DOE: Broken System for Protecting Nuclear Material Could Compromise Los Alamos Operations
February 26, 2009
In the midst of trying to account for 80 missing or stolen computers, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is now under fire for a new problem. Critical deficiencies in its system for keeping track of its huge stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—enough for hundreds of nuclear weapons. According to a February 23 internal Department of Energy letter, the amount of nuclear material that LANL could not account for in January "exceeded alarm limits." While Los Alamos says there is no suspicion of theft or diversion, if it does not know where the material is, it cannot say for certain that the material has not been stolen.
DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) sent a Special Review Team earlier this month to assess Los Alamos' Material Control and Accountability (MC&A) program. The Team found inaccuracies in accounting, a lack of adherence to requirements, and that "key personnel in critical positions lacked a basic understanding of fundamental MC&A concepts." In fact, in light of the Team's findings, both government and contractor officials have recently been removed from their positions. According to the letter, if identified weaknesses remain unresolved it "would impact the ability of the facility to continue operations."
POGO met with NNSA staff yesterday, who would not talk about the issue, claiming it was classified. Yet today, Los Alamos sent out a press release on the subject. The release misleadingly states that the problem was first reported to NNSA in January, yet MC&A concerns was an issue for a greater part of last year. According to the internal DOE letter, there were MC&A "issues identified during assessments over the last year," including an on-site review in June 2008. Also, POGO had raised concerns about these MC&A problems in a September 2008 press alert.
Despite being aware of MC&A problems during the 2007-2008 performance period, DOE still granted LANL the full $1.43 million performance award fee for security, which includes “Material Control and Accountability,” as one of the areas of performance evaluated.
"This letter shows that DOE is not afraid to use vigorous inspections for identifying potential security problems. Unfortunately, DOE did not use its power of the purse to get its contractor to quickly resolve the problem," says Peter Stockton, POGO Senior Investigator. "A sharply worded letter is a good step, but without financial penalties, improvement is much less likely."
DOE and LANL have tried to downplay the risk of stolen bomb-making material by pointing to LANL's "strong and effective physical security." However, based on the results of security tests throughout the weapons complex, including last year's debacle at Livermore Lab, POGO is concerned that the weak MC&A program at Los Alamos could be exploited by an insider and pose a serious security threat.
DOE appears focused on preventing this latest bad news from becoming publicized and sent out messages to staff warning them not to release critical information to the public. If the information was sensitive enough to pose a security concern, there is a process in place at DOE to classify the information. However, the letter is stamped “Official Use Only,” which is not a classification marking but is generally used to prevent internal documents from seeing the light of day. POGO finds this objectionable, as taxpayers have a right to know what they are getting for their $2.7 billion tax dollars spent at LANL.
Founded in 1981, the Project On Government Oversight (POGO) is an independent nonprofit that investigates and exposes corruption and other misconduct in order to achieve a more effective, accountable, open, and honest federal government.
53 comments:
We're in trouble now...Annie get your gun!!!!
Oh, jeez. This whole thing is so stupid. NNSA gave LANL MC&A a "fully satisfactory" rating as recently as 2007. The press however, prodded by Danielle Bryan of POGO, a very close friend of Sharyll Atkisson of CBS, will continue to make this a "story." What a waste, And, the fact that the blog owner here considers this top-post worthy, is a testament to the "get LANL" frenzy. Show me a journalist who believes in truth, and is willing to withhold material that is not shown to be true until truth is obtained.
Every post is a top post until the next post comes along.
We've been talking about this on the blog since at least September, and I've known about it even longer. The reason it is not a five month old story is that LANS, with all the spin and qualifications Kevin Roark could muster, didn't admit to it until today.
So just get it over with. How much is missing and for how long? And drop the BS about it being impossible to remove it from TA-55. I know better.
From the Washington Post
Posted at 11:06 AM ET, 02/24/2009
Department of Energy Loses Track of Radioactive Material
The Department of Energy has done a poor job of tracking nuclear materials it has loaned under licenses to contractors, educational institutions and other organizations, according to an investigation by DOE Inspector General Gregory Friedman and his staff.
In some cases, the department cannot say where where the heavily radioactive substances are, how they're being used or whether they have been disposed of, the auditors found.
At issue is the tracking system used by DOE known as the Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System. Based on the new report, the tracking system appears to be a health -- and could it be, national security? -- nightmare.
It could be that the missing nuclear materials -- including depleted and normal uranium --has been disposed of and that the particularities of accounting for the stuff were ignored.
Or not. No one seems to know for sure, according to the report.
"During this effort, the Department agreed to write off the following quantities of its nuclear materials from the NMMSS inventories of just the 40 facilities we reviewed:
• 20,580 grams of enriched uranium;
• 45 grams of plutonium;
• 5,001 kilograms of normal uranium; and,
• 189,139 kilograms of depleted uranium.
"Considering the potential health risks associated with these materials and the potential for misuse should they fall into the wrong hands, the quantities written-off were significant. For example, even in small quantities normally held by individual domestic licensees, special nuclear materials such as enriched uranium and plutonium, if not properly handled, potentially pose serious health hazards."
More on this before long.
I find it interesting that LASO's anger seems to have been catalyzed by the LANS request to downgrade the incident severity to IMI-3. Even the C-students should now be asking themselves: "What else is LANS trying to sweep under the rug in their pursuit of bonus?"
This is why I need my bonus at the beginning of the year, just in case
bad things happen.
Mikey.
LANL reports 'material control' errors
Missing material was stored in main plutonium facility, LANL spokesman says
Sue Vorenberg | The New Mexican
2/26/2009 - 2/27/09
Officials at Los Alamos National Laboratory are having a hard time finding the stuff that somehow didn't make it to TA-55, the lab's main plutonium facility.
That's the general gist of a vague news release sent out from the lab Thursday claiming that LANL reported an "internal material control issue" to the National Nuclear Security Administration.
The release says there was an error in "internal inventory and accounting that documents movement of sensitive materials" in a small part of TA-55.
Kevin Roark, a spokesman, declined to say what, exactly, was misplaced according to the accounting. He added that while TA-55 is a plutonium research, development and processing facility, it also "works with a wide variety of nuclear and other materials."
Pete Stockton, however, a senior investigator for the Project on Government Oversight, said he has a pretty good idea about what's missing, and how much of it lab staff are looking for.
"It's plutonium, that's certainly our understanding," Stockton said. "It's an issue of about a kilogram, with is about 2.2 pounds. You'd need about twice that much for a weapon."
While the lab's release said staff noticed the problem in January, Stockton said that problems with "material control and accountability," which is the general category the error falls into, have been going on at the lab and across the complex for more than a year.
Officials from the Project on Government Oversight met with NNSA staff Wednesday to talk about the issue at the lab, but were told that the problem was "classified," according to a news release from the group.
"They say they can't tell you anything, then the lab issues a press release," Stockton told The New Mexican on Thursday. "They're really antsy about this."
The Project on Government Oversight also cited an internal Department of Energy letter that said the amount of nuclear material the lab couldn't account for "exceeded alarm limits."
Roark said there's no way the material left the TA-55 facility. It appears to be a problem of moving material from one area to another, he added.
"That's the most logical explanation — that material is in a place we haven't looked for it yet," Roark said.
He also said security at the facility is extremely tight, with multiple safeguards in place to protect anything from getting out.
"We know nothing's missing because nothing has left the building," Roark said.
That comment, with its circular logic, gave Stockton pause.
"They say there's no way that material could possibly get out," Stockton said. "That's bull."
Stockton pointed to a recent security test at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in which material was taken out of a building and tossed over a security fence with a lacrosse stick, he said.
"You just stash that and take it out the emergency doors," Stockton said.
Still, Roark agreed with the lab's release, which said "there is 100 percent certainty that no sensitive materials left the facility."
And either way, the problem should be resolved soon, he added.
"We expect to have this resolved in the next couple of weeks," Roark said.
This calls for a cage match between Sharyll Atkinsson and our Ewok in charge.
Stop calling me an ewok.
Mikey
"Still, Roark agreed with the lab's release,"
You don't say! I though the lab spokesman would disagree with the press release he was reading from.
We need a new sign at the entrance of the Laboratory ...
How about ...
"PLUTONIUM's A TREASURE ... LEARN TO MEASURE!"
Oh wait.
Here it is!
Did anyone check the duct work?
NY Times article on Rocky Flats 1989
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE4D6163CF934A35753C1A96F948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all
"We've been talking about this on the blog since at least September, and I've known about it even longer. The reason it is not a five month old story is that LANS, with all the spin and qualifications Kevin Roark could muster, didn't admit to it until today.
So just get it over with. How much is missing and for how long? And drop the BS about it being impossible to remove it from TA-55. I know better."
Frank, Frank, Frank. No you don't know better. Working 3 weeks at TA-55 doesn't make you an expert on the facility, MC&A controls, Pu processing and everything involved therein.
THe incident happened in January and there has been an on-going investigation since then. I think it would be premature for LANS to announce the issue while undergoing investigation.
I know you have a bone to pick with 55 but this time, please don't interject when you don't have the slightest clue of what's going on.
Please refer to 8:45 pm in the original post on the press release. This person has it right on.
wow, if those numbers from the washington post are true, we're in trouble again...and management was worried about a few stolen laptops!
if you have a chance to get out, it might be a good time to do that.
http://www.clearancejobs.com/
"THe incident happened in January and there has been an on-going investigation since then."
So you are contending this is not due to long term hold-up and radioactive decay, but rather this material all disappeared since January, or at least the since the period covered by the January reconciliation.
In that case the situation is that half a bomb's worth of material (according to POGO) just recently disappeared. This would be far worse then anyone would have guessed.
"We know nothing's missing because nothing has left the building," Roark said. (News)
I realize that it's Kevin Roark's job to do PR for LANL and follow the LANS script, but frankly he's doing an extremely poor job of it.
His comment above may be true, but it sounds ridiculous to the man on the street.
It's time for Kevin to be removed from his job. He's failing at his position and has become a huge embarrassment to the lab. I suggest he go find a job as the key PR man for Madoff Investments, Inc.
Did anyone look behind the xerox yet?
2/27/09 8:44 AM,
I indeed do know better. I've seen it with my own eyes.
Also, this is an old issue. See Audit: Los Alamos Not Tracking All Stock and "And has a 100% inventory of all the Pu taken place yet? If so I would expect the lab to be crowing about it - if it was all accounted for, that is."
=**= ATTENTION LANL EMPLOYEES =**=
LANS is hosting a special cake and Kool-Aid party for all their loyal employees at the lab. Attendance is mandatory. A tasty blue Kool-Aid will be served up. Don't worry about the bitter after taste.
I can't believe we (the general public) are counting on DOE to investigate this loss of 2.2 lbs of plutonium. Apparently, DOE will believe anything the LANS team tells them. I wonder how many ex-DOE people are now working for LANL?
LANL does NOT hire DOE people.
They are D students. LANL only hires C students!
"LANL only hires C students!" (4:15 PM)
It's C- students at best, with a whole crop of community college types holding Associate degrees on the next step down the LANS hiring ladder.
The precipitous drop in employee hiring standards under LANS management has been nothing short of jaw-dropping.
GolllllllEEE!!!! Us workers at TA-55 walked out the front door with 2.2 pounds of Pu shoved down our underpants. We slipped it out of the glovebox while nobody was looking, managed to get through a couple sets of rad and SNM monitors and nobody seemed to notice!!!
Thank goodness for POGO, Frank and the anti-nukers for "knowing better." HOw DID you figure us out??
"Stockton pointed to a recent security test at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in which material was taken out of a building and tossed over a security fence with a lacrosse stick, he said."
Can someone point me to the actual POGO statement on this? Considering how high the fence is, must be a hell of a lacrosse player. Thanks.
1:47 pm: "I can't believe we (the general public) are counting on DOE to investigate this loss of 2.2 lbs of plutonium."
What a joke, POGO presents no evidence at all, let alone credible evidence, for this number. If you know anything about the NMC&A procedures and techniques, it is not credible that that amount of material is missing. Find another horse to ride, yours is lame.
Listen up, people. DOE is very likely preparing to shut down TA-55 for a long period of time.
We can all sit around arguing about the seriousness of this recent event, but when Congress and the President read the news wires like those below, some serious stuff will likely be coming LANL's way.
The Obama Administration reluctantly gave in to the idea of very limited pit production at TA-55. We can now safely assume that pit production won't be resuming at LANL any time soon.
They'll use this incident as the excuse to shut it down for a long period of time while DOE and many others "investigate" the situation to death. You heard it here.
__________________________________
__________________________________
New Security Lapse at Los Alamos Triggers Angry Response From Energy Department
By Greg Webb, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 27, 2009
WASHINGTON -- Plutonium handling practices are so poor at a major U.S. nuclear-weapon laboratory that they threaten the facility's ability to function at all, Energy Department officials warned in a letter this week (see GSN, Feb. 12).
In January, the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico reported to Energy Department officials that an "inventory difference" had "exceeded alarm limits," according to a letter back to the laboratory from two National Nuclear Security Administration officials. The Feb. 23 letter was acquired by the Project on Government Oversight, a watchdog organization that has persistently raised alarms over lax security practices at Los Alamos and other nuclear laboratories.
__________________________________
__________________________________
Memo questions Los Alamos lab's control of plutonium
By Katherine McIntire Peters, GovExec.com, February 27, 2009
In a Feb. 23 memo to the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, officials in the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration said inaccurate inventory records at the lab's plutonium research, development and processing facility raised doubts about the lab's ability to "deter and detect theft and diversion of special nuclear material."
The memo was in response to the findings of a special review team's assessment of an "incident of security concern" involving amounts of nuclear material "that exceeded alarm limits with no suspicion of theft or diversion" earlier this month.
Mikey will probably get a small if not zero bonus because of this.
I think that we should take up a collection.
"Abolishing Nuclear Weapons - A Debate"
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/fi
les/abolishing_nuclear_weapons_debate.pdf
A good read on the subject but, I can't help but think too much emphasis is being placed on the belief that "Today, a terrorist nuclear attack is thought to be much more likely than an exchange of nuclear weapons with another state."
Abolishing nuclear weapons as a means to reduce this risk, imo, would only make the chem/bio threat more likely, if it isn't already.
As of this minute, LANL has no strong future. Not as a pit production facility nor as a national science lab.
The place is not functioning properly at almost any level you care to observe. The for-profit contractor process has made the facility much worse and the best people are fleeing if they can possible get out. Sig Hecker said the atmosphere under a highly dysfunctional and risk adverse DOE/NNSA and LANS LLC has become like a "prison". Those are his words from his Senate testimony last spring.
The path forward to get out of this mess is becoming increasingly hazy. However, if things do not change, and change quickly, LANL is going to become Rocky Flats II.
No need to take up a collection for my bonus. Just toss the money in the front seat of my sports car.
MIKEY
"Mikey will probably get a small if not zero bonus because of this. I think that we should take up a collection." (6:26 AM)
If bonuses disappear, Mikey and his PADs and ADs will simply raise their salaries to compensate for it. They'll likely do the same thing if Obama's tax increases hurt their take home pay.
You'll never know they did any of this, of course, because LANS executive salaries are treated as "proprietary information".
Life is full of the C students getting revenge. Just look at the C students at POGO, many who have never had a real and meaningful job. And let us not forget the C students here at the laboratory. We can find many of them in our organizations (safety, security, over at LANCE, TA55, etc). TSA, the folks who check us out at the airport, there is the ultimate revenge of the C student mantra...Government is full of C students. Just look at Congress.
What is really bad here is yet another problem has emerged at LANL, and those who want to get ride of us get fed ample ammunition. It would be nice for once that when the matter is resolved that the institution would report it, and press on those who speak less than the truth be forced to admit their mistakes.
If we know that something is missing, how is it that POGO can tell us the amount? My guess is that those who work at TA55 simply cannot add or subtract.
8:27
You might also find of interest the latest position on the CTBT from the editors of Scientific American
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=nuclear-testing-is-an-acceptable-risk
------
"But wouldn't a ratified treaty that goes into force leave the U.S. and other countries that abided by it vulnerable to cheaters that clandestinely develop and test their nuclear capabilities? Isn't that reason to enough to reject the treaty? The answer may seem counterintuitive, but the CTBT would make the world a safer, more secure place for the U.S. than a world without the treaty.
...once the planned International Monitoring System of the CTBT is fully operational (it is about two-thirds complete today), no underground test with an explosive yield of more than one kiloton could "be confidently hidden." Moreover, even if a test smaller than a kiloton were somehow concealed, it would do little to harm the strategic interests of the U.S. Because of their prior experience with nuclear testing, Russia and China could learn the most from a low-yield test but the NAS report concludes that such a test could only marginally increase the great threat they already pose. New, aspiring nuclear powers would be less likely to derive technical benefits from a test small enough to hide, and they would be far less skilled at keeping it hidden.
Still, successful cheating could be harmful to U.S. interests. But compared with what? The only realistic alternative to living with the risk that parties to the CTBT will cheat at a low, undetectable yield is living in a world without the treaty the world we inhabit today. In that world, India, Pakistan and North Korea can test at whatever explosive yield they like, as they have done. Iran's nuclear ambitions deeply threaten the stability of the Middle East, but with the CTBT in force an Iranian nuclear explosion would risk even greater international condemnation than it does today. And testing begets testing: the anxiety among the nonnuclear neighbors of a testing state makes the pressure for the neighbors to "go nuclear" almost irresistible. Such proliferation is far more dangerous to the U.S. not to mention the countries directly involved than the worst-case risk of putting the CTBT in force.
----
I'm an outsider and I was directed to your blog by a professor who was demonstrating the waste in government-sponsored research. He was pointing out that this was a redundant and unproductive operation that consumed billions of dollars in research with no useful patents or products, He further pointed out that the individual productivity at Los Alamos, measured in reviewed publications was negligible in both number and citations at a cost of nearly a half million dollars per researcher. The town of Los Alamos, he said further, was the wealthiest in the nation!
Scientific research is one factor in what makes our country great and this coming recession/depression is making it impossible for the latest generation of PhD graduates to find employment. I beg you all, for the sake of our nation's future, to consider a noble act. You must renounce the acceptance of funds for programs that you know are unproductive - for the sake of science!
Have you noticed how lately any and all kinds of events and nonevents are getting blown out of proportion in the national media? Three $400 old laptops stolen from a scientist's home -- why, let's hold congressional hearing about that, no less. Imperfect book-keeping? Let's shut the damn T-55 down!
The last time there was such histeria in the press was in the run-up to the contract change. Somebody needed to make UC look really bad. Does this latest stream of bad publicity indicate another change coming? Who'll get to "manage" us next? Waste Management?
Just wondering ...
D. Brian and P. Stockton (couple) have got the lab down, now they can go for the juggler and end it once and for all. Any idea why they hate LANL worse, than any of their other crusades? They never learned their lesson, on journalistic accountability, remember Tommy Lee Hook? Wait, they aren't journalists, they're 'investigators - as long as anti-lab insiders are leaking information so they have a story.
This is just one more reason why the DOE and NNSA have zero credibility. Both should be dismantled. Just save the taxpayer the money and be done with it!
Opps! There goes another "Best & Brightest" straight out the front door of LANL...
===================
Los Alamos Labs’ Top Engineer Joins NuScale Power as COO
February 20, 2009 06:54 PM
CORVALLIS, Ore.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Tom Marcille has joined NuScale Power, Inc. as Chief Operating Officer. Tom will lead NuScale efforts to complete the NuScale design and prepare a Design Certification Application to be submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the end of 2010.
Marcille joins NuScale from Los Alamos National Laboratory where he was chief engineer for advanced reactors. There his responsibilities included development management, and execution of terrestrial and special purpose reactor programs.
Prior to that he spent 20 years as a contributing, managing and principal engineer in GE's advanced and terrestrial BWR business units.
"Tom Marcille brings both management and technical depth as well as significant nuclear experience to the NuScale management team,” said Paul Lorenzini, Chief Executive Officer. “We are delighted that he shares our vision and are excited about the energy he will bring as we take the NuScale product to market."
Marcille said he sees the “NuScale design as disruptive technology.” “NuScale offers an innovative way of deploying nuclear power on a large scale,” said Marcille. “The technology combined with the top down design approach for licensing and constructability, teamed with Kiewit Power Constructors – a turnkey, NQA-1 constructor engineer – as partner, makes this a truly unique and compelling opportunity."
Marcille is the author or co-author of some 20 papers and contributed articles. He is a graduate of the University of Florida with degrees in physics and nuclear engineering.
================
Thomas Marcille, LANL Biography
Tom Marcille is the project leader at Los Alamos National Laboratory for Space and Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) reactor systems, including reactor design, space fuel development and manufacturing and critical physics experimentation. He has 15+ years of experience in space reactor design, lattice physics, cross-section application (GE), SP-100 core design, flight shield design and optimization (GE), and JIMO (Lockheed Martin and LANL). He has significant experience in both fast reactor and thermal reactor design. Mr. Marcille was the principal engineer at GE Nuclear Energy for the Global Nuclear Fuel operation and was responsible for all Monte Carlo and deterministic transport methods, as well as all cross-section methodology and development tools/procedures.
2/28/09 3:25 PM,
I'm glad you're here and commenting. Now here is some additional data you should research and bring to your professor.
(1) What fraction of LANL's budget comes from "civilian" science programs and industrial partnerships, for which the correct productivity metrics are publications and patents/license agreements, respectively?
(2) What fraction of LANL's budget comes from nuclear weapons program activities? What is the appropriate metric for productivity in these programs?
(3) What fraction of LANL's budget comes from Nuclear Nonproliferation, and work for other government agencies, including the Intelligence Community and Homeland Security? What is the correct metric for productivity in these programs?
(4) What fraction of researchers' time at LANL do you think is consumed by efforts to prevent or mitigate the effects of unrelenting scrutiny from the press, anti-nuclear organizations (POGO, CCNS, NWNM etc), Congress, etc?
(5) What is the cost of the security systems that are required to safeguard nuclear materials and nuclear weapons information at Los Alamos? How does that compare to other research organizations and universities with higher per-capita tangible productivity (publications and patents)?
(6) What is the nature of the wealth in Los Alamos? Cash? Stocks? Real estate? Pension value? What is the median level of educational attainment in the county?
(7) What fraction of the residential real estate in Los Alamos county is valued at over $1M? Over $750K? What is the median age of the available housing? What is the median number of bathrooms in Los Alamos homes?
1:12 Quit using facts. It is confusing to the detractors.
"(3) What fraction of LANL's budget comes from Nuclear Nonproliferation, and work for other government agencies, including the Intelligence Community and Homeland Security? What is the correct metric for productivity in these programs?" (1:12 PM)
LANL is currently at 13% and rapidly falling in terms of non-DOE WFOs.
It was at 17% back in FY03 when Nanos became Director. Sandia currently does 37% of their work as non-DOE WFO projects. That's almost 3 times larger than LANL!
The only metric I can think of for this one is whether customers keep coming back. It appears they are fleeing, though this is probably due to: (a) the extreme FTE costs, (b) work stifling policies, and (c) the fact that in reality LANS doesn't really want to see WFO work at LANL.
They'll tell the local politicians whatever they want to hear on this matter.
Say, what? Tom Marcille was deeply involved with space reactor work? That sounds suspiciously like WFO activity to me. Probably contracts with NASA.
I told LANS upper managers to get rid of this WFO stuff. I guess we'll just need to re-double our efforts to kill it off. Yeah, I know, WFO has dropped from 17% in 2003 to 13% today, but that's not good enough. I want to see it down in the single digits before the end of FY2010. Sandia may have grown their WFO base to 37%, but we'll not be going down that path here at LANL. WFO only get lips service while LANS and this Director run the show.
What's it going to take to make these scientists at LANL finally give up and drop out? Terry, my boy, I want you to get right to work and have TR and ST Directorates set up a bunch of those time-sucking workshops to kill these people's productivity. Also, start banning all MS Word and Excel files. Oh, and set up a new LANS policy: All charge codes other than overhead accounts must be entered to the millisecond and any errors will be seen as fraud that will be prosecuted to the limit. And tell our CIO, Tom Harper, to start destroying all Emails that come into LANL on odd numbered days.
Clean-up activities and plant engineering... that's the future of LANL for future decades. The management of this stuff is easy and NNSA pays no matter what we do. In fact, they even pay us more when we do absolutely nothing! Imagine that! It's called Work Free Safety Zones and NNSA loves it. Sweet!
That's it for now, gotta go. My sports car is waiting out front and I've got to rush out of this ugly Sh*t Hole and get back to my home in Santa Fe.
Your truly,
Mikey
2/28/09 2:54 PM
Thanks for the link & interesting article on CTBT.
From my perspective, the conclusions drawn in the article are a bit overly confident as to the benefits to the U.S., e.g.:
“But wouldn't a ratified treaty that goes into force leave the U.S. and other countries that abided by it vulnerable to cheaters that clandestinely develop and test their nuclear capabilities? Isn't that reason to enough to reject the treaty? The answer may seem counterintuitive, but the CTBT would make the world a safer, more secure place for the U.S. than a world without the treaty.”
Safer, more secure – only if the CTBT is really effective over time. As for the U.S., while we’ve not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, we’ve conducted many more nuclear tests than any of the other nuclear states. Further, a National Academy of Sciences 2002 report concluded the “...ongoing stockpile stewardship program can maintain and verify the reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons without explosive testing.”
As for the future success of the CTBT, there's several issues to resolve prior to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Ratifying the CTBT after Iran tests its “Gadget” might make it a lost cause.
3:25 claims to be an outsider, yet posts as an anonymous. Why?
We, working at the laboratory, know what might be the cost to post with our names, but a student who just was forwarded by her/his professor to look at the waste at Los Alamos should not have such fears. My suspicion is it is a provocateur, who wants us to explode.
"If we know that something is missing, how is it that POGO can tell us the amount? My guess is that those who work at TA55 simply cannot add or subtract."
Not quite! But you can keep thinking what you want.
"The town of Los Alamos, he said further, was the wealthiest in the nation!"
Talk about the most misleading statistic of all-time.
Now pardon me while I go remind the valet to wax the Rolls so I can take the wife shopping for a little something at Tiffany's tomorrow. We're celebrating the one-month anniversary of our newest yacht, what ho!
2/28/09 3:25 PM
Ask your professor when the last time he, his children, or grandchildren had to practice "duck and cover" at school. Ask him when the last time a foreign nation tried to establish an advanced base for nuclear missiles on an island just off our shores. Ask him if he has any inkling of just why the wall came down. Our product is Nuclear Deterence. It gives real meaning to National Security. It has infinitely greater value to this nation than all of the trivial papers and patents bursting the seams of our libraries.
"Our product is Nuclear Deterence. It gives real meaning to National Security. It has infinitely greater value to this nation than all of the trivial papers and patents bursting the seams of our libraries."
Yeah, but not to hear the LDRD brigade talk about it. So how about you actually do this 'deterrence' thing, unless you mean losing a kilo of Pu is deterring something.
People like 6:20 will ruin this place to the ground.
3/1/09 6:20 PM
Don't bother with the post from
"2/28/09 3:25 PM". He is not an outsider and there is no professor. This poster tried the same BS trick before. Read it again and it will be obvious that it is our old friend Mr Ass Troll. Of course you may also know him as Chrissy the nutcase.
The last, anonymous (12:32) blogger seems to have little to add but expletives. He did, however, direct us to the comment that seemed to upset him. I thought that 3:25's points were good ones but that LANL might be important just for contributions to the national defense. Can anyone make the argument that the two weapons labs are not redundant? Is LLNL better at patents and research? Who has been chosen to develop the latest weapons?
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