May 20, 2007

Study reveals Los Alamos National Lab still leaking plutonium

By ANDY LENDERMAN | The New Mexican
May 18, 2007


Officials say pollution poses no immediate health risk

Canyons downhill from Los Alamos National Laboratory continue to release plutonium and other radioactive contaminants into the soil and the Rio Grande, a new state Environment Department report shows.

However, state officials and a spokesman for the nuclear-weapons laboratory said there is no immediate health risk from the pollution, tracked in a nearly decadelong study released Friday.

One of the report’s authors stressed that no plutonium has been detected in any drinking-water wells in Northern New Mexico.

While the New Mexico Environment Department sees no immediate health danger, the constant release of plutonium — a highly toxic substance used in nuclear bombs — still worries the state agency.

“Basically we haven’t seen the levels of plutonium decrease in the storm water over the last six years,” said Ralph Ford-Schmid, a department employee who helped write the report. “So we think there’s still a lot of plutonium leaving the lab. Pueblo Canyon appears to be the primary source of the plutonium.”

Most of that plutonium was dumped there by the lab in the 1950s and 1960s, he said. Increased erosion after the massive Cerro Grande Fire in 2000 exacerbated the release of the contaminants.

Plutonium is created from uranium in nuclear reactors, and ingestion by humans “is an extremely serious health hazard,” the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency says in educational materials.

“It generally stays in the body for decades, exposing organs and tissues to radiation, and increasing the risk of cancer,” the agency has reported.

In one location near the Rio Grande, state investigators found plutonium levels 170 times higher than normal in sediment suspended in the water. In another, they found plutonium in storm-water runoff at 16 times the safe drinking water standard.

Ford-Schmid said the plutonium in sediment is diluted greatly when it hits the Rio Grande. He also said water-treatment processes can remove such pollutants to undetectable levels.

Santa Fe is working on a project that eventually will draw water directly from the Rio Grande and treat the water for use in the city and county utility systems. The city of Albuquerque already has begun diverting surface flows from the river.

Lab spokesman James Rickman pointed to three studies — performed by the lab, the Environment Department and an outside firm — that show no health risks even under the most extreme circumstances. Those studies were commissioned after the Cerro Grande Fire.

“All three of those studies unquestionably found that even under the most extreme scenarios, where every bit of contaminated sediment was washed off site and was ingested through even the most extreme ingestion scenarios by the public ... that these sediments did not represent any credible health risk whatsoever,” Rickman said.

Rickman also stressed that the lab has worked to mitigate the problem by replanting vegetation and building structures to trap the sediment in arroyos.

Both the Environment Department and a Santa Fe citizen’s group said the lab must do a better job to keep the contaminated soils in place on lab property.

“This report shows something must be done now to protect New Mexicans and the environment from continued discharges of harmful contaminants to the Rio Grande,” Environment Secretary Ron Curry said in a news release.

Joni Arends of Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety said her group and others, including the New Mexico Acequia Association, have filed a notice warning the lab they intend to sue “for failing to install and maintain the required pollution-control measures for storm water or flooding as required by the Clean Water Act.”

Rickman said lab managers are willing to meet with the department “to see if there are other measures to be taken to provide even greater protection.”

Arends also said the latest report shows why New Mexico’s congressional delegation should push hard for money to pay for environmental cleanup at Los Alamos.

“It’s not OK for the plutonium to be rolling down through these storm events to the Rio Grande,” Arends said.

Contact Andy Lenderman at 995-3827 or alenderman@sfnewmexican.com.

Statement from Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman on the Nomination of Thomas P. D’Agostino as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of NNSA

May 17, 2007

“Today the President announced his intention to nominate Thomas P. D'Agostino as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Tom served as NNSA's Acting Administrator for three months and as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs for the past fourteen months. In these roles, Tom has done an outstanding job and has earned my full confidence.

With this nomination, we are making NNSA even stronger and I am eager to have Tom step into the NNSA administrator role on a permanent basis. I look forward to working with Tom as we continue to pursue NNSA’s national security mission. While the nomination is under consideration by the U.S. Senate, Bill Ostendorff will continue serving as NNSA’s acting administrator.”

Media contact(s):
Megan Barnett, (202) 586-4940
Bryan Wilkes, (202) 586-7371

Exclusive: Los Alamos Breach Was Easy

CBS News Learns Details Of A Major Security Breach At Nation's Top Nuclear Lab
WASHINGTON, May 20, 2007

"I printed out the pages I needed and put in my backpack with my school books and walked out like I did every day."
Jessica Quintana


(CBS) When Jessica Quintana wanted to sneak classified material out of the nation's top nuclear weapons lab, the biggest outrage is how scandalously simple it was.

"Where I was, It was easy," she tells CBS News correspondent Sharyl Attkisson.

Last week Quintana, 23, plead guilty to the national security breach at Los Alamos. In an exclusive interview with CBS News, she tells how she did it.

She was just 18, right out of high school, when the Lab hired her to archive documents. The job came with a security clearance that gave her access to highly sensitive weapons data.

Last summer Quintana claims she wanted to take some work home, a major security violation. She walked unchallenged into a special work vault with a computer storage device called a flashdrive.

"I had the flashdrive in my pocket when I entered the vault that day," recalls Quintana. "And at some point in the day I knew I wasn't being watched, the racks were open, simply inserted the flashdrive into my computer, took what I needed."

It was material related to underground nuclear weapons tests from the 70's, and she printed more classified documents — 228 pages.

"I printed out the pages I needed and put in my backpack with my school books and walked out like I did every day," said Quintana.

The materials were found accidentally months later by local police during a drug raid on Quintana's roommate in their trailer home, reports Attkisson.

It's an understatement to say that walking out with national secrets shouldn't have been so easy, especially in light of the rash of security scandals at Los Alamos: missing hard drives, even radioactive material smuggled out.

Tens of millions of tax dollars have been spent to upgrade security. Quintana's case raises the question. Have others, even spies, made off with top secret material?

Quintana says in the years she worked at the lab, nobody ever questioned or searched her. Not once.

"They were so lax about coming in and out," said Quintana.

Congress was so outraged that the Energy Department fired its top nuclear security official.

Quintana has agreed to cooperate with prosecutors and faces up to a year in jail. Her lawyer says Americans can thank her for one thing: exposing persistent gaps in security at a place guarding some of our most sensitive nuclear secrets.

[View video of the interview here.]

May 19, 2007

UC legitimizes nuclear weapons industry

Darwin BondGraham
Friday, May 18, 2007


The U.S. nuclear weapons complex is hurriedly finalizing the design and preparations to build a new hydrogen bomb, called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). According to a recent National Nuclear Security Administration report, "the RRW strategy would enable a major transformation in the nuclear weapons stockpile and complex infrastructure. Although the stockpile would be smaller in 2030, deterrence would be enhanced because the transformed complex would be fully capable, sufficiently flexible to address technical matters relating to the stockpile in a timely manner, and able to respond to adverse geopolitical change" (www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs). In other words, RRW, if supported by the president and funded by Congress, will expend billions of dollars over the next few decades and guarantee the long-term existence of nuclear weapons.

Such a program will also constitute a U.S. violation of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a regime that has mostly worked up to the present day. A number of students within the University of California, the government's No. 1 nuclear warhead contractor, have seized on the same criticism, and on May 9, initiated a hunger strike demanding UC severance from the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories. Their argument: The University of California must withdraw from the labs so it can be a major force in defeating an unnecessary and dangerous new weapons program and thus in creating the conditions for disarmament politics.

RRW, plutonium pit production and the various other practical steps being taken toward a new U.S. nuclear weapons program are already in motion, even though Congress has yet to fully commit itself to the mission (in fact, funding was just reduced from $119 million to $74 million for RRW by the House Armed Services Committee). Nor have the armed forces committed themselves to the idea of rebuilding the U.S. arsenal. So where is the push for RRW and pit production coming from? Lobbyists for this new program include managers at the weapons labs and other facilities contractors, alongside a powerful (but small) alliance of politicians and policymakers in Congress and the executive branch.

The University of California's role in this is primarily about legitimation. At one time, UC's administrative influence at the labs was high. Although UC, as an institution, had little say over the programs and policies that the labs would promote, certain members of the Board of Regents, UC President's Office and members of the faculty have held considerable sway over U.S. nuclear weapons policy. This did not mean, however, that the university operated these labs in "the public trust," (a phrase the regents often invoke to imply transparency and disinterestedness), but rather that only several regents and a few UC administrators have ever had a say with the labs. The vast majority of the university community -- its faculty, students, staff and administrators have never had any ability or opportunity to oversee the labs.

The advent of contract competition in 2003 for Los Alamos signaled a new era for the nature of UC lab management. As a result, both LANL and LLNL have effectively been privatized. They are now operated by for-profit limited liability corporations, with 96 percent of the National Nuclear Security Administration's appropriations going to payments to contractors (www.lasg.org/NNSAPrivatization.pdf).

By grafting the University of California's name onto the weapons labs, the UC Board of Regents effectively gives respectability to a mission that is increasingly rejected by the American people and the international community. It gives an aura of enlightened decision-making to a task that has already become profit-driven.

The students have begun catalyzing faculty and administrative dissent against the labs and their missions to challenge UC role's as the grand legitimator of nuclear weapons.

Darwin BondGraham is a graduate student in Sociology at UC Santa Barbara and a member of the UC Student DOE Lab Oversight Committee (http://doeloc.org).

May 18, 2007

Parsky's Party

The UC regent whose pension fund overhaul may have cost the university billions is now in a position to play with even more of the public’s money.
By Chris Thompson
Published: May 9, 2007


Last December, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger created a new panel to figure out how to solve what may be California's worst-ever budget crisis. The state's two biggest retirement funds will owe at least $49 billion they don't have, and Californians will be paying this bill for decades. The man Schwarzenegger chose to lead this historic undertaking is commission chairman Gerald Parsky. But for the hundreds of thousands of teachers and state employees who depend on these funds, his appointment should be cause for alarm. Just ask the employees of the University of California.

Parsky's reputation as a financial genius is undisputed, at least among the people who count. A former official in Richard Nixon's Treasury Department, Parsky made a fortune in real estate, junk bond, and venture capital investments. In the 1990s, he gradually rose through the ranks of the California Republican Party until he became one of the state's most important power brokers. He raised millions to organize the 1996 Republican National Convention in San Diego, and chaired the state presidential campaigns of George W. Bush in both 2000 and 2004. Today, he reviews candidates for California US Attorney positions on behalf of the Bush Justice Department. He has been appointed senior economic adviser to presidential candidate John McCain; if McCain is elected president, Parsky could well become the next secretary of the Treasury.

But it was in his capacity as a regent of the University of California that Parsky made his greatest impact. In the ten years before he took over as chair of the Regents' Investment Committee, the university's pension plan, which provides retirement benefits for more than 190,000 employees, made a small fortune playing the stock market and investing in long-term bonds. The fund earned so much money that it literally paid for itself — in fact, employees haven't had to pay into their pension plan since 1990. These generous retirement benefits have been critical in attracting renowned professors and researchers, who draw considerably lower salaries than they would at top-tier public or private universities. Without the pension plan and other benefits, the university would be starved of talent.

In 1999 and 2000, in a series of secret meetings, Parsky spearheaded an effort to radically remake the pension fund's investment philosophy. Under his leadership, the regents gave hundreds of thousands of dollars to a Los Angeles investment firm to recommend and implement changes to the way the university invests tens of billions of dollars. At the same time, the president of that firm, Wilshire Associates, gave tens of thousands of dollars to the very Bush presidential campaign chaired by Parsky.

Wilshire, Parsky, and the Regents' Investment Committee farmed out control of the investment fund to an army of pension consultants and money management firms, ending the decades-long practice of using university staff to trade stocks themselves. Along the way, they humiliated and destroyed the reputation of Patricia Small, the UC treasurer who had managed the investments for years and strenuously opposed their plans. Billions of dollars in stock were bought and sold in the midst of a massive stock market crash.

Seven years later, what was once one of the most lucrative pension plans in America is in desperate trouble. Before Parsky and his colleagues restructured the investment strategy, the university's fund easily made more money than the average pension plan. Now, it ranks among the country's worst performers. Before Parsky's reforms, the university paid nothing to outside money management companies, aside from a small venture capital arm. Last year, the UC treasurer's office paid at least $32 million to forty different money management companies whose investment advice may have cost the fund billions of dollars.

Now, faced with sharply declining investment revenue and rising retirement benefit costs, university officials have asked their employees to start paying money back into the pension fund for the first time in seventeen years. The amount is projected to steadily rise over the next few years until it constitutes 8 percent of each employee's paycheck. Many claim that they can't possibly afford such a blow, especially those who are struggling to pay California's record mortgages. From professors to secretaries and janitors, more than 120,000 university workers now face one of the worst personal financial crises in the institution's history.

Gerald Parsky led a campaign to remake the university pension plan from top to bottom, and the retirement future of almost 200,000 people has been profoundly damaged. Thanks to Governor Schwarzenegger, this same man has now been asked to reform two of the largest public pension plans in the country. Hundreds of thousands of people now depend on him to make the right decisions. In the last seven years, the employees of the University of California have learned what happens when he makes the wrong ones.
[Read the full article here.]

LLNS Board of Governors Chairman Gerald Parsky
“LLNS is dedicated to delivering the best in science and technology, management and operations at Lawrence Livermore. Through LLNS’ collective of expertise, Livermore Laboratory will continue its long and proud tradition of security and service to the nation for decades to come. We look forward to working with Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration and the employees at Lawrence Livermore to provide as smooth a transition as possible in order to ensure the Laboratory’s continued success.”
[From May 11, 2007 LLNL Newsline.]

Goodbye SRS, hello Chickasaws!

By Damon Cline
Chickasaw Nation Industries Inc., the government contracting arm of the Chickasaw Nation, is in negotiations to run information technology operations at Savannah River Site.

You heard me correctly, the Department of Energy is planning to outsource its 200-employee IT department at SRS to the Chickasaw Indians. I say hats off to 'em for moving beyond tobacco outlets and casinos.

Top brass at Washington Savanah River Co., SRS's main contractor, notified employees last week that the Energy Department that talks are in progress. The Energy Department had already put the installation on notice that it had planned to outsource IT (which includes everything from computer security to cellular service) along with the heath/human services and transportation/mechanical departments.

As you can imagine, the people at SRS already employed in those departments are concerned their wages and benefits will be cut when, or if, they become employees of Chickasaw Nation Industries. After all, that's precisely why the government outsources things, so it doesn't have to pay government wages and benefits.

Like most tribal enterprises, Chickasaw Nation Industries is an 8(a) (that's government-speak for a minority-owned business eligible for set-aside contracts). It employs about 2,000 people and is headquartered in Ada, Okla.

If you're interested in learning more about the Chickasaw Nation or its businesses, you can go to www.chickasaw.com and read a nice letter from Chickasaw Nation Industries' very non-Indian looking president, Deryl Wright. By the way, can someone tell me why these 8(a) companies always seem to have white guys in charge?

[An anonymous contributer requested this post and asks the following question:
Is this the type of unidentified company that both NNSA and LLNL Director George Miller refused to identify? There is already a lot of speculation that most of the service groups will be outsourced. I don’t have a good feeling about this, and the secrecy in identifying the four small business partners to participate in running LLNL.]

May 17, 2007

LANL enforces strict drug policy

By ASSOCIATED PRESS
May 17, 2007

LOS ALAMOS, N.M. (AP) — Some employees of Los Alamos National Laboratory have resigned or been fired under the lab’s new random drug testing policy, but the lab said it hasn’t been very many.

Fewer than 10 people have left Los Alamos lab since the tougher drug testing was implemented March 5, a lab spokesman, Kevin Roark, said Thursday. Some resigned and some were terminated, he said.

Lab officials have called in about 200 employees, most of them with security clearances, since the random tests began.

The lab announced earlier this year that under the expanded drug policy, tests will be conducted for at least 20 percent of the work force. The policy said workers could be fired for a positive drug test, and those who fail to appear will be treated as if the test were positive.

The policy states that a positive drug test will result in disciplinary action — up to and including termination.

Employees who test positive or who refuse to be tested can resign to avoid termination, Roark said.

He said he’d heard some “outrageous” numbers in the past few weeks about the number of people who’d left the lab under the new policy.

“It’s fewer than 10,” he said. “We have no reason to make it what it’s not.”

More than 300 lab employees submitted comments on the policy to the lab before it was implemented, many of them concerning the possibility of “false positive” results.

Doris Heim, the lab’s associate director for business, said this spring that safeguards are in place to address those types of results. If, for example, an employee provided documentation about a prescription medication, the drug test will be reported as negative, she said.

Lab Director Michael Anastasio said the lab updated its substance abuse policy as part of its efforts to tighten security.

“The new substance abuse policy reflects today’s environment and the need to take greater precautions to ensure a work place that is safe, secure and demonstrates that we are worthy of our nation’s trust,” Anastasio told an all-employee meeting in December.

The policy includes pre-employment screening of all regular employees, including contractors; random testing of lab workers; testing after serious incidents or accidents; and testing in response to reasonable suspicion of illegal drug use.

Testing 1, 2, 3...

123 as countdown to CTBT by the backdoor

Siddharth Varadarajan

No matter how it is cushioned or phrased, the U.S. insistence on a "right to require the return" of exported material if India conducts a nuclear test will convert India's voluntary moratorium into a bilateral, and eventually multilateral, undertaking with legal consequences.

THE INDO-U.S. agreement on civil nuclear cooperation is built around a core bargain but as the moment of final implementation draws nearer, it is evident the United States does not intend to uphold its end of that trade-off. On July 18, 2005, the U.S. agreed that "as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states." Accordingly, the American President undertook to "seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies" and "work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India." In return, India said it "would reciprocally agree that it would be ready to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States."

Behind this word play was a simple proposition: in exchange for India assuming a number of costly "responsibilities and practices" in the nuclear field, the U.S. was saying it would (1) no longer treat India as a non-nuclear weapons state in political or legal terms; and (2) adjust its domestic statute and the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow nuclear commerce with New Delhi in line with the new reality.

The joint statement enumerated exactly what the "responsibilities and practices" of other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology consisted of. It is in this context - and only in this context - that the continuation of India's moratorium on nuclear testing is mentioned. India was, inter alia, giving a political commitment that it would not end its moratorium. But it is clear from the preambular reference to the responsibilities and practices of "other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology" that this commitment was reciprocal to the commitment of others not to test. Thus, if the U.S. were to detonate a nuclear device in the future, or if any other leading country with advanced nuclear capability were to deviate from its responsibilities, the Indian commitment would become infructuous.

Had the July 2005 statement been truly reciprocal, India's moratorium would have also been linked to an American commitment not to develop new, "usable" nuclear weapons. After all, the immediate danger confronting the world is not nuclear testing, per se, but the U.S. drive to design new and "better" nuclear weapons such as robust nuclear earth penetrators and the so-called `reliable replacement warhead,' or RRW. Indeed, the reason the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a flawed treaty is that it seeks to block only one end of the nuclear weapon technology spectrum - testing - leaving countries like the U.S. plenty of room to refine and build deadly new nuclear weapons without violating the treaty.

The irony is that even though the CTBT privileges `advanced' nuclear weapons states, the Bush administration is opposed to the treaty's ratification since it wants the U.S. to have the option of testing for at least the next two decades. This option is crucial because as the U.S. nuclear arsenal - under the Complex 2030 programme - switches gradually from its existing stockpile of proven but allegedly ageing `legacy' warheads to greater reliance on the untested RRW, political and military pressure to test the new warhead will increase. In other words, if one were to identify the one "leading country with advanced nuclear technology" most likely to break the testing moratorium in the next decade, that would be the U.S., and not India, Russia or China.

It is important to bear this background in mind in considering the tug-of-war currently under way between India and the U.S. over the bilateral nuclear cooperation - or `123' - agreement.

Not satisfied with New Delhi's political commitment to continue its moratorium, the U.S. wants India to give that commitment a bilateral legal character by accepting that any future Indian test would have adverse consequences for New Delhi. But this is something India cannot and should not accept. It is not that India is seriously bothered by the prospect of having to ship back to the U.S. any imported nuclear equipment or material in the event of a test. Rather, it is the principle of not being forced to concede something that was not part of the July 2005 agreement. Besides, if conceded, this bilateral legality would inevitably get converted into a multilateral one at the NSG and India would find itself effectively saddled with a CTBT in all but name.

The reason testing has emerged as a stumbling block is because Washington is simply not willing to stop treating India as a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS). That is why the Bush administration did not seek all the necessary adjustments to domestic law in line with India's actual status and is now insisting that certain legal riders applicable to NNWS as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be made a part of the 123 agreement with India.

This insistence stems from Section 123(a)(4) of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which declares that except in the case of agreements with nuclear-weapon states, all 123 agreements must allow America the right to require the return of "any nuclear materials and equipment transferred" if the recipient country "detonates a nuclear explosive device." Needless to say, the U.S. 123 agreement with China does not include such a clause, nor does its 123 with Euratom as far as cooperation with Britain and France are concerned. The only stipulation is that these countries will not detonate a nuclear device using U.S. material. This is precisely the undertaking India says it is willing to abide by.

Since the U.S. agreed not to treat India as an NNWS anymore, the Bush administration should have either included a waiver to Section 123(a)(4) in the Hyde Act, which was passed last December or amended the definition of a nuclear weapon state in its domestic statute to remove the tight linkage with the NPT. But it did neither. And now, it is citing the constraints of domestic law as the reason why India must agree to convert its voluntary moratorium into a formal undertaking with legal penalties in case of violation.

One of the formulas now being studied by both sides is whether the "right of return" can be "cushioned" by stretching out the process of its implementation. Indian negotiators are also examining the merits of making the cost associated with any return of equipment and material prohibitive to the U.S. in monetary and environmental terms. But all of these proposals revolve around India conceding a legally binding aspect to its political, voluntary commitment not to test.

The only flexibility the U.S. side has indicated it might show is to exempt from the agreement's ambit any Indian test conducted after a future Chinese or Pakistani test. Senator Joe Biden, for example, has openly endorsed this line of thinking. For India, however, such a formulation would be even worse since it would repeat the diplomatic blunder the erstwhile Vajpayee government committed in blaming the 1998 Pokhran tests on the `China threat.'

India has every intention of standing by the political commitment of continuing its unilateral moratorium and has little interest in being the first to break the prevailing international moratorium on testing. Indeed, one could even argue that if an initial Indian test were to serve as a rationale for
further tests by Pakistan, China and, eventually, the U.S. and others, the military "gains" from perfecting a new Indian weapon design would be more than offset by similar gains others might enjoy as a result of their new round of tests. But even though there is zero probability of India testing first, the

U.S. would also like to rule out the prospect of an Indian test as part of any domino effect triggered by a future American test. When the RRW is eventually tested, the Chinese would be tempted to validate their attempts at manufacturing miniaturised warheads; and, given the unstable logic of deterrence, it is only natural that pressure inside India for further tests would increase.

The only way to break this chain of insecurity is for the U.S. to move away from nuclear weapons. For as long as it continues to privilege this genocidal currency of power it is unreasonable to expect powers like China, Russia or India to accept binding unilateral restraints.

Can the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal be salvaged if the U.S. insists on retaining a `right of return' clause in the 123 agreement? Or indeed any termination clause that might potentially penalise India for not toeing a particular line? My guess is that it cannot. Since 1947, India has always avoided entering into agreements that might restrict its future freedom of action. Even at times of economic vulnerability, the Indian leadership somehow managed to avoid getting pushed into a strategic corner. It would be highly unnatural for the country to agree to be boxed in at precisely the same moment that the entire world is heralding its arrival.

There are only two ways around the offensive clause. India can live with a restraint on testing if the U.S. agrees to scrap its new weapons work, including the RRW. But the U.S. can never live with such a restraint. This leaves only one option: President George W. Bush must invoke the waiver authority he already enjoys under Section 123 and seek the necessary legislative approval for waiving the right of return clause when the 123 agreement with India is submitted to Congress. If Mr. Bush does not have the political capital to push a waiver through, or if Congress were to disapprove it, the agreement would not meet the yardstick held out in July 2005. And there would then be no more deal. Not because India is being "greedy" or "pushy" but because the U.S. failed to live up to its promises.

May 16, 2007

DOE Polygraph Program

[Originally posted 4/30/2007, this post has been moved up to the top again at the request of a reader.]

To/MS: LANL Employees
From/MS: Roger L. Hagengruber, MS A105
Phone/Fax: 606-2263/606-2264
Symbol: DIR-CCSO: 07-010
Date: April 30, 2007



Subject: DOE Polygraph Program

For some years, DOE has been planning to implement a polygraph
policy as part of its counter-intelligence (CI) program.
Recently, LANL was notified of the official commencement of
random counter-intelligence scope polygraph examinations for
personnel in certain “high risk” categories. These exams will
cover employees across the NNSA facilities including LANL. In the
past week, we have received a list of names of individuals at the
lab that will be contacted soon to set up the schedule for their
polygraph. This memorandum is intended to announce the new
program and to provide you with some explanation of the
situation.

The letter of notification that we received is reproduced in part
below:

“Effective October 30, 2006, the Department of Energy issued
10CFR 709 Counterintelligence Evaluation Regulations.
Subparagraph 709.3 explains the provisions covering Random CI
Evaluations, including the requirement to complete a counter
intelligence scope polygraph examination. The Counter
Intelligence Evaluations Division (CIED) is responsible for
administering this program.

This regulation may be accessed on the DOE Homepage under the
National Security, Intelligence and Counterterrorism tab. [View it here.]”

In our discussions with DOE, it became apparent that LANL had
essentially no choice in shaping the policy implementation for
the lab. Per direction from DOE/CI, LANL provided names and other
data for all people in the categories that they specified. Some
of this information was conveyed to DOE/CI via NNSA or IN. This
included all personnel at the laboratory with the following
accesses or clearances:
1. NNSA Special Access Programs (an access requiring a Q)
2. SCI (a clearance)
3. Classified computer system administrators (a position
within LANL)
4. Sigma 14 and 15 (an access within RD)
5. All LANL Counter Intelligence personnel (a position
within LANL)
6. All personnel within the Human Reliability Program at
LANL (HRP) (an additional personnel vetting process at LANL)

(Some of these categories have already required that a security
agreement be signed that included an acknowledgement that the
signer could be subject to a polygraph examination.)

All people in the above categories will be subject to random as
well as investigatory polygraph examination. If informed to
present themselves for a polygraph, they are to understand that
participation is mandatory. Should they fail to pass the test,
they will be removed from the pertinent category list and will
not be allowed to participate in any of the other categories. If
they choose to object now to the implied participation in the
polygraph program, they will immediately become ineligible for
any of the accesses or programs listed. They will be informed
that failure to participate in the polygraph program by itself
will not affect their basic security clearance.

The total number of names submitted by LANL numbers over 5000
(for Sandia some 3800). We expect the random sampling rate to be
a few percent at most per year since the capacity for exams is
limited, which means that the likelihood of being called in any
year is very small. The LANL/CI organization will notify
individuals when we are given a list of people that will be
contacted directly by DOE/CI. The Chief Security Office and CI
will schedule sessions to explain the polygraph program and to
help people prepare.

Is Help On the Way?

Evidence suggests that the Labor Department is seeking to limit federal compensation payouts to victims of Cold War-era nuclear contamination.

Audrey Dutton | May 16, 2007 | web only

In the desert of southeastern Idaho, there is a sprawling nuclear complex named the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL). It's a smattering of boxy buildings surrounded by about 900 miles of sagebrush and sand. The facility was built at the very beginning of the Cold War, when the Atomic Energy Commission peppered the country's most desolate areas with power plants and nuclear testing sites.

In 1951, the INEEL was the first in the United States to produce electricity using atomic energy. Ten years later, it was the site of the country's first and only fatal nuclear power plant accident.

On January 3, 1961, three workers were sent in for routine maintenance on a low-power reactor at the edge of the INEEL campus. That night, two of the men hovered near the reactor, while the third stood on top, bracing his legs to hoist a 90-pound control rod. But he pulled too fast, triggering a nuclear reaction that burst the vessel. The violent explosion killed all three men -- impaling one in the ceiling -- and pumped their bodies so full of radiation that they would later be buried in lead caskets.

Wilford Anderson was one of the first men at the scene. He and his wife Betty had been on their way to bed that night when the phone rang, and Wilford heard about the accident. Radiation was leaking from the reactor at levels beyond what INEEL equipment could measure; Wilford's job at the plant was to monitor radiation exposure. He headed out the door, and didn't come home for a week.

In the fall of that year, Wilford got sick. Within a few years, Betty says, her husband was visiting the plant's infirmary two or three times a week with headaches and chronic colds. He later learned he had developed lymphoma and thyroid cancer. The cancers killed him in 1993.

Betty says the federal government denied until last year that Wilford had been exposed to fatal doses of radiation. She spent five years trying to convince the Department of Labor that Wilford's cancers were linked to the INEEL disaster. She filed seven Freedom of Information Act requests that yielded heavily blacked-out copies of her husband's employment records. It was only after hiring chemists, physicists, and attorneys to help make her case that she won compensation for her husband's death.

“They took us in circle after circle,” Betty said. “It’s so unfair, and what really, really disturbs me is I know this is still going on.”

Her frustration is echoed by chronically and terminally ill people who worked at nuclear facilities across the country during the Cold War. Men with radioactive particles lodged in their sinuses, welders who remember iodine spills and crane operators who breathed cesium -- these people, or their surviving family members, say the government is betraying its promise to compensate them for decades of radiation overdoses.

Indeed, evidence suggests that the Labor Department and Bush administration have sought to limit payouts through a federal compensation program by delaying or blocking the approval of eligible compensation claims. Cold War nuclear workers and their advocates point to a series of e-mails and memos circulated within the DOL and between it and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) -- documents that sparked a series of under-noticed congressional hearings last year. Former nuclear workers and their families hope that those hearings will not mark the end of congressional investigations into the program.

But the program’s administrators maintain that their only goal is to pay claims fairly, and that critics are misinterpreting the documents that sparked hearings.

---

In the eleventh hour of his presidency, Bill Clinton acknowledged tens of thousands of cases like Anderson's when he approved the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000. The Act had won bipartisan support on Capitol Hill and was presented as an expression of contrition for decades of government-sponsored radiation overdoses. It recognized that, for decades, Cold War workers were kept in the dark about the dangers of chemicals and radioactive materials they handled each day. In his statement accompanying the Act, Clinton told administrators of the program to be "compassionate, fair, and timely."

The Act mandates that the federal government give lump-sum payments of $150,000 to ailing nuclear workers or their surviving spouses and children, pay medical bills, and make up for lost wages. But first, claimants must prove that their work at Department of Energy facilities made them sick.

Most claims are decided by a lengthy technical process -- sometimes taking as long as three years -- that calculates how likely it is that an illness was caused by work in Cold War facilities. Many claimants have died while awaiting payments from the Labor Department.

A select group of facilities are part of a "special exposure cohort," whose retirees are automatically granted compensation if they have one of 22 types of cancer and worked at the facility within a set timeframe. There are currently 18 sites in the cohort, and legislators (including New York Senators Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton) have jockeyed to get the coveted cohort status for their states' facilities.

The INEEL belongs to the former group, putting the burden of proof on claimants. Retirees who have applied for benefits outside of the cohort describe a losing battle -- denials followed by years of appeals.

One of these claimants is Darrell Hanni, a 77-year-old grandfather who ran the bulldozers that razed the INEEL wreckage and buried the contaminated debris in the desert, far from human contact. Hanni started that job on July 1, 1961. He finished on July 1, 1962. He said his records show that he got nearly 70 times the average American's annual radiation during that year. According to the Department of Energy's guidelines, a nuclear employee's acceptable dose of radiation in a calendar year is 2,000 mrem. If you're going to push it, the DOE says you can get away with 5,000, under strict monitoring. Hanni said the medical records he got from INEEL when he retired show a total dose of more than 13,000 for the 12 months he worked at the radioactive site.

Hanni was diagnosed with bladder cancer in 2001. Faced with piles of medical bills and suspecting a link to the INEEL cleanup -- or to the 40 years prior that he spent working in radioactive danger zones at INEEL -- he applied for compensation under the Act, but was denied. In Hanni's denial letter, the Labor Department told him that a computerized calculation showed only a 41.83 percent chance his job gave him cancer -- not the 50 percent likelihood required to get paid. He would need to come up with proof of that extra 8.17 percent.

Another claimant who was denied, Harold Rothwell, worked as a welder at INEEL. One of many accidental radiation exposures he recalled happened in the 1950s. He woke the next day with a blistered mouth, swollen throat, and loose teeth, he said. He continued working as a welder at INEEL, where he frequently went into the heart of nuclear reactors to finish welding jobs. Now he is wheelchair-bound from lung and joint problems, including an elbow whose cartilage has fallen out of the joint and hangs loose in his skin.

Shirley Codding is another Idaho worker whose claims were denied. Codding processed uranium byproducts from spent fuel rods from 1981 until last year. Codding’s first tumor appeared in her head 20 years ago, when she was 39. Three more tumors followed. Codding has gone through radiation treatments, and doctors removed her ear to extract the tumors. She is now deaf in her right ear, which is sewn shut and missing an eardrum. Codding says she loved her job at the plant, but wishes the government would answer her plea for medical coverage. “The last time they denied me, I said, you know, I’ve been arguing with them for three years, [and] I finally just dropped it,” she said, adding that most people who ask for compensation “don’t stand a chance.”

Former INEEL workers and their families filed more than 4,300 claims under the Act since 2000. To date, about 300 have been paid. Nationally, nearly 62,000 Cold War veterans have asked for compensation, and of their 146,000 claims, roughly one in five were paid. Nearly 60,000 claims came back with a rejection letter marked "final."

Though standards for compensation have been stringent from the beginning of the program in 2000, matters have worsened under the Bush administration. Program mismanagement by the Labor Department and joint efforts between the DOL and the White House Office of Management and Budget to limit pay-outs are the reasons for high rates of denial, according to claimants and advocates. They said an effort to lower federal spending by a conservative administration, combined with a lack of real interest in paying former Cold War workers, created fertile ground for malfeasance in the Labor Department.

“This is a culture, a trajectory, a set of initiatives,” said Richard Miller, a nuclear worker advocate who had testified during hearings on behalf of the Government Accountability Project, a watchdog group. “We were fighting constantly, not knowing this whole hidden agenda was going on … or the degree of contempt they held claimants, members of Congress.”

Starting in October 2005, less than a year after the Labor Department began adjudicating claims under program director Shelby Hallmark, the DOL began sifting through eligible claims and sending them back through the claims process to be "reworked." According to Miller’s testimony from the fourth hearing, a DOL e-mail written during that time said, "When we send remand orders to claimants, I don't want them to know they are part of a management plan."

Hallmark said the e-mail was written by someone “down at the staff level” and doesn’t mean that the Labor Department was hiding a management plan. “That was inadroit language,” Hallmark told the Prospect earlier this month.

Also that October, an e-mail from the OMB to Hallmark praised him for alerting the OMB to efforts by workers' advocates and legislators to add more nuclear plants to the automatically-compensated special exposure cohort. The e-mail encouraged Hallmark to present "programmatic reforms" that "we could potentially tee up for our policy officials."

The subsequent memo from OMB to Hallmark, for the White House's proposed 2007 budget, listed five ideas to "contain growth in the cost of benefits provided by the program." One option was to give the White House authority to decide which claims qualified for compensation. Hallmark brought up budget and cost-containment in a number of e-mails subpoenaed by the House subcommittee that held hearings on the program last year. Despite this, the OMB and DOL have maintained during congressional hearings and interviews that there are no plans to restrict claims.

"The OMB document they're talking about raised options for internal debate within the administration, and obviously there was a lot of internal debate that was going on," Hallmark said during an interview on the Hill last December. He said the DOL's only plans were to fairly compensate nuclear veterans.

In an interview earlier this month, Hallmark said he understands why some veterans are angry at the Labor Department for rejecting their claims. “Many people get cancer. Forty, 50 percent of the population is going to get cancer at one time or another, regardless of what they’re exposed to. And if I were a worker at one of these sites, and I got cancer, I would … think that my cancer was caused by exposure at the work site,” Hallmark said. “The science doesn’t necessarily work out that way.”

Hallmark said the memo opened a floodgate of “20,000 e-mails” subpoenaed by the committee that he has “spent the last two years having to dig up,” and that his words have been misinterpreted. (The White House has never disavowed its memo suggesting ideas for cost-containment.)

The five-part series of hearings on the Hill occurred following the leaking of the OMB memo to the Associated Press in the spring of 2006. Ousted Republican Representative John Hostettler chaired the hearings. He brought in officials from the OMB and Labor Department, scientists, claimants, and the Government Accountability Office -- which found a need for “diligent” program oversight. The hearings provoked outraged statements from elected officials across the country, including Senators Schumer, Clinton, and Obama.

Cindy Blackston, then a House Judiciary Committee staffer who worked on the investigation, spent at least 16 hours poring over Labor Department communications after the OMB memo was leaked. Blackston said the e-mails she read showed a deeply rooted bias in the administration against paying Cold War survivors.

“The only way to make [the program’s payment record] somewhat reasonable is to basically police it 24/7, and that’s a problem because you have to have a concerted effort by a lot of people with influence or visibility,” she said. “Nobody from the new majority or minority is banging the drum.”

Meanwhile, the movement against the program is gaining momentum outside of Capitol Hill. Six workers from Colorado, New Mexico, and Ohio filed the first class action lawsuit against the administration last month. The men sued the DOL over withholding payments for in-home nursing care. There would have been eight men named as plaintiffs in the suit -- but two of them died, both of whom were waiting for the Labor Department to pay for healthcare services ordered by their doctors.

But Hostettler’s successor, Democrat Zoe Lofgren of California, has not committed to picking up where Hostettler left off investigating the program -- though she said in an e-mail to the Prospect that she is "deeply distressed" by the DOL's payment record.

With investigations at a standstill in Washington, claimants and their surviving family members are struggling to figure out just who are the compensation program's true beneficiaries. "Once you get into it deep, and see all the politics, it makes you wonder," Betty Anderson said. "The people who were exposed out there, most of them are dead now because they were in their 80s. It seems [Labor Department administrators] were just waiting for people to die so they wouldn't have to pay them."

Audrey Dutton is a reporter for The Gazette in Montgomery County, Maryland.

May 15, 2007

Former Los Alamos National Laboratory Contractor Pleads Guilty to Removing Classified Information

WASHINGTON, May 15 /PRNewswire-USNewswire/ -- Jessica Lynn Quintana, a former employee of a contractor at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), has pleaded guilty to knowingly removing classified information from the national security research laboratory, Assistant Attorney General for National Security Kenneth L. Wainstein announced today.
According to the facts admitted in her plea, Quintana was employed by a contractor at the Los Alamos research facility to archive classified information. On July 27, 2006, while she was working on this project in a secure area at the LANL, Quintana printed off pages of classified documents and downloaded other classified information to a computer thumb drive, before putting them in a backpack and taking them home. Quintana stored the pages and thumb drive at her residence, which was not an authorized location for the storage of classified information.
On Oct. 17, 2006, the Los Alamos Police Department executed a state search warrant on Quintana's home and seized the thumb drive containing classified information. Three days later, the FBI seized the classified printouts during the execution of a federal search warrant on her residence.
Quintana entered her misdemeanor guilty plea this afternoon in federal court in Albuquerque, NM. She faces a maximum sentence of up to one year in jail, a $100,000 fine, and a year of supervised release. She could also be sentenced to probation for up to five years. As part of the plea agreement, Quintana has agreed to cooperate with the government. Quintana no longer
has a security clearance.
The case was investigated by the Albuquerque Division of the FBI. The case was prosecuted by Senior Trial Attorney Clifford I. Rones of the Counterespionage Section at the Justice Department's National Security Division and by Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert D. Kimball of the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Mexico.
Contact: U.S. Department of Justice, 202-514-2007, or TDD, 202-514-1888
SOURCE U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Memorandum #1026

Post-Cold War security requires a new nuclear weapons policy, operational doctrine, arsenal, and infrastructure. The Bush Administration, which announced a new strategic policy with the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in 2002 and issued a draft of the new Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations for the mili­tary in 2005, is now moving to construct a nuclear arsenal to meet the needs of the new policy and doctrine, which directs the field­ing of both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear and conventional forces to reduce to an absolute minimum the possibility that any hostile state will be able to launch a successful stra­tegic attack on the U.S. or its friends and allies.

While the Bush Administration does not use the term, this constitutes a damage-limitation strategy. In this context, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced on March 2, 2007, that a joint Department of Defense and NNSA Nuclear Weapons Council had selected a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory design for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW is to be provided to the Navy to replace existing warheads on a portion of its submarine-based nuclear-armed missiles.

The NNSA's description of the requirements behind the design and the design itself, however, seems to indicate that meeting the requirements for military utility and effectiveness was not the most important consideration in the selection process. This should set off alarm bells on Capitol Hill. An effective nuclear deterrent force remains essential to the protection of U.S. security. An RRW design that fails to meet the requirements for the dam­age-limitation strategy, which is dra­matically different from and more taxing in certain ways than the Cold War strategy for deterring the Soviet Union, would not only be of limited capability, but could also be coun­terproductive insofar as it bolsters a perception of effectiveness that is a delusion.

A Question of Emphasis. The NNSA's announce­ment listed seven attributes of the RRW program as important achievements reached through the de­sign competition:

  • Assuring long-term confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile,
  • Enhancing the security of U.S. nuclear weapons,
  • Improving the safety of the stockpile,
  • Developing a responsive infrastructure,
  • Sustaining nuclear weapons design and produc­tion skills,
  • Reducing the size of the weapons stockpile, and
  • Decreasing the likelihood of the need for an explosive nuclear test.

All of these attributes are appropriate for a suc­cessful RRW program, and all but the last two are essential. None, however, speaks to the issue of how the RRW will meet the needs of the new dam­age-limitation strategy that presumably involves entirely new targeting requirements, more urgent timelines for conducting operations, and mating of the warhead with new delivery vehicles beyond the existing Navy missiles.

Acting NNSA Administrator Thomas P. D'Agostino, in testimony before the House Sub­committee on Strategic Forces on March 20, 2007, indicated that ensuring the utility of the RRW in meeting new military requirements has been all but ignored: "We are pursuing the RRW strategy to ensure the long-term sustainment of the military capabilities provided by warheads in the existing stockpile, not to develop warheads for new or different military missions."

Need to Focus on Military Utility. It appears that Congress needs to remind the NNSA Adminis­trator that the NPR and the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations have already designated new military missions for nuclear weapons and that it is the NNSA's responsibility to design and build the warheads needed to fulfill those missions.

This does not mean that Congress should with­hold support for the RRW as was done by the House Armed Services Committee in its May 10 mark-up of the fiscal 2008 Defense Authorization bill. The Committee took the short-sighted action of reduc­ing funding for the RRW program by 40 percent. Rather, Congress should accelerate the program and broaden its purpose. Specifically, Congress should:

  • Provide the NNSA with the full $6.5 billion re­quested for weapons activities in fiscal year 2008.
  • Direct the NNSA to refine the RRW's design and build it to provide the military with the capabili­ties to hold at risk enemy targets that require nuclear weapons and that constitute the means to attack the U.S. and its friends and allies with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. This includes both hardened and mobile targets.
  • Direct the NNSA to design and build the RRW so that it can be mated to delivery systems that can strike enemy targets quickly and accurately enough to limit the damage that otherwise would be imposed on the U.S. and its friends and allies.
  • Give the NNSA the explicit authority to pursue the RRW as a new warhead design and conduct explosive tests as necessary to field nuclear weapons with these capabilities.

Conclusion. Nuclear weapons are no less essen­tial to the security of the U.S. and its friends and allies than they were during the Cold War, but the requirements are different. Current and projected circumstances will allow the U.S. to maintain a smaller active nuclear arsenal and stockpile of war­heads, in part based on the deployment of effective conventionally armed strategic strike weapons and defenses. This smaller U.S. nuclear arsenal, how­ever, makes it more important that the arsenal is fully modernized and tailored to meeting the demands of the damage-limitation strategy.

U.S. strategic forces should not be used to exact revenge on an enemy foolish enough to attack the U.S. or its friends and allies with weapons of mass destruction. They should be used to deter that enemy from attacking by making it clear that such an attack will fail.

Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Alli­son Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for Interna­tional Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

May 14, 2007

Time to support nuclear workers

The Current-Argus
Article Launched: 05/12/2007 08:57:32 PM MDT

Even during the blithest years of Los Alamos National Laboratory when the place took on an especially sanitary look and lab leaders motto seemed to be "What, me worry?" savvy scientists knew they were playing with more than mere fire. Radiation poisoning was just one of the early clues; cancer wasn't far behind.

But some daring people persevered in pursuit of super-weapons America's politicians hoped would deter our nemesis, the Soviet Union, from launching their nuclear bombs in our direction. Mutually Assured Destruction, as the doctrine came to be known, was MAD, all right even though there was method to it.

What wasn't as clear was why this country's finest mathematicians, chemists, physicists and engineers could push the risks of contamination to the backs of their brilliant minds and take comfort in lead sheeting and other shields concocted after zapping animals and watching the results. From the nuclear garbage spewed down the arroyos outside the laboratories to the hydrogen-bomb components assembled inside, sometimes in close quarters, the wizards were working with dangerous stuff.

When cancer struck, denial came with it: People everywhere get it; that's life ...

Or death. Or fear prompted by certain symptoms. Or misery. Or loss of an organ, maybe only part of it.

Those Northern New Mexicans who knew less about the cancer risks tend to be the bitterest about what hit them physically and bureaucratically: Can you prove that your cancer came from exposure to radiation on the job? Or was it radon that occurs naturally all over the West? Or was it something else?

Decades of official responses such as that prompted Sen. Jeff Bingaman, D-N.M., to push for an Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act. Passed in 2000 while Bingaman was chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, the law is good as far as it goes.

But it comes with that catch: prove that you've got a radiation-induced and work-related cancer.

Most people knowledgeable enough to prove that probably would have stayed away from LANL in the first place and making a case before the Bush Department of Labor seems to demand the background of a J. Robert Oppenheimer.

So we're encouraged by the effort of our state's Speaker of the House, Ben Lujan of Nambe, whose constituents include hundreds of lab employees: He got a $125,000 appropriation through the Legislature to open an office of advocacy for folks who figure their medical problems come from work on the Hill.

That money, most likely, isn't nearly enough. Lujan had sought $610,000, and that would only be a start. And it's strange that New Mexico taxpayers have to pay for it at all: As the speaker notes, "all we're trying to do is to get the Department of Energy to live up to its obligations. Some of these people have legitimate complaints."

Maybe not all of them but where there's the slightest doubt, the federal government should err on the side of the claimants. As Bingaman points out, thousands of workers took part in experiments at LANL "and only later were some of them determined to be dangerous to their health. I strongly believe that they should receive compensation and medical care for the important work they performed."

His support, and that of Rep. Lujan, come under the category of better late than never. What's needed now is legislative-branch follow-up, at the state and federal level.

Nuke weapons workers denied

Government rejects 60 percent of their cancer health claims
By MICHAEL ALISON CHANDLER and JOBY WARRICK
The Washington Post
Article Last Updated: 05/14/2007 01:35:31 AM PDT

WASHINGTON — Walter McKenzie's assignment toward the end of the Cold War was to mop up after mishaps at a nuclear weapons factory. With a crew of other laborers from rural Georgia, he swabbed away leaks and spills inside the secret buildings, until one day his body became so contaminated with radiation that alarms at the factory went off as he passed.

"They couldn't scrub the radiation off my skin — even after four showers," McKenzie, 52, recalled of his most terrifying day at the Savannah River nuclear weapons plant near Aiken, S.C. "They took my clothes, my watch and even my ring, and sent me home in rubber slippers and a jumpsuit."

Later, when doctors discovered the first of 19 malignant tumors on his bladder, McKenzie followed the same torturous path as thousands of nuclear weapons workers with cancer: He filed a claim for federal compensation. It was denied.

Unable to access secret government files, or even some of his own personnel records, McKenzie could not sufficiently prove that he was exposed to something that may have made him sick. Nor can most of the 104,000 other workers, retirees and family members who have sought help from a federal program intended to atone for decades of hazardous working conditions at scores of nuclear weapons facilities around the country.

Hidden costs|

Since its inception in 2000, the compensation program has cut more than 20,000 checks and given long-delayed recognition to workers whose illnesses were hidden costs of the Cold War's military buildup.

Yet, of the 72,000 cases processed, more than 60 percent have been denied. Thousands of other applicants have been waiting for years for an answer. Overall, only 21 percent of applicants have received checks. Even as the nation continues to close and dismantle many nuclear weapons sites, a growing number of those who helped build the bombs are turning to lawyers and legislators to argue they are being treated unfairly.

Many complain that the compensation process is slow, frustrating, even insulting. "You get exposed to something that's so bad you have to leave your clothes behind," McKenzie said, "then they try to tell you it's not their fault that you got sick."

Feds call program a success|

Some evidence suggests the government has tried to limit payouts for budget reasons. Internal memos obtained by congressional investigators show the Bush administration chafing over the program's rising costs and fighting to block measures that would increase workers' chances of compensation.

But Labor Department officials who oversee the program say it has been successful, pointing to the large sums distributed: about $2.6 billion in payments in five years, far more than some early estimates. Missing or unreliable records and the murkiness of cancer science, the officials say, make it difficult to satisfy all the claimants.

"In a compensation program, you get benefits out to people who are eligible and you inevitably have to deal with the fact that some people are not eligible," said Shelby Hallmark, director of Labor's Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. "As for the assumption that the program is somehow trying to block people from getting compensation, nothing could be further from the truth."

David Michaels, a former Energy Department official who helped launch the program in the late 1990s, said it is designed to "bend over backward" to award compensation to deserving workers. "Most of the people who should be compensated are being compensated," said Michaels, now associate chairman of George Washington University's department of environmental and occupational health.

'Normal beans'|

Still, Labor's management of the program has drawn bipartisan, and often fierce, criticism from members of Congress.

Former congressman John Hostettler, an Indiana Republican who chaired a House subcommittee overseeing the program, said at a hearing last December that Labor Department memos reflect a "culture of disdain" toward workers and raise questions about whether the department exceeded its authority by using "legalistic interpretations" to limit eligible workers.

"To the bean counters, I would remind you that these aren't normal beans you are counting," Hostettler said. "These funds are a small acknowledgment of the sacrifice by workers whose lives were put at risk to make this country safe."

The compensation plan was unveiled in September 1999 by then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson. "We're reversing the decades-old practice of opposing worker claims and moving forward to do the right thing," he said in 2000.

The shift was prompted in part by a drumbeat of reports about hazards at nuclear weapons plants, including articles in The Washington Post that showed how the government for years fought lawsuits from workers in Paducah, Ky., who were exposed to plutonium 100,000 times as radioactive as they were trained to handle.

Under the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program, the government agreed to provide $150,000 and medical benefits to claimants who developed certain diseases and cancers. Another part of the program covers those exposed to toxic chemicals.

For each claim, government investigators review the evidence and decide whether a worker's illness was more likely than not caused by exposure to radiation at work. Under the act, the claim is denied if the probability is ruled to be less than 50 percent.

The complex task of coming up with such estimates through reconstructing the conditions inside secret plants as much as 60 years ago was assigned to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, or NIOSH.

Scant records|

The estimates are based largely on personnel files and historical radiation measurements at the plants. But the records are often so incomplete and unreliable that it can be impossible to determine a worker's true exposure. For example, workers would sometimes remove the badges they were supposed to wear to monitor their cumulative doses of radiation.

"At every site, you hear stories about workers being told to put their badges in their lockers," said Mark Griffon, a radiation-safety expert who advises the government on worker exposure. "If workers wore their badges and ended up exceeding their quarterly radiation limit, they could be laid off or put in a different job."

Another obstacle is that records are becoming harder to track as plants are dismantled. Early this year, for example, more than 400 boxes of medical records that had been contaminated by radiation at an Ohio weapons facility turned up in a landfill in Los Alamos, N.M. The government is deciding whether to exhume them.

The compensation program does provide a path for the government to help workers if records are lost or questionable. But critics say officials are reluctant to pursue it.

NIOSH and a White House-appointed panel on radiation exposure can recommend groups of workers from a particular site for a "special exposure cohort," making them automatically eligible for compensation if they suffer from leukemia, thyroid cancer or one of 20 other cancers.

No special status|

So far, groups of workers from 18 sites have been added to the special exposure cohort, and petitions are pending for workers from a dozen other sites. The process can be difficult, as people who worked at the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons plant who applied for that status have learned.

On the rugged foothills outside Denver, there's little sign now of the sprawling plutonium facility that once employed as many as 7,000 people. The site was dismantled in a $7 billion, 10-year effort that ended in 2005 and is being turned into a wildlife refuge.

With the plant gone, many workers are struggling to re-create what happened in the 800-building complex that manufactured plutonium triggers for nuclear bombs. Thousands of fires were recorded in the plants' 40-year history, including one on Mother's Day 1969 that burned for several hours and released massive amounts of radioactive material.

Of the more than 5,100 Rocky Flats claims filed, about 1,400 have been approved. Many applicants who were denied blame missing or inadequate records and petitioned two years ago for special cohort status.

NIOSH officials recommended against the special status for Rocky Flats, reasoning that they could account for missing records by altering their models and overestimating exposures. Then, earlier this month, the radiation advisory board recommended the special cohort for a small number of workers: those employed from 1952 to 1958, when gaps in the recordkeeping apparently were the largest.

Advocates for the Rocky Flats workers point to multiple cases to illustrate the difficulty of meeting the government's standard for compensation without being part of the special cohort.

One worker, Donald Gabel, contracted a rare form of brain cancer at age 29, after nearly 10 years at the plant, and died in 1980. Months before his death, he testified that his job required him to climb several times a day to the top of a furnace, his head inches from a pipe expelling radioactive exhaust. Government contractors said they could not find his records and could not take new measurements because the pipe had been removed.

After Gabel died, his wife requested tests of plutonium levels in his brain, but she says government scientists told her they had lost most of the tissue and could not take an accurate sample.

Despite the problems, Gabel's widow, Kae Williams, won a rare victory in a traditional workers' compensation lawsuit, getting about $15,000 for her three children. But when she applied for additional benefits under the new program in 2001, the claim took four years to process and was ultimately denied. A government computer program found only a 41.73 percent chance that her husband's brain cancer was work-related.

"They make it sound like they are doing the right thing," Williams said. "For a glimpse, you think they are. And they are not."

Takoma Park, MD — May 14 - Radioactive materials are being released from nuclear weapons facilities to regular landfills and could get into commercial recycling streams, finds a new report released today by Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS).

The report: Out of Control — On Purpose: DOE's Dispersal of Radioactive Waste into Landfills and Consumer Products — was commissioned to track if and how the Department of Energy (DOE) releases some of the radioactive wastes from nuclear bomb production.

The report authors, led by Diane D'Arrigo, NIRS' Radioactive Waste Project Director, researched seven sites and the DOE national headquarters. The seven sites were: Oak Ridge TN, Rocky Flats CO, Los Alamos NM, Mound and Fernald OH, West Valley NY, and Paducah KY.

"People around regular trash landfills will be shocked to learn that radioactive contamination from nuclear weapons production is ending up there, either directly released by DOE or via brokers and processors," D'Arrigo said. "Just as ominous, the DOE allows and encourages sale and donation of some radioactively contaminated materials."

The report tracked the laws, guidance and technical justifications that DOE uses to rationalize allowing radioactive scrap, concrete, equipment, asphalt, plastic, wood, chemicals, soil, and more out to landfills, commercial businesses and recreation areas, recycling and reuse in places unprepared to handle radioactivity. Applauding DOE's ban on recycling of radioactive metal from nuclear weapons, the report cautions there are loopholes and it is again threatened.

"DOE is ignoring public opposition to unnecessary exposures and releasing radioactivity even though the U.S. Congress revoked such release policies," said Mary Olson, director of the NIRS Southeast office and a co-author of the report. "DOE is using its own internal guidance to allow radioactive weapons wastes out of control, claiming the doses to people will be 'acceptable' even though they are not enforced or tracked."

Under the current system, the DOE and other nuclear waste generators release materials directly, sell them at auction or through exchanges or send their waste to processors who can then release it from radioactive controls to landfills, to recyclers or for reuse.

The report found that the State of Tennessee is a leader in licensing processors that can release radioactive materials for the nuclear waste generators.

"Tennessee is serving as a funnel to bring in nuclear weapons and power waste from around the country to disperse into the landfills and recycling without public knowledge," D'Arrigo said.

The waste is processed by state-licensed companies and in some cases "redefined" as "special" then released to regular landfills. This free release also opens up the potential for the materials to enter the recycling stream to make everyday household and personal items or to be used to build roads, schools, and playgrounds.

"As long as DOE and other nuclear waste generators can slip their contamination out — letting it get Out of Control — On Purpose — there is really no limit to the amount of additional radiation exposure members of the public could receive," D'Arrigo concluded. "Only an informed, outraged public can force DOE and agreeable states to shift the goal from dispersal to isolation of radioactive waste."

A copy of the full report can be found on the NIRS web site at: http://www.nirs.org/radwaste/outofcontrol/outofcontrol.htm

The report authors and contributors include: Diane D'Arrigo, NIRS' Radioactive Waste Project Director Mary Olson, Director, NIRS Southeast Office Cindy Folkers, NIRS, Health and Environment Project Dr. Marvin Resnikoff, Radioactive Waste Management Associates, NYC

University of Mass Destruction:

UC Students Demanding “No More Nukes In Our Name!”
by Will Parrish; May 13, 2007

For over six decades, the University of California has been the United States government’s primary nuclear weapons research and design contractor. It has managed the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore nuclear weapons compounds since their inceptions. Scientists at these laboratories – UC employees, all – have designed every nuclear warhead in the US arsenal, of which there have been 65 designated types (1). UC nuclear weaponeers have also carried out close to every US nuclear weapons test detonation since the dawn of the Nuclear Age, of which the official tally is 1,054.(2)

The fealty of the UC Board of Regents to the nuclear industry is such that, during Fiscal Year 2005-06, the UC received almost as much money from the Department of Energy to conduct nuclear weapons programs ($2.76 billion) as it received from the State of California for education ($2.85 billion).(3)

On Wednesday, May 9th, 41 UC students, alumni, and faculty members began a hunger strike to demand that the UC retract its management of the Los Alamos and Livermore labs. The hunger strike marks a new approach for a student-driven UC labs severance campaign that has taken place for the past five years. Individuals at four campuses – Berkeley, Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and Santa Barbara -- are part of the hunger strike roster. They are being joined by one “solidarity faster” in Albuquerque.

This bold act of civil resistance comes at a critical time. In March, the US Nuclear Weapons Council, an interagency committee of executives from the Departments of Defense and Energy, announced that the UC's Livermore facility would develop a new hydrogen bomb. Officially, this is to be the first new US nuclear weapon since the end of the Cold War.

Los Alamos is slated to manufacture the plutonium bomb cores, or "pits," for these weapons. Owing in part to its technical complexity and political baggage, pit manufacturing is the pivotal step in creating a new generation of nuclear bombs.(4)

The larger context for these programs is that the US nuclear weapons complex is attempting to renew itself, to prepare its infrastructure and employees for the task of building dozens of new nukes a year by the year 2030. The Department of Energy (DOE) has outlined that plan in its “Complex 2030” document, released this past November.(5)

The UC stands to play a central role in these developments. But it is instructive to note that the Regents do not really “manage” LANL and LLNL in any meaningful sense. As a UC faculty committee observed in 1970, the UC’s role at the weapons labs is akin to that of a “benevolent absentee landlord.” The Regents rubber-stamp everything the labs do, providing no actual oversight of their programs and policies -- precisely as the (DOE) requires of them.

From the perspective of the DOE, then, what is the benefit of UC weapons lab management, or the illusion thereof? As the largest public research university system in the world, the UC provides the ultimate fig leaf of academic respectability to nuclear weapons science. Over 30 years ago, the late grassroots organization the UC Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project noted: “The UC does not manage the nuclear weapons labs, but rather the public relations about the weapons labs.” By casting the UC’s intellectual and political capital on the side of the nuclear weapons industry, the Regents help to legitimize everything these labs do.

By contrast, if the Regents withdrew their management of LANL and LLNL, they would effectively do the opposite: They would provide the weapons labs with the worst publicity possible. The political consequences of their doing so would be vast. A major crisis would ensue for the nuclear weapons complex. Congress might awaken to the necessity of overseeing the labs’ work in a more meaningful way. Morale among lab workers would plunge. The public discourse about nuclear weapons would shift in a small but significant way. Those who favor disarmament would have achieved a major victory that they could mobilize in their effort to eliminate nuclear weapons once and for all.

That is particularly so at this critical juncture. The Regents have rarely been more politically vulnerable in their capacity as nukes lab managers. The labs' new hydrogen bomb program, misleadingly referred to as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), has virtually no technical justification and is clearly contrary to the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits the US to pursuing negotiations in “good faith” for nuclear disarmament. The RRW is deeply unpopular even among many long-time nuclear weapons supporters. It is even opposed by The Navy.(6)

If the RRW dies, the US nuclear weapons complex will be, in turn, one step closer to the grave. One of the complex’s dirty secrets is that it is currently in a state of crisis. The post-Cold War world is producing increasingly few young scientists interested in working on nuclear weapons. Many of the weapons labs’ projects lack a clear purpose and a clear goal. UC weapons lab severance would cause this crisis to deepen appreciably.

The day prior to the hunger strike, the UC officially received a new contract, only with a twist: It will manage the lab as part of a limited-liability corporation with Bechtel Corporation, two other multi-national firms, and Texas A&M University. In 2006, UC-Bechtel’s Los Alamos Security, LLC likewise took over from the UC alone as manager of Los Alamos. The contradictions of UC weapons lab management, thus, have never been greater.

The focus of the UC hunger strike is, in many ways, the UC Regents meeting at UC San Francisco on Thursday, May 17th. Hunger strikers, hundreds of their supporters at UC campuses, and other supportive activists and individuals throughout California will mobilize for direct action at the meeting. In the meantime, we are attempting by every non-violent means possible to pressure The Regents to sever their nuclear ties. If The Regents fail to withdraw their weapons lab management, many of those participating (including the author) have pledged to sustain their hunger fasts indefinitely.

We invite everyone who supports a livable future to support this effort in any way you can. There are endless ways to do so. For more information, please visit nonukeshungerstrike.blogspot.com and www.ucnuclearfree.org, or e-mail wparrish@napf.org.

Will Parrish is an alumnus of UC Santa Cruz, a coordinator of the UC Nuclear Free campaign (www.ucnuclearfree.org), and an anti-war organizer living in Santa Barbara, CA.

1. http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/50.htm
2. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Usa/Tests/index.html
3. http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/regents/regmeet/nov06/502attach.pdf
4. http://www.lasg.org
5. http://www.fcnl.org/issues/item.php?item_id=2159&issue_id=51
6. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/03/AR2007030301077.html

Pension changes challenge for Lawrence Livermore

Article Last Updated: 05/13/2007 08:19:54 AM PDT

FOR DECADES, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has been a unique place to work.

During the decades of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union, it offered challenging work at competitive compensation that was clearly in the national interest. During that time, work centered on nuclear weapons, a focus that still is central to the lab, but challenges and opportunities have broadened.

As the work world changed dramatically in the last 15 years, one of the labs huge competitive advantages was its amazingly rich, defined-benefit contribution system. Work there long enough, and you could retire at virtually the same pay as your final working check and receive annual cost-of-living increases, along with lifetime health care to supplement Medicare.

The golden handcuffs provided by that system allowed the lab to offer career employment, a term that is foreign to private sector companies today.

Come Oct. 1, it also will be a term that no longer will be used at the lab.

The Department of Energy announced last week the results of its competitive-bidding process for management of the lab. Management of all three Energy Department facilities formerly managed by the University of California was put out to bid after a series of security and management breaches, particularly at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, got too much for the feds to bear.

Perhaps ironically, UC retained the contract in all three instances, but has partners in the two national weapons labs.

The primary partners in the group that will run Lawrence Livermore include Bechtel National Inc., BMX Technologies Inc. and the Washington Group International Inc. Also involved are Battelle Memorial Institute, four small business subcontractors and Texas A&M University.

Only time will tell whether bringing private partners into the mix will improve laboratory performance, particularly in the security and business areas.

It will cost much more: The maximum management fee went from $7.1 million for UC in the fiscal year that ends this September to $45.5 million for the next year.

Perhaps the bigger challenge will be the work force issues. Veteran Livermore employees now must figure out what to do to retain their UC pensions even though theyre grandfathered into the new system that is supposed to provide equivalent benefits.

Its the newcomers who no longer will have the golden handcuffs of defined benefits. The new plan, by Energy Department fiat, was required to be a defined-benefit plan similar to a 401(k) in the private sector. Theres a world of difference.

Notably, the UC pension system has benefited from both good management of invested funds and the rising stock markets, so that neither the government nor the employees have had to contribute to the plan for more than a decade. Thats a great deal compared to others with defined-benefit plans who routinely see 8 percent or more of their paycheck withheld for their pension.

Come Oct. 1, the retirement plan will stand by itself with just the single new entity from just one lab, instead of the immense UC system.

From a work force recruitment and retention standpoint, it will become much more challenging for lab managers to bring in talented people and hold them with the lure of the private sector and its stock option potential.

This is particularly likely in the hot areas of bioscience, which holds much promise, both in private companies and for government-funded labs that will need to focus on homeland security issues.

Part of the strength of the labs has been the capability to bring experienced people from varied disciplines together to work on a big issue. If the labs can no longer retain key people at the working science level, the challenge will be much greater than it already is.

Heres hoping the politically driven decision actually proves to be in the national interest. The mixture of the private sector management expertise with the science skill from the university could result in much superior results, but the jury is still out and will be for a number of years.

Tim Hunt is the former editor and associate publisher of the Tri-Valley Herald. He is the principal with Hunt Enterprises, a communications and government affairs firm. He can be reached at HuntEnterprises1@comcast.net.

May 11, 2007

Whistleblower Week

Join POGO and 50 other public interest groups to celebrate Whistleblower Week in Washington

To our friends in the D.C. area: Please join us for the kick-off of "Whistleblower Week in Washington," a week of activities designed to promote protections for government and corporate whistleblowers. This will be the largest gathering of whistleblowers and related public interest groups in U.S. history, and will feature a series of whistleblower panels as well as a screening of the movie The Insider at the Warehouse Theater. Senator Charles Grassley will be receiving a lifetime achievement award for his work protecting whistleblowers.

Click here to learn more about Whistleblower Week in Washington.

Blogging Bechtel Blunders

Wyden pushes Hanford 'accountability'

Posted: 2:37 PM, May. 10, 2007

Last Updated: 2:38 PM, May. 10, 2007


WASHINGTON - Citing a recent report by the Inspector General of the Department of Energy -- which stated that the control system intended for use at the Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford "does not meet the stringent procedures, plans, specifications, or work practices associated with nuclear quality standards" -- Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) sent a letter to Secretary Samuel Bodman Thursday asking what actions the Department will be taking in response to the Inspector General's findings.

"On top of the litany of problems already plaguing construction of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, the Inspector General's report raises serious concerns about the Department's ability to manage nuclear waste clean-up," Wyden said. "Failure to properly manage the project has already added eight years of delay and billions of dollars to the taxpayer's bill. Assurances need to be made that this project is being taken seriously."

In March 2006, Wyden requested that the Inspector General conduct an investigation after a former employee of Bechtel National, Inc - the U.S. Department of Energy's principle contractor for the Hanford Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant Project - raised concerns about his former employer's use of unproven and flawed control systems.

Wyden's letter to Secretary Bodman is below. (To read the Inspector General's Report in its entirety, visit: http://wyden.senate.gov/DOE_Hanford_Report.pdf).

The Honorable Samuel Bodman

Secretary

U.S. Department of Energy

1000 Independence Ave. SW

Washington, DC 20585

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In March 2006, I requested that the Inspector General of the Department of Energy conduct an investigation into complaints that equipment and control systems destined for use in the Nuclear Waste Treatment Plant at Hanford did not meet nuclear safety and quality standards. The Inspector General has just completed the first portion of this investigation concerning the plant's integrated control system. The Inspector General found that this system "...does not meet the stringent procedures, plans, specifications, or work practices associated with nuclear quality standards." For its part, the Department's contractor continues to insist that it has done nothing wrong and the proposed control system is acceptable. I am therefore requesting an explanation of what actions the Department intends to take in response to the Inspector General's findings.

The Inspector General's report quite clearly identifies a number of areas where the Department's contractor failed to establish adequate quality assurance requirements to ensure that the proposed control system met the Department's standards for nuclear activities. For example, the report states that the prime contractor - Bechtel National - had not made sure that subcontractors working on the system had appropriate quality assurance programs, had not clearly set forth the quality assurance standards the system was supposed to meet, and had not consistently applied those standards throughout the plant.

The report also concluded that the Department itself had not properly managed this activity and made sure that Bechtel National was meeting the Department's quality assurance standards. In fact, the report notes that the Department "...was unaware of the nuclear quality assurance standards issue prior to our review."

Unfortunately, this is just the latest example of serious management problems concerning the design and construction of this high-level waste treatment facility - a facility that is essential to the clean up of millions of gallons of high-level waste at the Hanford site. This facility is already being delayed approximately eight years until 2019 at a cost that has more than doubled - from $5.8 billion estimated in 2003 to this year's estimate of $12.3 billion. DOE still lacks a viable plan for more than half of the so-called low-activity waste that is supposed to be removed from the waste tanks and which also has to be vitrified.

Please describe what actions the Department will take to address the Inspector General's findings concerning the design and procurement of this control system and the Department's management of the Waste Treatment Facility. I look forward to your response at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Ron Wyden

United States Senator