'Minute' Radiation Released
By Raam Wong
Journal Staff Writer
A "minute" amount of radiation was released inside a Los Alamos National Laboratory building last Wednesday after equipment malfunctioned, according to officials.
But nasal swipes taken on a few employees working in the area turned up negative for radiation exposure, lab spokesman Kevin Roark said Tuesday.
The building, a chemistry lab in Technical Area 48, was evacuated after air monitors detected germanium-68. The radioactive isotope is used in medical procedures such as MRIs.
The incident was not reported to the National Nuclear Security Administration or the state Environment Department because it did not rise to the level of a reportable incident, Roark said.
James Bearzi, head of the Environment Department's Hazardous Waste Bureau, confirmed that Los Alamos was not obligated to report the incident.
Parts of the building were closed after the incident and probably will reopen this week, Roark said.
"All the safety systems worked exactly as designed," Roark said. The incident occurred late in the day inside a "hot cell"— a shielded room in which radioactive material is manipulated using robotic arms.
Hot cells are typically employed to work with radioactive isotopes like germanium-68, which is used in medical imaging.
Roark said a circuit breaker malfunctioned and switched off a compressor, causing the hot cell to lose negative pressure and a tiny amount of germanium to escape.
None of the workers was contaminated, and surface swipes showed no residual contamination, the spokesman said.
Journal staff writer John Fleck contributed to this story
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37 comments:
Oh my god... Now Kevin Roark and the Albuquerque Journal have been sucked into the hoax, too!
Ok,
Since I personally had a couple of people contact me to indicate that this incident represented large exposures to staff, and that the direct management chain was actively covering up certain aspects of the event, I'd like to know the following:
* Who got exposed; how much? And,
* Who is doing the covering up; what is being covered up?
A lack of acceptable, creditable answers will cause me to conclude what most of the reputable journalists have already decided: that one should give not much credence to wild claims that were made on an anonymous LANL blog.
-Gus
Why weren't nasal swipes taken on everyone in the area?
What model CAM can detect the presence of germanium-68?
How much is a "minute" amount?
"The incident was not reported to the National Nuclear Security Administration ... , Roark said."
That contradicts some of the first comments here.
JC, I've never seen such a group of paranoid people!
So why did it take LANS a week to come up with this story?
Because they can.
Wow, this was the super major contamination incident. I thought I saw black helicopters out and around the last few days. In fact, I bet Trinity was actually closed down early Monday morning as part of this nefarious cover-up. Thank God this blog is around to save us!
Yes, and Mitchell was probably involved in the coverup, with his latest laptop powered by Germanium dust.
Anyone who takes unsubstantiated material on here seriously has probably watched too much X-Files and has lost the ability to separate plausible fact from probable fiction.
Because they can.
POGO Paranoia at its best!!!
Who said anything about a CAM detecting Ge-68?
7:38 pm - nobody official did, but people who work in the bldg where the hotcells are located do. There was a briefing on Tuesday morning regarding what happened.
So the salient questions are - if this "incident" was so small that no report to NNSA was required or made, 1) why did it take so long for LANS to speak up, and 2) why were so many residents of TA-48 so spun up and so in-the-dark about this? Was this a PR screwup, or a real screwup, still being covered up?
"that one should give not much credence to wild claims that were made on an anonymous LANL blog."
Took you long enough.
The only claims made were of silence and coverup. What's changed?
The lady doth protest too much, methinks.
Why wait until the Albuquerque Journal calls to explain these events to the workers who were obviously concerned about their own health and safety?
By keeping this event quiet, LANS has further eroded what little credibility they have left.
1/31/08 8:34 AM get a grip. It was a small incident and didn't require earth shaking action. Did you miss this post?
1/30/08 7:49 PM said:
7:38 pm - nobody official did, but people who work in the bldg where the hotcells are located do. There was a briefing on Tuesday morning regarding what happened.
No earth shaking action required at all. An employee tips off the blog and a string of frantic denials follows. A week later LANS admits it never notified the NNSA. Any further questions?
String of frantic denials? What planet are you on? Last I saw, someone "tipped off the blog", and nothing but a sequence of rumors and grand speculation and conspiracy-theorizing occurred by a bunch of anonymous blog readers.
1/31 9:26 am
The alarms went off when? On the 23rd. The briefing was when? The 29th. Everyone left to wonder what the hell was happening for what, 6 days?
And since when is a measureable air contamination event outside the hot lab not reportable?
If it wasn't for this blog, this event, however large or small, wouldn't have been known to the Albuquerque Journal and LANS wouldn't have been forced to admit that they did not report it.
12:26 pm: "...LANS wouldn't have been forced to admit that they did not report it."
What? "Forced to admit"?? Read the story again - there was no REQUIREMENT to report it to either NNSA or NMED.
And since when is a measureable air contamination event outside the hot lab not reportable?
LANS wouldn't have been forced to admit that they did not report it.
===============
If the release is small enough - within
federal limits - it is NOT reportable.
In this case, it appears the release
was not reportable; so LANS is not
in any type of trouble for not
reporting.
Below limits; the Feds don't want to
hear about it.
So the lab wasn't obliged to report it, a bunch of blog people feel not reporting something that isn't necessary to report constitutes a coverup, and that's that.
...and there was no CAM detection of Ge-68.
Providing everything was as has been described by the Lab. Obviously, Gus and Pinky's early "sources" either had differnt information, or a different agenda.
5:34 pm. WHat you forget is that originally people were claiming that there was no incident - and that the inicial report was hoax. Well, there was an incident. The delay in reporting anything is because managers were scared that there were workers who had uptake. Fotunately on Monday last worker's in vivo was found clear. Thank good ness. I love the people who keep trying to minimize. Parts of facility was shut down and hotcells still not up 100%, but this was all hoax.
4:45 PM ... yeah, but for 6 days, the management was shitting their pants waiting for the tests on the workers to come back. I think that is the point.
Q: Why did LANL report a non-issue to the Albuquerque Journal?
A: Because blog posters drew attention to the incident.
Q: Why did blog posters do this?
A: Because TA-48 management refused to tell workers why they were being thrown out of their facility for two days.
Q: Why was a loss of negative pressure in a hot cell facility, that resulted in CAM alarms going off and potential uptake by three employees, not reportable to DOE?
A: Because the ventilation system that maintains negative pressure is not categorized as a "safety significant system."
Q: Why is a ventilation system that protects workers from exposure to high levels of beta/gamma activity not categorized as a safety significant system?
A: Hmm. Can I get back to you on that one?
Finally 100 posts later a fact.
"Q: Why is a ventilation system that protects workers from exposure to high levels of beta/gamma activity not categorized as a safety significant system?"
Because the confinement barriers (walls, etc.) provide the primary worker protection (passive confinement). The active system (ventilation system) provides lesser protection, so is probably categorized at less than safety significant. Just my guess w/o knowing the particulars of RC-1's safety analysis.
Can you trust working for management that stone-walls a contamination incident and doesn't fully inform workers what they might have been exposed to until they know their ass is in the clear? Think about this question long and hard. Your life may depend on it some day.
What do you expect from all the cronyism, starting with the ADCLES AD all the way down to the new program manager...
5:11 PM - what do you mean? Can you elaborate?
A post under another story:
CLES AD- line manager for RC-1 and hot cell facility.
CLES AD's hubby is the National Medical Isotope Program Manager. Most work done in RC-1 hot cells facility.
Chem DL is the former Rad Isotope Program Manager
CLES's former postdoc and longtime running buddy (traithalon training partner?) is new Medical Isotope Program Manager under CLES' hubby.
This program wreaks cronyism and neptosim.
2/3 10:20 pm:
"This program wreaks cronyism and neptosim."
Ha! Pun probably unintended, but very funny nonetheless!
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