Mar 3, 2009

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: NNSA and DOD Need to More Effectively Manage the Stockpile Life Extension Program

New GAO report released.

Results in Brief
NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks for either the B61 or W76 life extension program. Regarding the B61 program, although NNSA completed the refurbishment of the B61 bombs on schedule in November 2008, the refurbished weapons do not meet all refurbishment objectives. According to DOD and NNSA laboratory and production plant officials, NNSA established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase 6.X process. To meet an aggressive production schedule, NNSA adopted a modified Phase 6.X process that compressed and overlapped the development and production engineering phases, leaving little time to develop and manufacture critical materials and evaluate test results before full-scale production. In addition, NNSA did not include any cost or schedule contingencies in its baseline to address unforeseen technical challenges. NNSA assumed that it would not need time for development and production engineering because it would reuse, rather than manufacture, critical materials. Before fully determining whether a critical material could be reused for the B61 bomb, NNSA developed a production schedule with fixed delivery dates. However, after additional tests showed that NNSA could not reuse this material, NNSA decided to develop an alternative material, which led to an $11 million cost overrun. When NNSA was unable to produce this substitute, it faced significant schedule delays and additional cost overruns.

NNSA was able to meet its refurbishment schedule and avoid significant cost overruns for the B61 bomb only because (1) some of the refurbishment objectives changed, thereby allowing NNSA to use the original material in the weapon design, (2) tactical B61 bombs that were decommissioned had material that NNSA could use, and (3) the Nuclear Weapons Council significantly reduced the number of B61 bombs in the stockpile and thus the number that NNSA had to refurbish. Even though these events allowed NNSA to meet its schedule, it refurbished less than one-third of the weapons in the original baseline for almost twice the unit cost. The cost of manufacturing each B61 bomb almost doubled. Furthermore, the refurbished B61 bombs still do not meet all of the refurbishment objectives.

Many of the B61 refurbishment problems might have been avoided if DOD had fulfilled its roles and responsibilities in overseeing NNSA’s life extension program activities. First, STRATCOM did not comprehensively review military requirements for the B61 bomb before NNSA started refurbishment activities, which might have avoided unnecessary testing and manufacturing of the alternative material. Second, the Air Force did not adequately review NNSA’s design, engineering, and testing activities—a review that would have alerted DOD that NNSA was not meeting all refurbishment objectives. According to Air Force officials, the Lead Project Officer failed to provide the necessary oversight and alert the Air Force to changes in testing that NNSA conducted of refurbished B61 bombs.

Regarding the W76 warhead, NNSA did not effectively manage one of the highest risks of the program—the manufacture of a key material known as Fogbank—resulting in $69 million in cost overruns and a schedule delay of at least 1 year that presented significant logistical challenges for the Navy. Recognizing that the manufacture of Fogbank was one of the highest risks to the program and that it lacked the knowledge, expertise, and facilities to manufacture Fogbank, NNSA developed a risk mitigation strategy. This strategy included three primary components: (1) build a new Fogbank production facility early enough to allow time to resolve any manufacturing problems before starting full production; (2) use the existing pilot plant to test the Fogbank manufacturing process while the new facility was under construction; and (3) consider the development of an alternate material for Fogbank. However, NNSA started operations of the new facility about 1 year late because the schedule for constructing the new facility was unrealistic, disagreements on the implementation of safety guidelines emerged, and the W76 program manager lacked authority to manage the construction schedule. In addition, NNSA did not use the pilot plant as planned, missing opportunities to improve the manufacturing process before full-scale production began. Finally, NNSA did not develop an alternate material that was less costly and easier to produce than Fogbank until a late stage. If NNSA had effectively implemented its risk management strategy, schedule delays and cost increases might have been avoided. Compounding these problems, NNSA did not have a consistent approach for developing a cost baseline for the W76 life extension program. The lack of a consistent baseline approach with similar cost assumptions and criteria makes it difficult to know the actual cost of refurbishing nuclear bombs and warheads and to track the costs of the program over time.

To improve the management of the stockpile life extension program, in our classified January 2009 report, we recommended, among other things, that the Administrator of NNSA direct the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to develop a realistic schedule for the W76 and future life extension programs. This schedule should allow NNSA to (1) address technical challenges while meeting all military requirements; (2) build in time for unexpected technical challenges that may delay the program; (3) assess the cost and include funding in the baseline for risk mitigation activities that address the highest risks to the W76 and future life extension programs; and (4) before beginning a life extension program, assess the risks, costs, and scheduling needs for each military requirement established by DOD.

To improve DOD’s oversight over NNSA’s life extension activities and ensure that refurbished weapons meet all military requirements, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct (1) STRATCOM and the Secretary of the responsible service to comprehensively review military requirements for a weapons system before beginning a life extension program and work with NNSA to assess the cost and schedule implications for meeting each military requirement, and (2) the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy to ensure that the respective Lead Project Officers have the technical and managerial expertise and resources to review NNSA’s progress and technical challenges throughout the life extension program.

We provided a draft of our classified report to NNSA and DOD for their review and comment. As discussed in our classified report, NNSA agreed with our recommendations and plans to take a number of steps to implement them. DOD partially agreed with our recommendations. DOD agreed with our two recommendations directed at the department, but asked us to make modifications to the language of the recommendations to better target the responsible service or agency that has authority to implement them. We made the requested changes. NNSA and DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.

[Download the full report here.]

24 comments:

Anonymous said...

The story leads off with "NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks ... NNSA established an unrealistic schedule and failed to fully implement its Phase 6.X process. To meet an aggressive production schedule, NNSA adopted a modified Phase 6.X process that compressed and overlapped the development and production engineering phases, leaving little time to develop and manufacture critical materials and evaluate test results before full-scale production. In addition, NNSA did not include any cost or schedule contingencies in its baseline to address unforeseen technical challenges."

Is it just me or is LANL (and through guilt by association, LANS, NNSA and perhaps even DOE) now just about compliance and not science? The dysfunction of just about every level of (mis)management is killing science, with this article being just another example. We have hordes of program managers, schedulers, budget analysts and other bean-counting types and if comments here are to be believed, more and more scientists heading out the door monthly. What is the point of keeping LANL if there is little to no science left for the managers to manage?

Anonymous said...

This is certainly aweful, but it should not affect my bonus, right?

MIKEY

Anonymous said...

"NNSA and DOD have not effectively managed cost, schedule, and technical risks ..."

What do you expect from D students?

Anonymous said...

In the immortal words of Private First Class Gomer Pyle, "Surprise, surprise, surprise!"

Anonymous said...

"What is the point of keeping LANL if there is little to no science left for the managers to manage?"

Re-build weapons. Duh.

Anonymous said...

Yawn.... The GAO expressed these same concerns in a letter to the Committee on Armed Services of both the House & Senate on December 7, 2001.

I'm sure the NNSA will give GAO its usual response to this criticism ...We're really thin and need more $$$ to do the job correct.

At times, I really think GAO is producing these reports as a basis for NNSA to get more $$$ from Congress.

NNSA didn't screw up - they just didn't have enough $$$ :(

Anonymous said...

"Obama says that his administration will stop outsourcing to private contractors many services that should be performed by government employees."

LOL - This ought to fix the problem!

Anonymous said...

"Obama says that his administration will stop outsourcing to private contractors many services that should be performed by government employees."

Just another excuse to hire more government employees from among the D students of the nation's worst colleges!

Anonymous said...

Bravo, in a jiffy of just two days Frank and Doug did produce a new top post.

That was sarcastic and I couldn't resist.

Mikey, Terry, Mary, Susan (damn, I don't know who I am today, but I am not anonymous!)

Anonymous said...

"What is the point of keeping LANL if there is little to no science left for the managers to manage?" - 2:01 AM


You haven't figured that one out by now?

LANL, in truth, is no longer a National Lab. It is slowly being turned into something more akin to a "facility" rather than a lab.

LANS will keep a very small coterie of scientists who live off the new (lower) 4% LDRD overhead rates, while the rest of the science is slowly pushed out the front door due to high costs, stagnating policies and massive overhead.

That's the future, and it's the future that LANS (Bechtel) and NNSA want to see implemented at this "lab".

Don't listen to their words.

Watch their actions.

Anonymous said...

"Obama says that his administration will stop outsourcing to private contractors many services that should be performed by government employees."
7:58 "LOL - This ought to fix the problem!"

You apparently prefer LANS, right?

8:47 "Just another excuse to hire more government employees from among the D students of the nation's worst colleges!"

Like Steven Chu?

Anonymous said...

"What is the point of keeping LANL if there is little to no science left for the managers to manage?" - 2:01 AM

Cashflow, baby, cashflow.

Anonymous said...

"Cashflow, baby, cashflow."

You called it. Bechtel is just as happy to manage a bunch of people who do nothing but paperwork. NM politicians are happy if the money comes in and nothing is done. The money flows either way. The more paperwork there is, the less risk there is -- to Bechtel. The interests of the nation, well, that's another issue entirely.

Anonymous said...

"You apparently prefer LANS, right?"

Feds or LANS...poor choice either way.

Anonymous said...

"You apparently prefer LANS, right?" 3/4/09 2:29 PM

And you apparently prefer the U.S. Postal Service, right?

Anonymous said...

"Bechtel is just as happy to manage a bunch of people who do nothing but paperwork. NM politicians are happy if the money comes in and nothing is done." (11:19 PM)


Were truer words about this present situation ever spoken? You nailed it, 11:19 PM. You nailed it good!

And this is exactly why the status quo will hold fast, no matter what the damage to morale and science at both LANL and LLNL. Hey, let's do some more studies and waste a couple of more years down this rotten road of decline.

Anonymous said...

Hey, let's do some more studies and waste a couple of more years down this rotten road of decline.

3/5/09 11:37 AM


You obviously haven't been spending enough time outside the front doors of the NSSB building reading the inspirational quotes my LANS team have produced for the electronic marquee board. If you had, you wouldn't be so soured on this lab's future!

- Mikey

Anonymous said...

"And you apparently prefer the U.S. Postal Service, right?"

Yes, I do. It is inexpensive, efficient, and a credit to the nation. The USPS is provided for in the US constitution.

Anonymous said...

"And you apparently prefer the U.S. Postal Service, right?"

To LANS? sure..

Anonymous said...

What ever happened to Terry's idea of having the USPS build the new Science Complex for our "best and brightest" researchers at LANL?

Last I heard, it was being farmed out to some venture capital firm. With the current recession, are plans for building the Science Complex still going forward? It seems to have dropped off the radar of late.

Anonymous said...

3/4/09 2:01 AM, if this bothers you, you will have a really hard time adjusting to management by DoD.

Anonymous said...

From inside I know this debacle lays squarely on LANS. While LANS attempted to portray the W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP) as a huge success it was an absolute failure. W-Division and Group leadership failed to accomplish the refurbishment on time and within budget. Come on, LANS leads the Production Realization Teams (PRTs) on the LEPs and yet they come-up trying to blame the Production Plants and NNSA for the failures. LANS turned the reigns over James Owen, Joe Baehr, and John Benner on the W76-1 LEP who lacked experience and leadership to lead this effort. Owen in particular is an indecisive snake just trying to promote his career. I am appalled that these junior "snot nose" so called "engineers" are still in their current jobs. These guys have literally run the weapon programs into the ground, not to mentioned the many engineers these guys have destroyed during the past 10-years. Owen and Benner will soon realize they are only being used and will also be thrown-out once LANS is done with them.

Anonymous said...

3/7/09 6:54 PM, Just curious - who would you have put in charge?

Anonymous said...

The one issue that the report fails to report on is the expertise that have been lost during the past few years. Let us not forget the engineers that have been released or left W-Division and the system they supported:

Joe Bowden (W78), Fred Bryant (W76), Keith Axler (B53, W76), Mike Garcia (W76), Manny Martinez (B61), Mercedes Castello (Gas Transfer Systems), Vince Trujillo (B61), Ray Valicenti (W88), Brain Smith (W88), Kevin Smale (W88), Art Salgado (Weapon Quality), Kay Matsumoto (Weapon Analysis), Zana Konecni (Weapon Analysis), Rick Hinkley (B61), Rick Romero (Weapon Quality), Rick Larson (Military Liason), Lloyd Montoya (B61), Bob Oakagawa (Gas Transfer Systems), Ron Barber (B61, W88), Tom Spatz (W88).

That almost 500-years of collective weapon engineering expertise that LANS threw out the door. Not only is LANS killing science, but they are killing the Weapon Program!