Making a Pitch for Nuclear Warhead Program
By Walter Pincus, The Washington PostMonday, October 6, 2008; A13
Continued study and development of a new generation of nuclear weapons and modernization of the aging manufacturing infrastructure needed to build them are necessary to maintain "the ultimate deterrent capability that supports U.S. national security."
That is the conclusion of a nuclear policy paper released quietly last month by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Energy Secretary Samuel W. Bodman.
The secretaries warn that without the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, which Congress has delayed, the United States will have to keep an inventory of older, non-deployed nuclear warheads. That would be in addition to the 1,700 to 2,200 Cold War-era warheads -- many whose useful life has been extended 20 years under the stockpile stewardship program -- that are to be ready for use on strategic bombers and intercontinental land- and sea-based missiles from 2012 onward.
The Gates-Bodman paper is the last attempt by the Bush administration to have an impact on future U.S. nuclear weapons policy. A congressionally mandated study, co-chaired by former defense secretaries William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, is to be completed by December. The Pentagon is to do a Nuclear Posture Review next year.
The Gates-Bodman paper warns, in the strongest terms yet, that the stockpile stewardship program will soon have to modernize so many components and materials that the weapons may no longer be reliable.
"Without nuclear testing, at some time in the future the United States may be unable to confirm the effect of the accumulation of changes to tested warhead configurations," they say.
They note that the United States "is now the only nuclear weapons state party to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty] that does not have the capability to produce a new nuclear warhead" and has not done so since the early 1990s. RRWs will be based on old, tested nuclear designs but put together with modern parts and technology.
What's missing from the nuclear strategy, as outlined by Gates and Bodman, is the basic rationale that requires 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear warheads into the future. The authors concede that such numbers are important in determining how large the new nuclear production complex should be, but they never come to grips with how many warheads the United States should be prepared to build.
The paper notes that, in the past, the U.S. nuclear force was determined by the size of Soviet forces and the targeting requirements for nuclear strikes against them. With the end of the Cold War, President Bill Clinton and President Bush entered agreements with Russian leaders on reductions.
The United States decided to reduce the number of its deployed warheads from more than 6,000 to 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. But rather than dismantling all warheads removed from delivery systems, the Bush administration plan placed many in storage, where they remain as a strategic stockpile -- a hedge against any future threat.
Gates and Bodman say the U.S. deterrent force, no longer fixed by Russian targets, meets "a spectrum of political and military goals . . . broader goals [that] are not reflected fully by military targeting alone." One political requirement is that the United States maintain a nuclear posture that reassures NATO and Asian allies, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, of Washington's commitment to their defense and gives them no compelling need to acquire nuclear weapons.
Another goal of the U.S. nuclear force is to dissuade potential adversaries and even "near-peer competitors," such as China and Russia, from adding sufficient numbers of nuclear warheads to wipe out U.S. systems. It also is based on "retaining a sufficient margin over countries with expanding nuclear arsenals to discourage their leaders from initiating a nuclear arms competition."
Gates and Bodman also see the U.S. nuclear force as a deterrent against other types of weapons of mass destruction -- such as chemical or biological -- and attacks against American "deployed forces, allies and friends." They also say the nuclear stockpile helps prevent "major conventional attacks."
They say the number of strategic warheads on 24-hour alert will be "smaller" than the 1,700 to 2,200 that will be deployed. But the larger number could be reached within "a few weeks to months" by putting bombers back on alert or sending more submarines to sea.
Pursuing development and deployment of RRW is "key to sustaining confidence in the U.S. nuclear stockpile," Gates and Bodman conclude. Once RRW is deployed in significant numbers, the paper says, "some or all of the reserve warheads . . . can be retired and dismantled without incurring significant risk."
National security and intelligence reporter Walter Pincus pores over the speeches, reports, transcripts and other documents that flood Washington and every week uncovers the fine print that rarely makes headlines -- but should. If you have any items that fit the bill, please send them to fineprint@washpost.com.
20 comments:
"Without nuclear testing, at some time in the future the United States may be unable to confirm the effect of the accumulation of changes to tested warhead configurations," they say.
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Here's the bottom line on this issue of testing. Not only does it apply to LEP modifications to the current arsenal, but it would also be an issue with any RRW design. The pro-RRW people aren't being honest on this point. If RRW is built, at some point down the road there will be a strong desire to do a complete test of the weapon. It's inevitable.
Because of this, I've come to the conclusion that the safest and best path forward is probably for the US to join with all the current nuclear powers and agree to a very limited resumption of nuclear testing.
This new testing would be highly controlled, internationally observed, and extremely limited in scope (say 4 tests allowed per decade). It would not allow any testing to be done on radically new weapon designs so as to not start up another arms race. Only safety feature issues would be allowed in terms of weapon modifications. Countries that currently do not possess nuclear weapons would not be allowed to join this new testing treaty. To give the treaty some teeth in this regards, it would specify mandatory and very harsh economic consequences to any non-nuclear country that decided to join the nuclear club.
Proceeding along these lines would allow the US to keep the current arsenal and yet have some reasonable confidence in its reliability. Once we have this confidence, we can begin reducing the numbers in our arsenal.
Seen in this light, a resumption of a very limited number of tests is a good thing. It would reduce budgetary costs and might actually make the world a safer place. Of course, selling this idea to the diplomats and politicians would be almost impossible (sigh!).
The pro-RRW people aren't being honest on this point. If RRW is built, at some point down the road there will be a strong desire to do a complete test of the weapon. It's inevitable.
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Not if the design is conservative enough!!
It's like saying at some point Boeing is
going to have to do a wind tunnel test
of the 787 Dreamliner before they attempt
to fly a real one. It's inevitable.
It's not inevitable if you have an
airliner that is designed with enough
margin that they are well within the
error bars on Boeing's aerodynamic
simulation capabilities.
A wind tunnel test is not a flight test. Boeing may get some orders prior to flight testing based on their good reputation, but the plane will be much easier to sell once it has flown.
Of course Boeing will not be
able to do a wind tunnel test
of a complete Dreamliner.
BUT, they will certainly test a
scale model.
Your statement reminds me of the
now-departed Bill Press who told
the nuclear weapons community:
"Experiments are unnecessary.
Everything can be proven by
simulation."
It can now be told.
'Bill Press' was actually a simulation.
Didn't work out.
I have found that only people who have never done experiments believe that simulations are sufficient. Experimentalists know that simulations are not sufficient. See for instance hedge funds that simplified their simulation in order to get management happy or in order to mollify investors. The stock market tanked when the unsimulated actually took place. The same analogy works for weapons science.
Unexpected events seldom occur in simulations but often occur in experiments. Understanding the rare unexpected event is how you win Nobel Prizes. Not understanding them is how you get caught doing stupid things.
Nobody believes simulations except the persons who did them.
Everybody believes experiments except the persons who did them.
There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and simulations.
"Not if the design is conservative enough!!" (8:18 AM)
This is total BS. The design can never be conservative enough to rule out that some fundamental (and undiscovered) flaw may have worked its way into the design. Since we are dealing with extremely important strategic issues here, full testing of RRW becomes a necessity at some point.
Also, as RRW weapons age, they may become unreliable due to age issues (just like the current weapons) and need to be tested if they are to be trusted.
RRW doesn't end any testing issues. At best, it just delays the point in time at which you are finally forced do to a full test to put everyone's mind at ease that the weapon still works most of the time when it is fired off.
Of course Boeing will not be
able to do a wind tunnel test
of a complete Dreamliner.
BUT, they will certainly test a
scale model.
======================
NOPE - they don't need to fly even a scale
model of the 787.
When Boeing designed the 777; they
substituted a lot of simulation for
wind tunnel tests of a scale model.
There were VERY FEW scale model tests
of the 777 before first flight.
I would be surprised if Boeing used a
scale model in a wind tunnel AT ALL
for the 787.
With the Boeing 787, we'll all quickly know if it can really fly once it hits the world's runways. We'll even be able to precisely analyze how well it flies and find any unexpected defects as it is flown over the next few decades.
With untested RRW nukes, we'll never know if they really work until we encounter an unfortunate 1-in-a-billion day when we have to use them, and on that day we better hope they perform as advertised.
This poorly thought out Boeing 787 analogy doesn't pass the smell test.
11:35 am: "With untested RRW nukes, we'll never know if they really work until we encounter an unfortunate 1-in-a-billion day when we have to use them..."
What makes you think that just because one worked in testing, that the next one will too? The best we'll ever do, testing or not, is "certified" after sign-off by the weapons labs' directors and the SECDOE. If you think the certification process is flawed, then concentrate your comments there. Objection to "simulation" or the balance of that versus testing, is just talk. Those charged with the certification recomendation will do what they are charged to do.
I think it is safe to say that simulation can only take you to a certain point. After that, testing can take you to a certain point. The breadth and depth of that actual testing is what builds confidence about operating over a particular environment. More testing, more confidence.
Anyone care to replay the first operational test of the PeaceKeeper missile (not the development flight tests)?
Those charged with the certification recomendation will do what they are charged to do.
10/9/08 8:21 PM
No, they will do what they are ordered to do, not what they are charged to do. None of the Directors at the NNSA labs have the guts and integrity to sign on the dotted line that they can't certify the stockpile. The annual certification requirement has become a meaningless side show.
Look at the men who we have as LLC lab Directors -- Miller and Anastasio. Neither of these two men want to cause any political problems for their for-profit companies. If NNSA says "Shut up and sign that everything is OK", they will do as told.
10/10 12:23 am:
Those charged with the certification recomendation will do what they are charged to do.
10/9/08 8:21 PM
No, they will do what they are ordered to do
****************
And if they don't, what? They get thrown in the brig for failure to obey orders? Or, they contact the New York Times? Or, they complain to the SECDEF or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs? These are not people without resources. Your cynicism is showing.
"Your cynicism is showing." - 8:16 PM
Your gullibility is showing. Where there is no integrity, anything is possible.
"Where there is no integrity, anything is possible." 9:07 pm
Quite true. However, your implication that there is no integrity in the certification process is unproven. As the lawyers say, it "assumes facts not in evidence."
As the lawyers say, it "assumes facts not in evidence."
10/12/08 1:23 PM
And you are assuming that the certification process has integrity when the facts demonstrate no clear evidence for this statement. Talk about the pot calling the kettle black! It cuts both ways.
The facts will come when we place a nuke in the ground out at NTS and test it. Until then, the certification process is mostly one of speculation. Worse, it is ripe for political exploitation by people who desperately want to see the "right" answer in their reports and will likely face no consequences for bending the data to support a biased view.
Someday our nukes will be over 100 years old or will be of a design that has never been fully tested. Does the US really want to reduce the arsenal and bet the farm on this risky scenario?
1:46 pm: You are obviously not in the nuclear weapons business and have obviously never read an annual certification report.
1:46 pm: You are obviously not in the nuclear weapons business and have obviously never read an annual certification report.
10/13/08 8:25 PM
I bow to your obvious greatest, O' Big Headed One. I am but a lowly 'nit wit', unworthy to question your wisdom. A thousand pardons!
Thank you - apology accepted;.
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