of weapons to the Nicaraguan contra rebels, in defiance of U.S. law and while the administration was denying to Congress that such shipments were occurring.

The point man for enlisting China into the off-the-books contra operation was Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North, then assigned to Reagan’s National Security Council staff.

Reagan’s White House turned to the Chinese for surface-to-air missiles for the contras because Congress had banned military assistance to the rebel force and the contras were suffering heavy losses from Soviet-built attack helicopters deployed by Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista government.

Some of the private U.S. operatives working with North believed China was the best source for SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. In his 1989 Iran-Contra trial, North described this procurement as a “very sensitive delivery.”

For the Chinese missile deal in 1984, North said he received help from the CIA in arranging false end-user certificates from the right-wing government of Guatemala. North testified that he “had made arrangements with the Guatemalan government, using the people [CIA] Director [William] Casey had given me.”

But China balked at selling missiles to the Guatemalan military, which was then engaged in a scorched-earth war against its own leftist guerrillas. To resolve this problem, North was dispatched to a clandestine meeting with a Chinese military official.

In fall 1984, North enlisted Gaston J. Sigur, the NSC’s expert on East Asia, to make the arrangements for a meeting with a Chinese representative, according to Sigur’s testimony at North’s 1989 trial.

“I arranged a luncheon and brought together Colonel North and this individual from the Chinese embassy” responsible for military affairs, Sigur testified.

“At lunch, they sat and they discussed the situation in Central America,” Sigur said. “Colonel North raised the issue of the need for weaponry by the contras, and the possibility of a Chinese sale of weapons, either to the contras or, as I recall, I think it was more to countries in the region but clear for the use of the contras.”

North described the same meeting in his autobiography, Under Fire. “Back in Washington, I met with a Chinese military officer assigned to their embassy to encourage their cooperation,” North wrote. “We enjoyed a fine lunch at the exclusive Cosmos Club in downtown Washington.”


North said the Chinese saw the collaboration as a way to develop “better relations with the United States.” Possession of this knowledge also put Beijing in position to leverage future U.S. policies.

While the details of a possible U.S.-China tradeoff are still unknown, the Reagan administration did authorize a broader exchange program between U.S. and Chinese nuclear physicists. The Chinese were given access to the Los Alamos nuclear facility.

The Wen Ho Lee Case

Los Alamos nuclear physicist Wen Ho Lee first came to the FBI’s attention in 1982 when he called another scientist who was under investigation for espionage, but Lee’s contacts with China – along with trips there by other U.S. nuclear scientists – increased in the mid-1980s as relations warmed between Washington and Beijing, according to a New York Times chronology that was published n 2001 after George W. Bush had become President.

The Times reported that limited exchanges between nuclear scientists from the United States and China began after President Carter officially recognized China in 1978, but those meetings grew far more expansive and less controlled during the 1980s.


“With the Reagan administration eager to isolate the Soviet Union, hundreds of scientists traveled between the United States and China, and the cooperation expanded to the development of torpedoes, artillery shells and jet fighters,” the Times wrote. “The exchanges were spying opportunities as well.”


“On September 25, 1992, a nuclear blast shook China’s western desert,” the Times wrote. “From spies and electronic surveillance, American intelligence officials determined that the test was a breakthrough in China’s long quest to match American technology for smaller, more sophisticated hydrogen bombs.”

In September 1992, George H.W. Bush was still President.

In the early years of the Clinton administration, U.S. intelligence experts began to suspect that the Chinese nuclear breakthrough most likely came from purloined U.S. secrets.

“It’s like they were driving a Model T and went around the corner and suddenly had a Corvette,” said Robert M. Hanson, a Los Alamos intelligence analyst.

Looking for possible espionage, investigators began examining the years of the mid-1980s when the Reagan-Bush administration had authorized U.S. nuclear scientists to hold meetings with their Chinese counterparts.

Though the American scientists were under restrictions about what information could be shared, it was never clear exactly why these meetings were held in the first place – given the risk that a U.S. scientist might willfully or accidentally divulge nuclear secrets.

China-gate

But the Chinese-espionage story didn’t gain national attention until March 1999 when The New York Times published several imprecise front-page stories fingering Wen Ho Lee as an espionage suspect.

During those chaotic first weeks of “Chinagate,” Republicans and political pundits mixed together the suspicions of Chinese spying and allegations about Chinese campaign donations to the Democrats in 1996. Clinton’s Justice Department officials then overcompensated by demonstrating how tough they could be on suspect Wen Ho Lee.

Virtually no one in official Washington noted the logical impossibility of Democrats selling secrets to China in 1996 that China apparently had obtained a decade or so earlier during a Republican administration.

Instead, conservative groups grasped the political and fund-raising potential.

Larry Klayman’s right-wing Judicial Watch sent out a solicitation letter seeking $5.2 million for a special “Chinagate Task Force” that would “hold Bill Clinton, Al Gore and the Democratic Party Leadership fully accountable for election fraud, bribery and possibly treason in connection with the ‘Chinagate’ scandal.”

The fallout from the spy hysteria kept spreading. The 60-year-old Wen Ho Lee was imprisoned on a 59-count indictment for mishandling classified material.

The Taiwanese-born naturalized U.S. citizen was put in solitary confinement with his cell light on at all times. He was allowed out of his cell only one hour a day, when he shuffled around a prison courtyard in leg shackles.

The case against Wen Ho Lee began to collapse, however. Prosecutors accepted a plea bargain on September 13, 2000, with the scientist pleading guilty to a single count of mishandling classified material.

A furious U.S. District Judge James A. Parker complained that he had been “led astray” by the prosecutors and apologized to Lee for the “demeaning, unnecessarily punitive conditions” under which Lee had been held. Parker ordered Lee released with no further jail time.

Still, the Cox report’s suspicions about Clinton-Gore treachery lingered and reemerged during the final days of Campaign 2000 with the “daisy ad” remake. The closing message was blunt: “Don’t take a chance,” the ad said. “Please vote Republican.”

In its appeal, the message was unintentionally ironic, since the worst compromises of nuclear secrets to China had occurred under Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, the team that would be restored to power if the voters followed the ad’s advice.

George W. Bush’s campaign also exploited the “Chinagate” suspicions, albeit a touch more subtly, by running ads showing Gore meeting with saffron-robed monks at a Buddhist temple in California.

So, millions of Americans went to the polls in November 2000 thinking that Gore’s temple appearance and the Chinese nuclear spying were somehow linked.

The national news media – still bristling with hostility toward Clinton and Gore – contributed to the confusion by failing to explain to the American public in a timely fashion that the Chinese security breaches represented a Reagan-Bush scandal, not a Clinton-Gore scandal.

-Robert Parry

_____

To read more, you can get your copy of Neck Deep at the publisher’s Web site, http://www.neckdeepbook.com, or through Amazon.com.

Robert Parry broke many of the Iran-Contra stories in the 1980s for the Associated Press and Newsweek. His latest book, Neck Deep: The Disastrous Presidency of George W. Bush, was written with two of his sons, Sam and Nat, and can be ordered at neckdeepbook.com. His two previous books, Secrecy & Privilege: The Rise of the Bush Dynasty from Watergate to Iraq and Lost History: Contras, Cocaine, the Press & 'Project Truth' are also available there. Or go to Amazon.com.