What Are LANS and NNSA Trying to Cover Up?

Something to while away the time while waiting for the other FY'08 shoe to drop.

Yesterday was the first time I'd ever actually read anything of POGO's, and even my jaded expectations regarding LANL management, DOE, and NNSA were mildly shocked. This excerpt from the first document referenced in Sunday's POGO post is actually a bit of an eye-opener, even by LANL standards. The document was discussing the reasons for repeated cyber-security violations at LANL. Down towards the bottom this little bit caught my attention:

Two fundamental flaws allow these security breaches to continue. The first, the Department of Energy’s new policy implemented at Los Alamos allows the contractor to investigate itself where there is a security breach or safety violation. Clearly this policy needs to be reconsidered. The second flaw is Title 32 of the National Nuclear Security Administration which seriously limits the Office of Independent Oversight’s access to NNSA sites. The NNSA Act mandates that investigators for DOE must wait for an invitation from NNSA before being allowed to investigate.

I mean, really: what are NNSA and LANS trying to cover up at LANL? LANS is allowed to investigate itself? DOE cannot, unless specifically invited to by NNSA?

Wow.

Finally, one other observation regarding POGO. I've noticed how fashionable it is for LANL staff to bash the crap out of POGO each time LANL gets mentioned by them following a LANL screw-up. In fact, I had begun to wonder if I was the only one who thought the general POGO condemnations that spouted from lanl.gov at each new POGO posting weren't just a little too shrill. A comment from yesterday's post seems to be voicing that same question:

Once again we demonstrate why we have so many enemies in Congress and elsewhere. POGO is the messenger, and while we may hate the messenger, the message is valid nonetheless. Like the whistleblower's society is so adept at punishing, we're now venting on the messenger (once again), while ignoring the message. It can not be denied my dear colleagues that these incidents occurred. Furthermore, it's highly unlikely, knowing the nature of Lab leadership, that what we’ve being told by Lab management over the years is even remotely reflective of the truth. Perhaps this is why outside forces feel a need to intervene because, as in the case of the proverbial iceberg, we're probably only being allowed by the officers of our ship to see the tip of the problem. And perhaps that’s why then, we react so harshly to those from the outside that tell us the problem is greater than we’re being led to believe by our leadership. In my view, at this juncture (and we may not like this view but, I pose it nonetheless) the DOE is the only entity that can truly fix the problem at the Lab and, in this case, the problem does very much start at the top (as with most institutional problems) with management. But since the DOE revolving door has provided much of that leadership, it remains now to be seen whether Congress can force the DOE to fix the problem it (the DOE) itself has created.

A bit wordy, perhaps, but it still makes a good point.

--Gussie