Nuclear forensics: more talk, little funding
By ROGER SNODGRASS, Los Alamos Monitor EditorA month past the seventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, a robust program for nuclear forensics has been touted as a future livelihood for the nuclear weapons labs, but serious plans and recommendations have yet to get to the drawing board.
The possibility of nuclear weapons reaching the hands of terrorists, while technically difficult, has often been described as a matter of “not if, but when.”
Analysts have remarked on the problem of attributing responsibility for detonation of a “dirty bomb,” which could be used to disperse radioactive material in urban settings, as one of many scenarios that might someday require a complex and coordinated response.
“A forensic ability that can trace material to the originating reactor or enrichment facility could discourage state cooperation with terrorist elements and encourage better security for nuclear weapons usable materials,” according to an influential scientific report delivered earlier this year.
“In addition, most terrorist organizations will not have members skilled in all aspects of handling nuclear weapons or building an improvised nuclear device. That expertise is found in a small pool of people and a credible attribution capability may deter some who are principally motivated by financial, rather than ideological concerns.”
Meanwhile in Washington, the Defense Authorization Act awaiting President Bush’s signature does contain a set of provisions for improving and revitalizing nuclear forensics, including new fellowships and plans for researching and developing international safeguards, seismic monitoring and nuclear detection technologies.
The item is of interest to the National Nuclear Security Administration and its nuclear weapons laboratories, including Los Alamos National Laboratory, because they are being asked to help plan and ultimately host these enhanced capabilities.
In recent announcements on the transformation of the weapons complex NNSA Administrator Thomas D’Agostino, referred to the nuclear forensics in a list of new responsibilities in the area of non-proliferation, counterterrorism and nuclear response.
In congressional testimony over the last two years D’Agostino has cited the goal of consolidating nuclear materials as enabling NNSA to increase attention to other national security issues, like forensics.
The authorizing language for “Enhancing Nuclear Forensics Capabilities” Section 3114 in the Defense act, was attached near the end of lengthy measure that passed in the final days before Congress adjourned for the fall campaign.
The bill reflects recommendations from the report cited above, “Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs”, which was prepared by a joint working group of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
Donald Barr, a retired nuclear chemist and former deputy group leader of nuclear chemistry at LANL was a member of the working group, as was Benn Tannenbaum, who received his Ph.D. in experimental physics from the University of New Mexico and is currently associate program director of the Center for Science Technology and Security Policy at AAAS.
Tannenbaum said this morning that the authorization measure called for implementation of all the report’s recommendations except for one calling for an external review.
Among the recommendations that were included were those that addressed the need for international cooperation, availability of trained personnel, developing lab and field equipment and numerical modeling and improved program of exercises.
“But the appropriators, by not finishing any new appropriations bills, haven’t given any new money to this program,” Tannenbaum said.
The only new funding for this fiscal year he pointed out was included in the generally “flat funding” appropriations for Defense, Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs and military construction. In that provision the Homeland Security Department was granted $16,900,000 for the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, including $1,000,000 for the new fellowship program.
[See also: Defense Bill Includes Nuclear Forensics Provision]
It works like this: Congress has decided they don't have to actually supply money for programs they say they want for US national security. They just have to verbally support them and then not supply the funds. This makes the US a paper tiger, but as long as no one calls the bluff the scheme works.
ReplyDeleteIt's a shame.
11:04 am: "This makes the US a paper tiger, but as long as no one calls the bluff the scheme works.
ReplyDeleteIt's a shame."
In this case, having our "bluff" called would be more than a "shame." Using the old formula that risk = probability * consequence, no matter how low you set the probability, the consequence of a giant smoking crater appearing where Manhattan used to be is astronomical. How can anyone be comfortable with that risk?
Actually, Wallace and Neu who both claim that they want to own a strong Nuclear Forensics program at LANL have NOT supported Nuclear Forensics whatsoever. NONE of the DR's submitted on the topic this year got funded. Actions speak louder than words ... in fact, Neu has been more interested in getting her pet Plutonium chemistry projects funded. And Wallace just wants to see ANYTHING from EES funded. Great way to support the institution!!
ReplyDeleteWallace's recent presentations demonstrate that he's living in a fantasy world and has no solid grasp on just how dire the situation has become for most scientists working at LANL.
ReplyDeletethe consequence of a giant smoking crater appearing where Manhattan used to be is astronomical.
ReplyDelete================================
Many scientists and academics have called
for more effort in this area. In early
2002, former UCLA Chancellor and Professor
of Nuclear Engineering Dr. Albert Carnesale gave a speech entitled "Rethinking National Security" in which he stated that a nuclear bomb could be smuggled into the USA in the trunk of a Toyota.
Professor Graham Allison of the JFK School of Government at Harvard University is another calling for us to get our act together in this area
Inquiring minds want to know...
ReplyDeleteWhich is going to hurt more at LANL? McCain's "hatchet" or Obama's "scalpel"?
Should we have a leg amputation or just get one of our kidney's cut out?
Why invest in forensics at Los Alamos? There is little reason to support an organization that pays so much for secrecy and security when neither are necessary. The Motorola Commission result which showed about seven employees supported for each for working scientist at LANL still seems to stand. Does the lab have a record of unusual success in this field? What is their record of accomplishment? When I had low concentration impurity measurements
ReplyDeleteperformed at the lab the results were very wrong and the scientists didn't seem to care.
I feel that a private lab, dedicated to forensics, can do a better, cheaper, more responsive job.
11:39 am: "Which is going to hurt more at LANL? McCain's "hatchet" or Obama's "scalpel"?"
ReplyDeleteBoth Obama and McCain are idiots. Neither will have any control over which "scalpel" or "hatchet" Congress wields. Reid and Pelosi will control the US - and not just the budget or the economy - the entire country. Welcome to Jimmy Carter Land, augmented by the Marxist leanings of the President. YeHaa!
Why invest in forensics at Los Alamos? There is little reason to support an organization that pays so much for secrecy and security when neither are necessary.
ReplyDelete=================================
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
that secrecy for NUCLEAR forensics is
MANDATED! ONLY a place like Los Alamos
that has the secrecy and security
apparatus can do the work.
There's more to nuclear forensics than
just measuring how much of a particular
isotope there is in the debris.
The raw measurement won't tell you
anything. It's the analysis that goes
with it - and that requires the
detailed knowledge that is SECRET!!
So ONLY Labs like LANL, LLNL, SNL can
handle this information.
We're not talking about forensics like
blood stains, fibers, hair....
We're talking NUCLEAR forensics - who
do you blame when a US city disappears
under a big mushroom cloud.
4:28 pm: "Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; that secrecy for NUCLEAR forensics is MANDATED!"
ReplyDeleteYou are absolutely correct, and that is why PNNL, Argonne, BNL, Oak Ridge, etc, will never do the job right. They don't get "classifed" and their scientists have a long record of ignoring or circumventing security rules. Yet, somehow, they are immune from Congressional inquiry. Wonder why??
This discussion reminds me of the accelerator production of tritium, (also known as NPB-3) where the idiot scheme was justified by a strange logic of regulation and policy. The lab program was an expensive flop, as usual, and rules were then bent slightly to produce tritium in a power reactor to accommodate the demand for tritium. In the LANL scheme for tritium, a giant accelerator, perhaps powered by the same reactor produced tritium from a target at huge, illogical, additional cost.
ReplyDeleteThe mass spectroscopy of actinides and actinide products does not need the same level of security that would surround the predictors of bomb residues. In other words, the lab can be "outside the fence" and the keepers of the secrets inside. Under any circumstance, this program would fund a small number of experts who are unlikely to bear the carcass of the lab into the future.
$65M for janitors? And I'll get a lousy 2% raise while the janitors show up once a week in my building....
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, they are not janitors they are Technical Sanitizing Members (TSMs). Second, try the next post up and you will at least be on topic there.
ReplyDeleteYou are absolutely correct, and that is why PNNL, Argonne, BNL, Oak Ridge, etc, will never do the job right. They don't get "classifed" and their scientists have a long record of ignoring or circumventing security rules. Yet, somehow, they are immune from Congressional inquiry. Wonder why??
ReplyDelete=============================
Evidently you don't understand that there
are TWO types of attacks that we have to
worry about - the nuclear weapon attack
and the RDD (radiological dispersion
device) aka "dirty bomb".
Argonne is the lead lab for RDD devices.
For an RDD; the requisite knowledge that
is needed is reactor technology - to
find out which reactor created the
radioisotopes in the RDD. But reactor
technology is UNCLASSIFIED.
The vast majority of the work at
Argonne, Oak Ridge...is UNCLASSIFIED -
so they don't run afoul of security
problems as do labs that handle
classified information.
Argonne can NOT do the job when we have
a true NUCLEAR device detonating in a
US city.
For a true NUCLEAR device; where the
detailed knowledge of nuclear weapons
physics is needed - that you will find
ONLY at LANL, LLNL, and SNL.
The knowledge needed for analysis of
a true nuclear weapon is CLASSIFIED.
Do your homework before posting.
To 5:37,
ReplyDeleteYour statement of the importance
of classification is ludicrous and radiological attack is not very important.
I'm just a troll presenting some simple logic that dismisses nuclear forensics as a rescuer of the lab. Who are you?
Regards,
7:59
At what point did the country become the rescuer of the lab instead of the other way around, more or less than two decades ago?
ReplyDeleteI guess "nuclear forensics" is all that is left. Nuclear non-proliferaion is an abject failure, so I guess if we can't prevent them from doing it to us, we can at least figure out who did it, after the fact. (That is, if anyone is left to figure it out.) Yay for us. What losers we've become. I guess Israel will do the work we can't stomach, but need to have done in order for us to survive. Good for them.
ReplyDeletePeople don´t forget the HEU bomb.
ReplyDeleteI have previously written on this blog, 5/13/08 4:50 PM:
"Suicidal terrorists would not need to steal the fissile material, they could simply detonate it as part of an improvised nuclear device on the spot." (Danielle Brian/POGO.)
Yeah, right, it is called; the HEU bomb.
I have previously written:
1) A brute fact, due to organization problems and communication problems between and within the FBI and CIA, and lack of imagination and intelligence, 9/11 wasn´t stopped, a severe wake-up call, that started the 21st Century.
2) The HEU bomb, as well as the "dirty bomb" are more probable that terrorists actually would use against the US, than an actual nuclear weapon.
3) The HEU bomb, as outlined by nuclear physicists Thomas B. Cochran and Matthew G. McKinzie, in Scientific American, April 2008, pages 80-81:
"The ´quality´of nuclear material since then [Little Boy] has continued to improve, however, so much so that 1987 Nobel laureate physicist and Manhattan Project scientist Luis Alvarez noted that if terrorists had modern weapons-grade uranium [HEU], they ´would have a good chance of setting off a high-yieled explosion simply by dropping one half of the material on the other half.´ To test that assertion, we modeled the difference between the Little Boy design and an improvised nuclear device as crude as the one Alvarez described.
We again used the Los Alamos software code and modeled the yield of Little Boy on publicly available design information, as well as two simple configurations of HEU in a gun assembly. Our modeling showed that, for an exlosive-driven gun assembly, the minimum quantity that was required to obtain a one-kiloton explosive yield would be substantially less than the amount of HEU in Little Boy. Most disturbingly, with larger quantities, a one-kiloton yield could be achieved with a probability greater than 50 percent by dropping a single piece of HEU onto another, confirming Alvarez´s statement. Designing an HEU bomb seems shockingly simple. The only real impediment, therefore, is secretly gathering sufficient material."
(For a more thorough analyse of this subject:
Scientific American, April 2008, National Security, Detecting Nuclear Smuggling, Radiation monitors at U.S. ports cannot reliably detect highly enriched uranium, which onshore terrorists could assemble into a nuclear bomb, by Thomas B. Cochran and Matthew G. Mc Kinzie, pages 76-81.)
(It ought to be an in-depth study of the HEU bomb, due to the fact that it would be the core nuclear terrorism weapon, i.e. a suicide bomb and a very crude nuclear weapon in conjunction, if the setup (gadget) gets supercritical, as previously shown by Dr. Luis Alvarez in 1987, that it was probable that terrorists could create an HEU bomb, by simply dropping one half of HEU into another half of HEU, this finding was later confirmed by Dr. Thomas B. Cochran (NRDC) and Dr. Matthew G. McKinzie (NRDC) in the study, Detecting Nuclear Smuggling, Radiation monitors at U.S. ports cannot reliably detect highly enriched uranium, which onshore terrorists could assemble into a nuclear bomb, in Scientific American, April 2008, pages 76-81.)
(Two comments of the HEU bomb by me, can also be found at:
www.armscontrolwonk.com/1877/would-they-could-they, #10, Anonymous, May 6, 11:52 PM [2008],and #22, Anonymous, May 15, 06:42 PM [2008].)
(NRDC= Natural Resources Defense Council)
Hot off the press...
ReplyDeletewww.insidedefense.com/
secure/data_extra/pdf7/dplus2008_2732.pdf
-----------------------------------------------
Report of the Defense Board Task Force on
Nuclear Deterrence Skills
-----------------------------------------------
September 2008
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
======== EXCERPTS ========
** Note, in particular, the remarks on Page 28...
Page vii:
The task force is concerned about the future of America’s nuclear deterrence expertise. A significant part of the current workforce in the national laboratories and production facilities are at or nearing retirement age. New people must be hired and trained. This need is complicated by resource issues in today’s environment. More fundamentally, however, the task force does not find adequate planning for dealing with the problem. The situation is further affected by the general decline in the numbers of U.S. citizens acquiring graduate degrees in science and engineering. Citizenship remains a prominent requirement in the highly classified world of nuclear weapons work. With our current course the end state will not provide for a safe and reliable stockpile or for a responsive infrastructure.
PAGE xi:
5.The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) must reduce the high indirect cost of the nuclear weapon complex. These high costs impede refurbishment of legacy weapons, or authorization of new weapons if proposed, and preclude the work experience needed to maintain competence.
The NNSA laboratories and production facilities must be incentivized to reduce indirect costs to make more affordable efforts to sustain and enhance the skills needed to respond to today's threats and future challenges. Many of the causes of these high indirect costs fall outside the control of the Administrator, but he can, working with the Secretary of Energy and Congress, move to address this increasingly burdensome issue.
Page 5:
In general, across a wide range of survey questions (similar or the same as those used in 1998), employee responses to the current survey strongly indicate that the NNSA government and contractor workforce attitudes are more positive than reported in 1999. Attitudes are distinctly more positive at the NNSA production plants than reported in 1999. However, attitudes about the future are more negative at Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in the face of impending workforce layoffs, most notably at Los Alamos.
There is concern about recruitment in specific knowledge fields as discussed in this report. However, this task force’s view is that the lack of national commitment to the nuclear weapons program and the lack of a stable base workload of design-development-production work will eventually erode the capability to attract the right level technical talent across a wide spectrum of skills needed to maintain competence.
Page 23:
In general, there does not appear to be a current problem in recruiting high caliber technical graduatesto the NNSA and its contractors. There are two main areas of concern—computer science/engineering and nuclear engineering. Graduates in computer science/engineering are in high demand both nationally and internationally. This talent is most critical for the NNSA weapons laboratories. While the weapons laboratories may not be able to compete with private industry salaries, they do offer the opportunity to work with some of the most advanced computation and simulation capabilities in the world.
Page 24:
There is concern that, in the long term, recruitment of high caliber technical talent for the NNSA and its contractors will be challenged by the general decline in the proportion of U.S. citizens acquiring post-graduate degrees in science and engineering at U.S. universities (Figure 2). A DOE “Q clearance” is required for virtually all nuclear weapons mission-critical skills, and U.S. citizenship is a requirement. This diminishes the talent pool available to the NNSA for its nuclear weapons mission, and it is particularly troublesome for the weapons laboratories that need the highest caliber technical talent.
Page 25:
In both the short and long term, retention of the right caliber technical staff for the mission will depend significantly on staff perception of the national importance of the mission and the amount of time they are allowed to spend on the technical aspects of the mission. A number of staff interviewed perceived the nuclear weapons enterprise as a declining industry. While it varied considerably by site, staff interviews left the impression that a significant number of managers and staff would not recommend a qualified friend or family member pursue a career in the nuclear weapon field. The survey results were less gloomy, with about 72 percent of the respondents at the laboratories, 79 percent at the production plants, and 68 percent at NNSA headquarters saying they would recommend their organization as a good place to work.
Page 28:
The capability-based infrastructure for nuclear weapons comes with a “high price of admission” due to its specialized technology and the inherent safety and security issues. Indirect costs to maintain the capability-based infrastructure have always been high. The unique capability cannot be abandoned and recreated based on how many weapons the government wants in any particular year—a longer range view has always been necessary. However, since the 1990s, DOE/NNSA indirect costs have grown substantially due to an ever-expanding compliance culture—for example, indirect costs associated with administrative, environment, safety, and security support functions. The support functions are important; however, with no applied cost/benefit analysis to control the generation of new, costly requirements, these expanding bureaucracies result in diminishing returns on investment and reduce the real weapons work and the mission competence of the agency.
One notable example about growth in indirect cost is the decision to compete the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory contracts in such a way as to increase indirect cost (award fees, taxes, and retirement plans) by a few hundred million dollars a year. While the government mandated these contracts be competed, Congress did not add this sum to the top line of the NNSA budget. Personnel working directly on weapons programs are being reduced to help bear this burden.
Page 64:
Retirement Eligibility and Turnover in the DOE
Weapons Complex
In 2007, about 4,000 essential employees in the DOE plants and laboratories (30 percent of essential employees) were eligible to retire. Figure 14 shows that this represents a substantial increase for most facilities since 2000. The portion of the workforce eligible to retire ranges from 21 percent at Sandia and Pantex to over 45 percent for Lawrence Livermore. By 2012, the facilities project that 7,000 essential employees will be eligible to retire (53 percent of 2007 essential employees). At Lawrence Livermore and Kansas City plants, and Los Alamos, the fractions range from 55 percent upwards to nearly 70 percent. (Projections suggest that two-thirds to four-fifths of the workforce will be eligible to retire by 2017.)
Page 69:
5.The Administrator of NNSA must reduce the high indirect costs of the nuclear weapon complex. These high costs impede refurbishment of legacy weapons, or authorization of new weapons if proposed, and preclude the work experience needed to maintain competence. - The NNSA laboratories and production facilities must be incentivized to reduce indirect costs to make more affordable efforts to sustain and enhance the skills needed to respond to today's threats and future challenges. Many of the causes of these high indirect costs fall outside the control of the Administrator, but he can, working with the Secretary of Energy and Congress, move to address this increasingly burdensome issue.
Page 78:
* Comparisons of 2008 with 1999 responses within DOE seem to correlate with changes in perceived career stability:
- Responses indicated substantial erosion in morale at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Both were undergoing layoffs during the 2008 survey period, and responses may reflect this, both in terms of relative ratings in 2008 and changes in their responses since 1999.
Page 83:
Table A-3. How Do You Rate the Stability of the Program?
(10 = High, 1 = Low)
LANL 1999 = 4.9, LLNL 1999 = 4.9
LANL 2008 = 4.3, LLNL 2008 = 4.1
Table A-4. Would You Recommend Your Organization? (Percent Responding ÏYesÓ)
LANL 1999 = 85%, LLNL 1999 = 84 %
LANL 2008 = 55%, LLNL 2008 = 70 %
The respondents least likely to recommend their organization are at LANL followed by Security personnel and employees who are 30 years old or younger. In 1999, the LANL group had the highest percentage of employees report that they would recommend their organization. A parallel, but less dramatic decline occurred at LLNL.
So LANL has a depressed cadre of scientists who are unlikely to recommend LANL to others or bring in bright, young post docs to suffer within the LANL "prison".
ReplyDeleteIt also has extremely high costs that are not based on any type of sane risk to reward analysis.
We knew all of this information. What else is new in this DOD report? Does this mean that the severe problems at LANL have been recognized and will now be fixed by those in positions of control? I doubt it.
The DOD skills survey of 2018 will be something to see. By then, the "recommend LANL to others" figures should be down to single digits and costs per average scientists should be hovering around $1 million per year.... that is, if there are any scientists still left at LANL by that date.
Wasn't this DOD report involved with sending out all those email surveys last winter that LANS told everyone not to open or answer because, God forbid, it might be malware?
ReplyDelete10/21/08 11:38 AM
ReplyDeleteYou are most likely correct.
From Table A-2. Survey Response, of the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on, Nuclear Deterrence Skills, September 2008, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C. 20301-3140:
Respondent Groups
Number Received
2008 Survey
1999 Survey
DOD (Other than services)
(OSD Policy, OSD Acquisition, Joint Staff, DTRA, DIA, Other Intel, STRATCOM, Other Combatant Commands)
2008 Survey: 1,477
1999 Survey: -
Army
2008 Survey: 54
1999 Survey: -
Navy
2008 Survey: 142
1999 Survey: -
Air Force
2008 Survey: 1,685
1999 Survey: -
DOE Labs
2008 Survey: -
1999 Survey: -
Sandia (Sandia National Labs, CA and NM)
2008 Survey: 1,147
1999 Survey: 1,054
LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Labs)
2008 Survey: 1,301
1999 Survey: 1,094
LANL (Los Alamos National Labs)
2008 Survey: 454
1999 Survey: 1,331
NTS (Nevada Test Site)
2008 Survey: 112
1999 Survey: 358
DOE Plants
2008 Survey: -
1999 Survey: -
KCP (Kansas City Plant)
2008 Survey: 241
1999 Survey: 454
PANTEX
2008 Survey: 761
1999 Survey: 801
SRS (Savannah River Site)
2008 Survey: 12
1999 Survey: 84
Y-12 (Oak Ridge/ Y-12)
2008 Survey: 608
1999 Survey: 353
DOE Headquarters
(NNSA HQ, NNSA Site Offices and Service Center, DOE Other)
2008 Survey: 259
1999 Survey: 204
Total
2008 Survey: 8,266*
1999 Survey: 5,733
* Respondents could select membership to multiple groups. The total values are representative of only unique members. That is, a respondent is only counted once for the total group.
(www.insidedefense.com/secure/data_extra/pdf7/dplus2008_2732.pdf)
(Blog administrator, make the DoD report a new top post!)
Hmmm, looks like the LANS "voter suppression" efforts in this survey matter may have worked...
ReplyDeleteLANL (Los Alamos National Labs):
2008 Survey: 454
1999 Survey: 1,331
I agree with 6:50 PM. The recently released DOD's "Nuclear Deterrence Skills" survey deserves a top post. Just don't put the whole thing up, as it is way too long. Make a link to the PDF.
Some of the tables in the back of this report are very interesting. Unfortunately, I don't think this survey captures the full extent of just how bad morale has become at both LANL and LLNL of late.